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Abstract
This is a study of United States' policy towards 
South Africa between 1976 and 1986, the important period 
in the history of their relationship. It sets out to
explain that there had never been a basic shift in
successive U.S. policies towards the Republic. The driving 
force behind the Ford, Carter and Reagan doctrines towards 
Southern Africa, with focus on South Africa, had been
to secure the U.S. national interests economic and
military/strategic. These policies, however, were based
on belief of negotiated settlement to achieve majority 
rule in the region, and were critical of the apartheid 
system in South Africa.
Throughout the period under discussion, South Africa 
has never remained important in U.S. policy planning, 
except the period of the mid 1980s, when it attracted 
the attention of high-level policy-makers, including the 
President and the Congress. It was during this time that 
the Republic appeared as a major political issue of U.S. 
domestic constituencies and on foreign policy agenda. 
It was partly because of the well publicized crisis in 
South Africa, and partly because of the Reagan 
administration's attitude towards the anti-apartheid
groups. The combination of these factors had led the defeat 
of the Reagan administration's policy of constructive 
engagement and the implementation of the Comprehensive 
Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 in which Congress, under public 
pressure, deviced its policy towards South Africa.
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INTRODUCTION
The thesis describe and evaluates the main
developments in ralations between the United States and 
South Africa between the period 1976 and 1986. This is 
not an attempt to promote the policy of a particular 
administration in the White House, but has been done from 
an impartial point of view. It reviews the measures adopted 
by the successive administrations under discussion from 
condemnation of apartheid to maintaining of free access 
to South Africa's strategic minerals, to pursue South
Africa, in one way or another, to abide by the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, and to gain Pretoria's 
cooperation in getting the Rhodesian and Namibian issues 
settled. The Successive policies therefore were pursued 
in the regional context of Southern Africa, with main 
focus concentrated on South Africa, because of its 
geo-strategic location, its mineral wealth, and its 
anti-Communist posture. It will also examine how South 
African policy reached at top of the U.S.-Africa policy 
agenda. In dealing with this, the role of other actors 
in play, such as Congress and public opinion will be
analysed in shaping the course of South African policy 
the way it took in 1986.
In addition, the objective in this study is also 
to trace the policy-making process in Washington, i.e
the role played by various Executive departments and 
agencies interested and involved in South Africa policy­
making during the period under discussion.
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Conceptual Framework
The analysis of U.S. foreign policy has tended to 
be dominated by two schools: the power school (realists);
and the decision-making school. The power or realist school 
is headed by thinkers, such as Hans J .Morgenthau, Raymond 
Aron, George Kennan, and Henry Kissinger. The realist 
theory of state behaviour was built on what Morgenthau 
described as power politics: "international politics,
like all politics is a struggle for power..........statesmen
think and act in terms of interest defined as power."(1) 
In other words, "the choices that policy-makers make [are] 
shaped by strategic calculations of power, not by domestic 
politics or the process of policy-making itself."(2)
The decision-making approach to foreign policy, 
which started flourishing in the 1950s marked the start
of a shift away from traditional approaches which looked 
to the state as a static unit of analysis, in part
inspired by the behaviouralist movement in the study of 
politics.(3) As opposed to realist thinkers, the "foreign 
policy decision-making scholars view the nation state 
as a primary, but not necessarily the sole arena in which 
foreign policy decisions are made."(4) This model 
"represents that area of governmental action where domestic 
and foreign policy interests intermesh."(5) They 
concentrate "on the behaviour of those who make decisions
on behalf of the state,"(6) which is " . influenced
by several elements, [such as] perception, cognition,
9
memory, choice, and management."(7)
The decision-making approach which is "the most 
frequently used approach to the study of U.S. foreign 
policy",(8) has however tended to draw on two different 
conceptual frameworks: the psychological-perceptual; and
the organizational-bureaucratic. The pioneering work on 
psychological factors in foreign policy decision-making 
was published in 1962 by Snyder, Bruclc, and Sapin. Snyder 
et al.'s central argument is that in order to understand 
the state’s behaviour one must study its "official 
decision-makers". It is therefore necessary to focus on 
the elements that influence those official decision-makers 
in the formulation of foreign policy. The internal and 
external factors discussed as determinants of action 
in the system were summed up by Snyder and his colleagues 
as "spheres of competence", "communication and 
information", and "motivation". Sphere of competence are 
the activities of the decision-maker necessary to the 
achievement of the unit’s objectives. Communication and 
information include meanings, values, and preferences. 
Whereas "motivations" are "a component of action", which 
embraces psychological, personality, perception, and value 
factors that influence the decision-makers, enter the 
process, and affect its outcome. In sum, the authors 
placed their emphasis on the psychological environment 
which influence the decision-makers.(9) "The cornerstone 
of the school" in the opinion of Bahgat Kornay and his 
colleagues "is the preposition that decision-makers
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respond not to the real world but their perceptions and 
images of the world, which may or may not be accurate 
representations of the world reality."(10)
The intellectual evolution of the bureaucratic 
politics of foreign policy decision-making traces its 
roots to the theoretical work on bureaucracies by the 
German sociologist and political economist Max Weber 
(1864-1920).(11 ) In the post-World II era, this model 
has been further developed and refined since the 1970s
by scholars, such as Graham T.Allison and Morton
H .Halperin,(12) This framework concentrates on the 
internal politics of bureaucracy on the one hand, and
the bargaining that usually takes place among them in 
decision-making, on the other.(13) The
bureaucratic-organizational framework has not only enlarged 
the arena of the decision-making school to include the
role of domestic bureaucratic politics in foreign 
policy-making, but has refused to see decision-making 
as a set of delibrate choices made by an individual, even 
the president or his top aide. State action is not a
delibrate choice rational or otherwise but an
outcome.(14)
In his book 'Essence of Decision', Graham Allison 
outlined three conceptual models to explain the 
decision-making process that was employed to reach one
decision the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962.
Model I is the "rational actor" drawn as by advocates 
of the power school. His Model II is the "orga~nizational
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process". According to this model different organizations 
within the government which are involved in foreign policy 
-making process, act according to their respective 
organizational pressures. Therefore, these constraints 
limit the options of the decision-maker, and the decision 
comes as a result of debate amongst them. Allison's third 
conceptual Model is the "bureaucratic politics" model. 
He put his emphasis on this model, within which he defines 
that "foreign policies are the result of bargaining among 
[various] components of bureaucracy."(15 ) Allison argues 
that the "rational actor" model cannot by itself explain 
foreign policy as has been claimed by the advocates of 
the power school. "There is powerful evidence" said Allison 
"that it must be supplemented by a frame of reference 
that focus on the governmental machine,"(16)
Unlike Model I, the bureaucratic politics model 
identifies no unitory actor (i.e national government) 
rather many actors as players in the game.(17) Allison's 
players according to this paradigm consist of: [1]
"Chiefs": the President, Secretaries of State, Defence,
Treasury, Director of the CIA, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
and special Assistant for National Security. [2] 
"Staffers": the immediate staff of each of the departments
and agencies, [3] "Indians": the political appointees
and permanent government officials within each of the 
departments and agencies. And, [4] "Adhoc Players": 
congressional influentials, members of press, and spokesmen 
for important groups. (18) When Graham Allison and Morton
12
Halperin collaborated in the early-1970s, the 
organizational process model ^ subsumed by the bureaucratic 
politics model.(19)
Morton Halperin defines the term bureaucracy as 
"civilian career officials and political appointees, as 
well as military forces."(20) According to Halperin, the 
civilian career officials are likely to have different 
set of guides from political appointees. The career 
officials usually support the interests of organizations 
in which they work. Whereas the interests of political 
appointees or "in-and-outers" are tied with the banking, 
legal, business, or academic communities, from which 
they been recruited and are likely to go back to their 
respective communities when the President leaves the White 
House.(21)
In 'Essence of Decision', Graham Allison has further
argued that the bureaucratic politics model, which focuses
on governmental machinery, could also be broadened by
including the role of other actors outside the bureaucracy
in foreign policy-making(22) i.e the U.S. Congress and
domestic interest/pressure groups. Thomas L.Brewer has
labelled the combination and involvement of all these
actors in foreign policy-making arena as the "pluralistic-
bureaucratic politics model." He observed:
 the traditional version of the pluralist
model focuses on Congress, the president, 
and interest group organizations. A recent 
extension of the pluralist model focuses 
on the executive branch bureaucracy, and 
it has been labelled the bureaucratic 
politics model.(23)
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These approaches to foreign policy analysis are 
by mo means the final or comprehensive answer. "These 
models could be applied to all countries to some degree, 
but none is applicable to every country under all 
circumstances."(24)
As has been discussed in the outset that most of 
the U.S. foreign policy actions are of non-crisis nature, 
therefore are decided through the bureaucratic politics 
in Washington. In the case of U.S. policy towards South
Africa a non-crisis situation though the core
approach in this study will be bureaucratic politics 
analysis, but "external environment" approach will also 
help in the explanation of the policy formulation process 
in this regard.
Although there is a rich literature that deals with 
various aspects of U.S. policy towards South Africa during 
this period, this study, however, is an attempt to provide 
some important insights regarding the involvement of, 
and relationship between major policy-making Executive 
departments, agencies and individuals towards South Africa. 
This analysis addresses the question of how competing 
departments and individuals had been struggling to assert 
their respective influence on South Africa policy-making 
process.
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Methodology
This research has drawn upon primary and secondary 
material ranging from interviews, government documents, 
to annual reports and speeches. This project is a case 
study of various aspects of U.S.-South Africa policy which 
involves individuals and organizations in the policy-making 
process. The best available method for researching these 
issues is to interview those persons who have been directly 
involved in this process. Interviews were conducted in 
Washington, D.C. with some of the former and current 
officials in the State, the Defence, and the Commerce 
Departments, on Capitol Hill, and some of the 
non-governmental observers interested in U.S.-South Africa 
policy. Most of the iterviews were open-ended aimed at 
uncovering the internal bureaucratic and departmental 
rivalries in the formation of South Africa policy. About 
60 people were considered for formal interview in the 
United States, of whom 26 agreed to be interviewed. The 
maximum time spent on an interview was about an hour, 
and most were tape recorded.
Following is the list of persons interviewed in 
the research:
Pauline H.Baker, Aspin Institute of Humanities, Washington, 
D.C., July 27, 1992.
Ambassador James K.Bishop Jr., U.S. Assistant Secretary 
of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 
Washington, D.C., July 31, 1992.
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Douglas Scott, Chief of Economic Modeling Branch, U.S. 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Washington,
D.C., July 31, 1992.
Nancy L ,Kassebaum, U.S. Senator, Washington, D.C., August 
3, 1992.
Peter R.Chaveas, Director Office of Southern African 
Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., August 
6, 1992.
Sally Miller, Director of Africa, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Washington, D.C., August 10, 1992.
Robert Cabelly, Regional Specialist Africa, Policy Planning 
Staff, U.S. Department of State, August 11, 1992.
Adwoa Dunn-Mouton, Staffer, U.S. Senator Paul Simon, 
Washington, D.C., August 12, 1992.
Larry Hall, Economic Analyst, U.S. Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), August 13, 1992.
Vincent D.Kern, Director Africa Region, International 
Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defence, Washington, 
D.C., August 17, 1992.
Witney Schneidman, former State Department official, 
Washington, D.C., August 18, 1992.
Robert B.Brauer, Special Counsel to Congressman Ronald 
V.Dellums, Washington, D.C., August 25, 1992.
Michael Mir Heydari, Foreign Minerals Specialist, Africa 
and the Middle East, U.S. Bureau of Mines and Minerals, 
Washington, D.C., August 26, 1992.
Jeffrey Davidow, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African 
Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington D.C,, August 
28, 1992.
Donald F. McHenry, former U.S. Ambassador to the United 
Ncvh'oris (1979-81), Washington, D.C., September 1 , 1992.
Amit A.Pandia, Counsel, Sub-Committee of International 
Operations, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of 
Representatives, Washington, D.C., September 4, 1992.
Professor I.William Zartman, School of Advanced 
International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, 
Washington, D.C,, September 10, 1992.
John W.Padan, Deputy Programme Director for International 
Activities, Office of International Activities and Marine 
Minerals, U.S. Department of Interior, Minerals Management 
Service, Washington, D.C., September 14, 1992.
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Mwiza Munthali, Information Specialist, TransAfrica, 
Washington, D.C., September 15, 1992.
Chester A.Crocker, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of 
State for African Affairs (1981-89), Department of State, 
Washington, D.C., September 15, 1992.
David King, Staffer, Congressman Howard Wolpe, Washington, 
D.C., September 17, 1992.
James S.Grichar, Senior Economist Office of Mobilization 
Preparedness, U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA), Washington, D.C., October 5, 1992.
Morton H.Halperin, Director, Centre for National Security 
Studies, Washington, D.C., October 6, 1992.
Herry Thompson, Under Secretary for Political Affairs,
U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., October 7,
1992.
Richard M.Moose, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State 
for African Affairs (1977-81), Department of State, 
Washington, D.C., October 7, 1992.
Scope
The time span covered by this thesis is from 1976 
through 1986. This has been selected because it is an 
important period in U.S.-South Africa relations. The 
starting point is the Ford-Kissinger administration's 
policy somersault towards Southern Africa in the wake 
of the emergence of two pro-Moscow governments in Angola 
and Mozambique on the world map, and protracted armed 
struggle between respective governments' forces and 
pro-Western factions. This also marked the beginning of 
the first U.S. coherent policy towards the region, which 
started attracting attention and interest of bureaucrats 
in various departments, and legislators on the Capitol 
Hill from both sides of the aisle.
In addition, throughout this period a consistent
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struggle on South Africa policy between the Executive, 
on the one hand, and the Legislature and interest group 
organizations, on the other, could also be found which, 
in fact is one of the few examples in U.S. foreign 
policy-making history.
The period is also peculiar because it ends at 
another turning event in U.S.-South Africa relations which 
marked the termination of the Reagan administration's 
policy of constructive engagement, on the one hand, and 
introduction of a policy devised by Congress, on the 
other.
Organization and Setting of the Thesis
The first two chapters deal with the overall 
structure of U.S. foreign policy-making, and the players 
involved in this arena. These chapters examine in detail 
the role of the President, the bureaucracy, the Congress, 
and pressure/interest group organizations in making of 
foreign policy, both in general and towards Africa as 
well.
The core of the research is the five case study 
chapters devided into two sections. The first section 
examines South Africa policy in the context of what might 
be called Cold War issues: strategic minerals, nuclear
relations, and the intelligence cooperation between both 
countries. Chapter 3, deals with the issue of four 
strategic minerals namely: chromium, manganese, platinum
group metals (pgm), and vanadium imported from South
18
Africa. The chapter examines the degree of U.S. 
’dependence’ on these minerals during the period under 
discussion. The minerals issue in this study is developed 
keeping the debate in this regard of last three decades 
in view in the United States, both within the Executive 
and the Legislative branches, and the academic world.
Chapter 4, 'U.S.-South Africa Nuclear Relations’
evaluates the extent of collaboration between both 
countries. The chapter is divided roughly into two 
sections: an era of cooperation, and an era of
non-cooperation on these issues. The period of nuclear 
cooperation between both countries ended during the mid 
1970s when the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) challenged 
the export of enriched uranium to South Africa in U.S. 
^court. The subsequent passage of the Non-Proliferation 
Act marked the beginning of an era of open confrontation 
between two countries on these issues.
The nuclear issue remained an important aspect of 
U.S.-South Africa relations during the first Reagan term 
until the promulgation of the Presidential Executive Order 
of September 1985 which among other things prohibited 
the sale of goods used for nuclear production to South 
Africa.
Chapter 5, ’U.S.-South Africa Defence and
Intelligence Cooperation’, presents the connection of 
covert activities and information sharing between the 
intelligence services of both countries. This cooperation, 
continued for more or less three decades from Truman
19
administration until the passage of the Comprehensive 
Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) which banned U.S. intelligence 
cooperation with South Africa. Their intelligence sharing 
had been focused on the Soviet and Communist related 
activities in the region, on the one hand, and against 
the black movements both inside and outside South Africa, 
on the other. The chapter also identifies the role of 
U.S. intelligence not only to influence South Africa 
policy, but to pursue its own policy as well, towards 
the Republic against the U.S. government policy. It became 
considerably active during the Reagan administration when 
covert actions were considered as basic part of a foreign 
policy not only to overthrow the Marxist regimes in Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America, but to support tyrant friendly 
governments like South Africa,
Chapter 6, suggests that it was the U.S. Congress, 
not the Executive branch, which "lit the candle" of the 
human rights issue in U.S. foreign policy. The chapter 
further analyses the factors of U.S. congressional and 
public pressure which brought the issue of human rights 
to the top of the U.S.-South Africa relations agenda during 
the mid-1980s. As a result of these pressures, the Reagan 
administration had to change the course of its policy 
towards the Republic.
Chapter 7 ’The Role of Sanctions in U.S.-South Africa 
Relations’, looks at the history of the sanctions movement 
in the United States. It examine the factors of the mid 
-1980s debate on sanctions which made South Africa a major
20
U.S. concern. The analysis of the mid-1980s includes the 
congressional consensus on sanctions issue on the one 
hand, and the Executive-Legislative tug-of-war on the 
other. In addition, the lack of presidential leadership 
and the bureaucratic friction in this matter made South 
Africa one of the major political issues of the Reagan 
administration.
As a result, Congress under public pressure, passed 
the CAAA in 1986 to imose sanctions against the Republic 
to undermine apartheid system. In addition, the Act also 
adopted some measures to help victims of apartheid in 
shape of scholarships, legal assistance, and human rights 
funds.
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CHAPTER I
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING: THE ROLE OF PRESIDENT AND
BUREAUCRACY
Introduction
The foreign policy decisions of the United States 
are the result of various inputs: public opinion, the
Congress, the federal bureaucracy, and the President. 
The foreign policy-making network in Washington, D.C.
is complex. "It's like a mix. It's like a seesaw", as
one senior official in the U.S. Commerce Department put
it.(l) The participants involved in the decision-making 
process see the issues from different angles and
perspectives, and compete to influence the decisions and 
actions of the government concerning foreign policy.(2)
This chapter will try to address the role of the
President, and the bureaucracy, [the Executive branch] 
in the making of U.S. foreign policy. It will also examine 
the degree of presidential and bureaucratic interest in
African issues. The role of public opinion and Congress
in the making of foreign policy will, however, be discussed
in the following chapter
1,1 Role of the President
Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. constitution 
designates the President as Commander-in-Chief of the
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Armed forces, assigns him to receive ambassadors, and
authorizes him to conclude treaties and appoint ambassadors 
to foreign countries. While the constitution does not 
specify any further foreign policy powers, two clauses 
in particular, the appointment of ambassadors and the 
negotiation of treaties have particularly been used to 
extend the role of the President in foreign affairs. 
America’s emergence from a long era of isolationism in 
the wake of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in 
December 1941, and its consequent rise as a global economic 
and military leader in the post-War period has led 
Ao cNgrowt, in presidential powers in foreign relations 
vis-a-vis the Legislative branch.(3)
To what extent are U.S. foreign policy decisions
made by the President and his principal advisers? Hundreds 
of foreign policy decisions are made in Washington every 
year. Only major issues of foreign policy reach the 
President or his top aides. The majority of decisions, 
therefore, emerge as a result of bureaucratic "pulling 
and hauling” and compromise.(4) According to President 
John Kennedy’s Special Counsel, Theodore Sorenson, 
President Dwight Eisenhower once told President Kennedy: 
"There are no easy matters that will come to you as
President. If they are easy, they will be settled at a
lower level." (5)
What are those ’major’ or 'difficult’ foreign policy 
issues which are decided by President and his top advisers? 
These are the issues which are important from the U.S.
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national security perspective, or which emerge during 
a crisis situation. These would include the Korean war 
decision (1950); the Cuban missile crisis (1962); the 
secret bombing of Cambodia and Laos (1970); the rescue 
mission of U.S. hostages in Iran (1980); the invasion 
of Grenada (1983); the air strikes against Libya (1986); 
the war against Iraq (1991). Almost all these issues 
or similar sorts of matters have been and are decided 
by very few people at the top of the administration, 
including the President himself.
These sort of foreign policy issues are by no means 
always decided unanimously. For example, during the Cuban 
missile crisis seventeen top advisers, as well as 
President Kennedy, were involved in deliberations. Eleven 
Presidential advisers, alongwith the President himself, 
favoured the blockade of Cuba. The other six advisers 
favoured surgical air strikes against the missile sites 
in Cuba.(6) The decision in favour of the secret bombing 
of Cambodia and Laos was made by President Nixon and his 
Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry 
Kissinger.(7) The Secretary of State, William Rogers only 
learnt of the bombings from the press. Carter’s Secretary 
of State, Cyrus Vance opposed the decision to attempt 
a rescue of U.S. diplomats in Iran in 1980, and eventually 
resigned.
The President's principal advisers in foreign policy 
matters are of two kinds: those who sit in the Executive
Office of the President, such as the White House advisers,
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and his Assistant for National Security Affairs; and the 
senior cabinet secretaries. Who influences the President 
on foreign policy matters depends upon the style of the 
President, and therefore varies from President to 
President and from issue to issue. For example, Jimmy 
Carter's Southern Africa policy between 1977 and 1979 
was mostly influenced by the Secretary of State, Cyrus 
Vance and Ambassador Andrew Young. During Carter's last 
year or so in the White House, the administration's
Southern Africa policy, alongwith other major political
issues of the world, became increasingly influenced 
by his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski.
This does not mean that Brzezinski turned a blind 
eye to African issues during the early years of the Carter 
Presidency. For example, soon after Carter's inauguration 
he tried to influence the administration's Southern Africa 
policy by ordering the preparation of Policy Review 
Memorandum-4 which gave importance to South Africa's 
cooperation in the resolution of the Rhodesian and 
Namibian issues. This, however, was strongly opposed by 
Andrew Young, Anthony Lake, and Donald McHenry, who
presented their point of view to the President, which
resulted in the issue of a Presidential Directive 
reflecting their policy approach and officially 
criticizing apartheid for the first time.(8)
After his failure to assert much influence on 
Southern Africa policy, Brzezinski focused on the Horn
27
of Africa and linked the regional crisis to U.S.-Soviet
relations, such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT).(9) How much influence Brzezinski exerted on U.S. 
policy in the Horn vis-a-vis the Soviet Union during 
Carter's first two years in office is difficult to measure, 
because "Carter and Vance [still] adhered to an image
of global complexity and the pursuit of global 
community."(10) But his influence grew after the Soviet
military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979. 
By this time "Carter and Brzezinslci’s images overlapped 
considerably, and together they dominated the making of 
American foreign policy."(11)
Similarly, the first Reagan administration’s Southern 
Africa policy was influenced by his Secretaries of State, 
Alexander Haig and George Shultz. His second term Southern 
Africa policy, until the passage of the Comprehensive 
Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986, was influenced by his White 
House advisers, such as Donald Regan and William Casey, 
the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Of all the 
U.S. administrations since Richard Nixon’s, Reagan’s 
second term presidency has probably been more dominated 
by his White House staff than by the cabinet secretaries 
in major domestic and foreign policy-making decisions. 
From 1985 until his resignation in 1987, the White House 
Chief of Staff Donald Regan "was the most powerful person 
who controlled the main levers of the White House 
power."(12)
Of course the tug-of-war between the President's
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advisers is not the only pressure which influences his
foreign policy decisions. Other pressures include those
from "foreign governments and domestic political
concerns,"(13) and a President "will often respond to
whichever pressures are momentarily strongest."(14) For
example, when the Carter administration joined in voting
for the United Nations mandatory arms embargo on South
Africa in 1977, it was partly in response to growing
Afro-Asian pressure in the United Nations on U.S. to impose
economic sanctions against the Republic. Similarly, when
President Reagan signed the Executive Order in September
1985 to impose limited sanctions on South Africa, his
actions were influenced by congressional and public
pressures. In this case, President Reagan was under
pressure from his White House advisers and the State
Department as well. In this situation Reagan’s public
comments regarding South Africa sent confused signals
to other parties. In Chester Crocker's assessment:
This varied input was perfectly reflected
in the bobbing and weaving of Reagan's own 
press comments during August and September
1985. One day he categorized the Botha
government as"reformist". Shortly afterwards 
he retracted this judgement as
"misleading"(15)
Usually presidents keep very few foreign policy 
matters of importance in the White House and the rest
of the affairs are left to the bureaucracy. For example, 
President Nixon concentrated on ending the Vietnam war, 
rapprochement with China, and easing tension with the
Soviet Union. President Carter focused on improving 
relations with the Soviet Union including arms control
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agreements, the solution of the Middle East crisis, and 
global human rights issues. In Brzezinski's account: 
"Actually in foreign affairs, contrary to public 
perceptions, Garter was a dominant president. His personal 
involvement in foreign policy process was assertive and 
extensive."(16 ) Whereas President Reagan’s attention was
focused to contain the influence of the "evil empire"____
the Soviet Union.
Ultimately presidential decisions in foreign affairs 
are materialized by bureaucrats who can create hindrances 
to their implementation. The classic example in this regard 
was the removal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey, ordered 
by President Kennedy twice between August and October 
1962. Because of bureaucratic disagreements the missiles 
were still there even at the time when the Soviet Union 
announced the withdrawal of its missiles from Cuba on 
October 28, 1962.(17) Therefore presidents are encircled
by an iron triangle of obstacles comprised of 
bureaucracy, congressional committees, and interest 
groups.(18)
In sum, whether the foreign policy decisions are 
made within the "inner-most circle which comprises the 
President and his closest advisers",(19) or through 
bureaucratic politics; whether the decisions are small 
or big; or made in crisis or non-crisis situations, it 
is the President who is always responsible for policy 
decisions.
30
1.2 Role of the Bureaucracy
We have noted that only the most important foreign policy 
matters reach the President and his principal advisers, 
and that the majority of decisions are made through
bureaucratic politics in Washington. With this in mind, 
we now move to examine the role of bureaucracy in foreign 
policy-making.
Much has changed in the foreign policy-making arena 
in Washington since the United States came out of
"historical slumber" of isolation during the Second World 
War. In its post-War role as a leader of the non-Communist 
world, the U.S. foreign policy-making bureaucracy has 
gone through two major transformation one soon after 
the War, and the other during the 1970s. In 1947 the 
"National Security Act at one stroke unified the Department 
of Defence, created the CIA, and established the National 
Security Council as the principal forum for presidential 
deliberation and decision in foreign affairs . "(20) This 
was followed by changes during the 1970s in the wake of 
Vietnam war when Congress passed a series of acts to assert 
its foreign policy-making role (discussed in chapter II).
These changes have not only influenced the entire 
character and behaviour of the foreign policy-making
system, but diluted the traditional power and authority
of the foreign affairs custodian_____ the State Department,
with the involvement of a large number of Executive
departments and agencies in the decision-making process. 
This in turn, has given birth to a never-ending 
bureaucratic struggle to influence policy decisions,
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It is necessary to distinguish two components of 
bureaucracy in Washington: the "appointive government"
and the "permanent government".(21) The officials who 
comprise the "appointive government" are those brought 
in by every new President. Halperin categorizes these 
officials as "in-and-outers". Their number varies from 
administration to administration. For example, President 
Clinton brought in at least five thousand "in-and-outers", 
including "several hundred secretaries, deputy secretaries, 
assistant secretaries, and their deputies." The other, 
and much larger component of bureaucracy is the permanent 
government employees "who do not change with Presidents, 
and carry on day to day work of all administrations."(22)
Thus, both categories of bureaucrats serve the same 
President with different perceptions of national interests. 
Each policy-making participant’s perception of the issue 
is heavily influenced by his particular concerns.(23) 
For example, the "particular concerns" of political 
appointees are usually linked with "their outside 
professional peer groups"(24) from where they have been 
selected. Whereas the "concerns" of civil servants are 
usually tied with their respective organizations in which 
they work. A career official usually believes that his 
organization’s welfare is important to the national 
security.(25) In addition, the tug-of-war between 
ideologues within the bureaucracy to influence foreign 
policy decisions also plays an important role, what the 
Bush administration’s Under Secretary for Political 
Affairs called the "Cold War guys [versus] morality guys."
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(26)
Although the high level policy-makers, such as the 
departmental secretaries, deputy secretaries, and assistant 
secretaries are mostly political appointees of the
President, they are usually influenced and "feel pressure 
from their career bureaucracies not to compromise agency 
positions",(27) and "often see themselves as their 
department's representative to the President."(28) Thus, 
the bureaucratic rivalries, especially among the major
policy-making agencies, are frequently identified in 
Washington, which "has its [own] political culture, its 
tribal customs, and its idiosyncrasies."(29) "When you 
say the U.S. administration", said the former British 
Ambassador in Washington, "I am sorry to be pedantic but 
there is the Pentagon view, the State Departmental view 
and the White House view."(30)
One of the important "tribal customs" used by the
bureaucracy to influence foreign policy decisions is a 
leakage of official information to the press, an important 
part of what Zara Steiner calls "the Byzantine world 
of Washington."(31) According to Halperin, there are 
various forms of leaks, such as "private and off-the-record 
interviews, vague tips to reporters, handing official 
papers to a reporter, etc."(32) In his opinion "information 
is provided to the press either to directly affect
bureaucratic manoeuvers or to alert and bring into the 
process participants from outside the bureaucracy".(33) 
For example, in August 1981, the Washington based
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organization TransAfrica, a black American lobby for Africa 
and the Caribbean, got hold of the State Department's 
sensitive policy documents towards South Africa and leaked 
them to the press. (34) The main purpose of "widening the 
circle" on the part of those who opposed the Reagan 
administration's South Africa policy was to "spread 
information to summon political allies within the 
administration [and] in Congress, [and] to rally public 
opinion"(35) on U.S.-South Africa policy. Thus each 
department has its own clientele and its own relations 
with Congress and certain Committees and
Sub-Committees.(36)
In addition, the relationship between an executive 
department or an agency with the White House is also 
important in influencing policy. If a department or 
an agency does not enjoy close ties with the White House 
it usually loses in the bureaucratic struggle to assert 
its influence on foreign policy-making.
The Commission on Organization of the U.S. executive 
branch, generally known as the Hoover Commission, counted 
in its January 1949 report around 45 executive agencies 
involved at certain stages in U.S. foreign 
policy-making.(37) The number reached to fifty according 
to the 1975 report of the Commission on the organization 
of the government for the conduct of U.S. foreign 
policy.(38) Among them the Department of State is the 
major player in this arena. Constitutionally, it is the 
major supervisory body which engages in both the
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decision-making and the decision implementation 
process.(39)
Apart from the office of the Secretary of State, 
the Department is divided into "sub-systems", the
functional bureaux, the area or geographic bureaux, and 
the management section. See Table 1.1
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Apart from the State Department, which is the lead 
agency, the other actors within the Executive branch, 
who usually play a role in the foreign policy-making system 
in Washington are defined in Table 1.2
TABLE 1.2
Other Important Executive Departments and Agencies
in the Foreign Policy System
DEPARTMENT
The National Security 
Council (NSC)
The Department of Defence
The 
( Adv
Joint Chiefs 
isory role)
of Staff
The Department of Treasury
The Department of Interior
The Department of Commerce
The
Agri
Department
culture
of
The Department of Labour
The Department of Energy
AGENCY/BUREAU
The Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA)
The Defence Intelligence 
Agency (DIA)
The U.S. Information 
Agency (USIA)
The Agency for International 
Development (AID)
The National Aeronautical 
and Space Administration 
(NASA)
The Expor t-Import Bank
the United States
The Federal Bureau of
Inve stigati on (FBI)
The Bureau of Customs
Source:
John E.Esterline and Robert B.Black, ’Inside Foreign 
Policy: The Department of State Political Systems',
Mayfield Publishing Co., California, 1975.
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Among these the most pertinent and important are
the NSC, and the Defence Department. The NSC is the only 
component of the Executive Office of the President (EOP) 
which is exclusively involved in foreign policy-making, 
and was originally designed to be an advisory forum for 
the President. Other components of the EOP which are
involved to a certain degree in foreign policy-making 
are: the White House Office; the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB); the Council of Economic Advisers; the
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative; and the Office 
of Science and Technology Policy.
The object of the State Department is to coordinate 
between all these organizations and different entities. 
Further, since the time of President Lyndon Johnson (1963- 
69) the system of inter-agency groups has been introduced 
to coordinate different policies. For example, during 
Reagan’s second term "there were 25 high level 
inter-agency groups, 55 mid-level inter-agency groups, 
and more than one hundred other task forces, committees, 
and working groups."(40) But it is in the State Department 
where the agenda or policy papers are prepared, which 
is known as the "initiating of policy". (41) It is 
noteworthy that participating departments and agencies 
also have their internal differences concerning any 
particular policy, but those are usually sorted out within 
a department or an agency before they are presented in 
front of the inter-agency discussion.(42)
In addition to the Washington based Executive 
departments and agencies, Foreign Service Officers,
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appointed in various U.S. diplomatic missions worldwide 
are also an important source of input in foreign policy 
formulation. These officials are, especially a source 
of information and a link between their respective host 
countries and the United States. How much influence a 
message, a telegram, or a telephone call from a U.S. 
diplomat abroad carry in Washington during decision-making 
phase is difficult to measure. In addition to a message 
coming from a diplomatic mission, information reaches 
in Washington from numerous other sources as well, both 
government and non-government. The decision, however, 
is made according to Washington’s own "tribal customs".
On paper the policy-making procedure works pretty
much the same from administration to administration, but
in practice it may not be progressing in the way it
appears in the paperwork. Someone in the bureaucracy might
have particular interests and be more involved than someone
else. The Bush administration's Assistant Secretary for
Human Rights, Ambassador James Bishop Jr. suggested that:
Any [U.S.] policy is the result of some 
degree of bargaining among various elements 
of bureaucracy [in Washington], Because 
various elements of the bureaucracy by their 
very nature have been in different 
constituencies, so they have different 
interests. They don't see the situation 
identically, and there has to be some 
compromise in order to reach a consensus. 
(43)
When asked about the formation of foreign policy,
Chester Crocker gave this response:
Well, the broad framework of policy tends 
to be put forward for discussion at the 
top level at the beginning of the adminis-
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tration. Certain guidelines would be put 
on paper and more or less agreed. And
that was true not just for the Reagan
administration [but] for earlier
administrations [as well]. And this is 
also for Bush administration. You have some 
efforts on the inter-agency basis to
define the broad principles. But having
done that a day-to-day conduct of
relations is usually at the Assistant
Secretary level. (44)
The general practice is that every Executive 
department and agency in the government that has some
interest in its task on any particular policy is asked 
to submit its views. They all have a chance to have their 
input. But it does not mean that policy output is always 
the result of bargaining among all the departments and
agencies involved in decision-making. Sometimes the policy 
decisions are made among the main players, such as the 
State Department, the White House, and the Defence 
Department, but usually within the State Department. 
"The latitudes of bureaucratic politics", said one senior 
official in the U.S. Commerce Department, "depends upon 
how connected and how ideological [the] State Department 
personnel are. Other Executive agencies contribute [in 
foreign policy-making], but it depends on the State 
Department’s receptivity."(45)
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1.3 U.S. Degree of Interest in Africa
Unlike Latin America, Europe, and Asia, (and with 
the obvious exception of Liberia), the United States has 
had few traditional links with Africa on such matters 
as trade and commerce. It was during the Second World 
War when the United States came into direct contact with 
Africa.(46) The strategic importance of the continent 
became perceptable, especially as a result of President 
Roosevelt’s (1933-45) journey via West Africa to meet 
the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in Morocco 
in January 1943.(47)
Until the first half of the 1950s nearly the entire 
African continent, except Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and 
South Africa, was colonized by the European metropoles. 
Thus the United States, with few exceptions, was not in 
a position to exert its responsibility towards the 
continent. However, one of the first early statements 
of U.S. governmental policy towards Africa was made in 
May 1950 by the U.S. Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, 
and African Affairs, George McGhee. In his address before 
the Sixteenth North West Institute of International 
Relations, Portland, Oregon, he showed the concern of 
the Truman administration by saying that his government 
could not allow Africa to be neglected to the extent 
that it might meet the same fate as Peoples’ Republic 
of China. He warned that there was still time to act.(48) 
Such sporadic "Africanist” voices of concern, like
42
McGhee's, were lost in the predominantly "Europeanist"
atmosphere of Washington bureaucracy. Moreover the United
States had to withdraw from its traditional role as a
candid critic of European colonial rule in Africa, because
Western Europe was perceived in Washington as a firm
bulwark against Soviet expansionism.(49)
However, it was not until the mid-1950s that the
United States began to articulate the need for a "free
and friendly Africa" in the wake of the Bundung Conference
of April 1955, which gave prominence to nationalist
movements in Africa and Asia. A year after the Bundung
Declaration, George V.Allen, the U.S. Assistant Secretary
of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs
in his policy speech of April 21, 1956 made it clear that:
All of the so called colonial powers 
represented on the continent of Africa are 
our friends and allies in the world-wide 
contest between the free and the communist
world.................. A strong, free, and
friendly Africa is extremely important to 
the United States security. (50)
This change, however, became more evident later
in 1956 at the time of Suez crisis when the United States
did not support Britain and France, the two main colonial
powers of Africa. In addition, American attitudes towards
Africa also changed with the emergence of civil rights
as a more pressing domestic issue.(51)
Eisenhower's last years in the White House bore
witness to the climax of independence movements across
Africa. By correctly perceiving the wind direction in
the continent, the old General made recommendations for
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the establishment of the Bureau of African Affairs in 
April 1957, one month after the independence of Ghana.On
his return from attending the independent ceremonies of 
Ghana, "Nixon, also lobbied for the creation of a separate 
Bureau of African Affairs to deal with the
continent........ in the Cold War battle. "(52) The Bureau
officially came into existence within the State Department 
in August 1958, with its own assistant secretary of state. 
However, the Bureau was more symbolic vis-a-vis other 
geographic Bureaux in its foreign policy-making influence, 
especially the Bureau of European Affairs.(53)
During the presidential election campaign of 1960, 
European colonialism was already nearing its end. "An 
index to John Kennedy’s campaign speeches contained 479 
reference to Africa."(54) When Kennedy came into power, 
his administration paid much more attention to Africa 
(from Algeria to South Africa) than his predecessors. 
G.Mennon Williams, an Africa specialist, was appointed 
as Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. According 
to Bichard Moose, a former U.S. Assistant Secretary for 
African Affairs (1977-81), "his administration first had
the idea of trying to outflank the Marxism in Africa by 
trying to establish important link and open lines of 
communication with the then African countries."(55) Or 
in Brzezinski’s opinion: "for Kennedy, it was to move
America forward again and in the process to make it more
appealing to the developing world."(56) It was also during 
the Kennedy years in the White House that the Congo crisis
44
set off all kinds of alarm bells ringing about the threat 
of Communism and the Soviet influence in the continent.
The Kennedy administration’s enthusiasm and interest 
in newly born African states to ’’outflank” Communist
influence in the continent, and the recognition of their
role in international and regional forums, significantly 
disappeared when Lyndon Johnson came to power after 
Kennedy's assassination in 1963. This was partly because 
of the U.S. growing involvement in Vietnam and the domestic 
civil rights movement, and partly because of the limited 
nature of issues in Africa during the Johnson 
administration. It was a period of 'relative calm’ in 
the continent. The majority of black countries had already 
gained independence, except the Southern portion of the 
continent where the nationalist movements, a part from 
the ANC, were still in their formative phase. Therefore, 
African issues were mainly considered as European concerns 
with few exceptions, such as the restriction of U.S.
Import-Export financing to South Africa in 1964, and the 
cancellation of all U.S. naval ships’ visits to its ports 
in 1967 in response to Pretoria’s refusal to remove colour 
restrictions from visiting U.S. black crew members.
Lyndon Johnson’s successors became preoccupied with 
the Southern portion of the continent, which became the 
linchpin of U.S.-Africa policy. This was partly due 
to the emergence of armed struggles in the region, and 
partly because of the abrupt collapse of Portuguese 
colonial rule in Angola and Mozambique in 1975, followed
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by an outbreak of armed struggle among the three 
nationalist movements in Angola. With the inception of 
the Republican government in the White House under Richard 
Nixon (1969-74), the National Security Assistant to the 
President, Henry Kissinger was authorized to prepare a 
policy memorandum on Southern Africa. The preparation 
of this study, known as the National Security Study 
Memorandum-39 (NSSM-39, April 10, 1969) was conducted
with extreme secrecy. Among five policy options developed 
in the study, the National Security Council (NSC) went 
for option two, also known as the "Tar Baby", which was 
approved by the President in January 1970. This policy 
option was based on a "quiet persuasion" to "relax 
political and economic restrictions on the white states" 
(57) of Rhodesia and South Africa.
The NSSM-39 is an interesting and valuable study 
at least from two perspectives: [1] it shows what
bureaucracy can do in Washington, D.C. in the field of 
policy formulation; and [2] it indicates the lack of 
interest of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger in African 
affairs. (58)
From 1969 until the Watergate scandal of 1972, apart 
from the NSSM-39, three other NSC study assignments on
A
Africa were prepared. These included: the NSSM-87 (North
Africa), January 22, 1970; the NSSM-89 (Southwest Africa),
February 12, 1970; and NSSM-115 (Africa), January 25,
1971.(59) Thus between 1972 until Nixon’s resignation 
in 1974, neither the President nor his top advisers, 
including Henry Kissinger, took personal interest in
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Southern African affairs, mostly because of their domestic 
preoccupation.
A consensus emerged in the United States about 
the proper response to the threat of Communism in Africa 
and the Middle East when detente began to crumble in the 
mid-1970s, certainly no sooner, when the Soviet Union
sent Cuban troops to support the MPLA regime in Angola.
It was at this stage that President Ford took a personal
interest in African affairs and sent the Secretary of
State, Henry Kissinger to visit Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, 
Zaire, Liberia, and Senegal in April 1976. The basic
strategy behind Kissinger's Africa visit was to take the 
initiative in forging rapprochement with black African 
countries. In his speeches and press conferences in host 
countries, Kissinger reestablished the U.S. position in
Africa.
In his address in Lusaka, Zambia, on April 27, 1976
Kissinger described the American policy towards Africa 
this way:
I have come to Africa with open mind and 
open heart to demonstrate my country's desire 
to work with you on these great tasks. My 
journey is intended to give fresh impetus 
to our cooperation and to usher in a new 
American policy.(60)
It was during this speech that Kissinger talked
about majority rule in Southern Africa. The major thrust 
of Kissinger's speech, however, was on a "rapid negotiated" 
settlement for Rhodesia. Thus, the Ford administration's 
approach certainly moved away from "tacit" support of 
white minority regimes in Southern Africa. In addition,
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the Ford administration's Africa policy also marked the 
beginning of U.S. policy-making in response to regional 
events in the continent. The Ford administration's 
turn-about in U.S. policy was intended to avoid the 
escalation of racial conflicts in the region.
The years between 1977 and 1981 were America's
best years in Africa since the Kennedy administration 
in terms of presidential interest and initiative. None 
of the U.S. Presidents since then have been as personally 
engaged with considerable frequency in African issues 
as Jimmy Carter. He had paid so much attention to Africa 
that James Callaghan, then British Prime Minister once 
remarked: "There seems to be a number of new Christopher
Columbuses setting out from the United States to discover 
Africa for the first time. Africa has been there for a 
long time."(61)
In 1977 the head of the Carter administration's 
Policy Planning Staff, Anthony Lake submitted his findings 
that the policy approach of the NSSM-39 was a failure.(62) 
Instead of putting emphasis on the strategic dimensions 
of Southern Africa, the Carter administration emphasized 
the need for peaceful resolution of conflicts in the 
region, and seeking an end to apartheid in South Africa.
In order to reduce U.S.-Soviet tension, President 
Carter appointed Cyrus Vance as his Secretary of State, 
and Andrew Young, a black-American Congressman, as 
Ambassador to the United Nations with special African 
responsibilities. Both men were anti-globalists, and 
architects of Carter's Africa policy. In addition to Cyrus
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Vance, President Carter appointed Warren Christopher, 
Richard Moose, Donald McHenry, and Anthony Lake, who were 
also knowledgeable about and interested in Africa.
The Secretary of State in his first major address
on Africa before the annual Convention of the National
Association for the Advancement of Coloured People at
St. Louis, in July 1977, outlined the following new
approach in America’s Africa policy:
Daily headlines should not set our agenda 
for progress. A negative, reactive American 
policy that seeks only to oppose Soviet 
or Cuban involvement in Africa would be 
both dangerous and futile. Our best course 
is to help resolve the problems which create 
opportunities for external interventions. 
(63)
The Southern Africa issues were at the top of the 
Carter administration’s African agenda. The
administration’s early Africa policy was based on a belief 
in the importance of eliminating the unjust system in
the region. In its perception social and political
injustice, rather than Communism, was the real threat to 
U.S. interests and influence in the region.
Since the administration’s early days President
Carter was torn between two policy groups, namely the 
globalists and the regionalists, led by his Assistant
to National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and 
the Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance respectively. Perhaps 
the Brzezinski-Vance schism on Africa policy was more 
sharp than any other Third World issue within the Carter 
administration. As Cyrus Vance has stated in his memoirs: 
” ......the internal divisions over Africa’s place in our
global strategy of managing U.S.“Soviet competition were 
becoming increasingly difficult."(64)
Against the Vance policy of "African solution to
African problems", Brzezinski's thrust was to argue that
the Soviet-Cuban military involvement be met forcefully
in Africa by supporting militarily those states which
would face the possible Communist aggression. Brzezinski
pointed out in his memoirs:
It seemed to me that we had underestimated 
the Eastern bloc connection in the region 
and that Andy Young and CY [Cyrus Vance],
alongwith most of those at the State 
[Department] took an excessively benign 
view of the Soviet and Cuban penetration
of Africa, underestimating its strategic 
implications. (65)
Like the Nixon-Kissinger approach, Brzezinski was 
looking at Southern Africa from the viewpoint of its 
geo-strategic importance, whereas Secretary of State Vance, 
and the President himself (at least until late 1979) were 
linking the regional problems with human rights issues. 
Therefore, the Carter administration’s policy towards 
Africa (from 1977 through 1979) was based on not 
confronting the Soviet-Cuban presence in the continent 
on the one hand, and condemning the white minority regimes 
in Southern Africa on the other.
In Vance’s account, President Carter’s "relatively 
calm reaction and wait-and-see policy attitude on 
Soviet-Cuban presence in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia 
and Katanga was not popular in Congress."(66) It was only 
after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan 
in December 1979 that Carter had to distance himself
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quickly from his human rights policy and support for black 
liberation movements in Southern Africa, and create the 
rapid deployment force, plus bases for it in Africa and 
the Middle East. Carter thus adopted Brzezinski's globalist 
approach "which emphasized the centrality of U.S.-Soviet
competition in regional affairs."(67)
In his January 1980 State of the Union Message, known
as the Carter Doctrine, President Carter declared:
Any attempt by any outside force to gain
control of the Persian Gulf region will 
be regarded as an assault on the vital
interests of the United States and will 
be repelled by any means necessary including 
military force.(68)
This speech, therefore, marked the shift from his original 
policy of accomodation with the Soviet Union to the policy 
of confrontation.
With the arrival of Ronald Reagan in the White House 
in January 1981, Africa had to face a U.S. President who 
was highly uninterested in its affairs. President Reagan's 
abstract role in foreign policy-making system was not 
only true in African affairs but other political regions 
as well. He confined his role only to a few broad themes 
of foreign policy, especially the containment of Communism. 
The noted characteristics of the Reagan foreign policy 
modus operand! was to delegate powers to his cabinet 
secretaries and their sub ordinates, and to his White 
House staff. In fact it was only after the Iran-Contra 
scandal of 1986, followed by the Tower Commission 
Report(69) which also pointed the finger at the 
"President's management style", that Reagan was forced
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to show a considerable interest in foreign policy-making.
President Reagan’s invisible role and indifferent
attitude towards Africa are clearly manifested in his
thick memoirs, which only contain some brief reference
to Angola in the superpower context. The main thrust in
the book is given to the Middle East, Lebanon, Grenada,
Iran-Contra, and the arms control issues.(70)
Like the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations,
the Reagan administration’s main interest of Africa policy
was in the Southern portion of the continent. The policy
which was announced by the new administration was named
as "constructive engagement". This policy was based on
a "quiet persuasion” , as claimed by the administration.
The constructive engagement was a tridimensional
policy. First, to build an overall framework for the
strengthening of regional security in Southern Africa
and to reduce violence. Second, to solve the Namibian
issue. Finally, to bring a "positive change” in the racial
policy of South Africa. What was new in the constructive
engagement was the linkage between the Cuban troops’
withdrawal from Angola, and Namibian independence. The
architect of the constructive engagement, Chester Crocker
gave three reasons for linkage:
First it was best way to get Namibian
independence as we can think about, because 
it would in fact give a package of which 
there was something in it for the South
Africans to get out of Namibia.........
Secondly, the Cubans had no business being 
in Angola and so for reasons of our Cuban
policy and our global policy vis-a-vis
the Soviets.............. .Finally, because
the way you can end a logjam in a
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negotiation is by shifting the agenda.
That was the only choice.(71)
In fact there was a fourth reason which was probably
the most important factor in the linkage affair, and that
was Crocker’s domestic considerations to ’satisfy’ the
far right Republican elements. When asked about this
his response was:
Well it was certainly a way of uniting 
various voices in Washington by bringing
together those most concerned about 
Communism in Angola. It provided a package 
that Americans could rally around. (72)
Despite "uniting” and appeasing some of the "voices” 
in Washington, constructive engagement came under severe 
criticism from five directions. The far right elements
in the ruling Republican party and the pro-South Africa 
bureaucrats in Washington considered it as a continuation 
of the Carter administration's policy. The more moderate 
Republicans, such as Senator Nancy Kassabum, labelled 
it as a "one way street". (73) The Democrats in the United 
States, and the blacks in Africa portrayed the policy 
as strengthening the system of apartheid in South Africa. 
Whereas the far right white elements in South Africa called 
Crocker an "instigator of Washington's spurious
constructive engagement."(74)
A careful analysis of Crocker's Foreign Affairs 
article entitled, ’South Africa:1 A Strategy for Change’ 
(Winter 1980/81), and his speech in Honolulu in August 
1981, reveals a rational approach towards the Southern 
African problems. "This was the policy for Southern Africa, 
not only towards South Africa,"(75) said one of the senior 
officials on Africa in the U.S. Defence Department. The
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question that comes immediately to mind is what were those 
factors which made it ’unacceptable’, especially in the 
United States? In this regard the following assessments 
of a Washington-based academic and a former State 
Department junior official are worth mentioning.
According to Professor William Zartman, "the weakest 
part of Crocker’s operations was the way he handled 
Congress, and the way Congress handled him. They were 
very critical of him. "(76) In the opinion of a former 
State Department official, "Crocker had some weakness 
in his ability to portray effectively a sort of sense 
of emotional outrage."(77) In sum, the constructive 
engagement was not really viable in the then existing 
anti-apartheid mood in the United States, which was in 
turn affected by those values, beliefs, and traditions, 
which formed the American political culture. 
Constructive engagement officially came to an end when 
the Secretary of State’s Advisory Committee on South Africa 
concluded in its report in January 1987 that "the 
administration’s strategy of constructive engagement has 
failed to achieve its objectives in Southern Africa." 
(78) Despite the Committee’s announcement, Crocker was 
still actively angaged in mediating efforts which resulted 
in the signing of two accords at the UN headquarters on 
December 22, 1988. These paved the way for the Namibian
independence and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from 
Angola.
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1.4 Bureaucratic Structures and Dynamics
The above discussion suggests that the State 
Department, the Defence Department, and the National 
Security Council are the major players involved in the 
U.S. foreign policy-making system. It also indicates that 
the U.S.-Africa policy-making system has been generally 
left in the hands of the State Department bureaucracy, 
with few exceptions, in almost all administrations from 
Nixon to Reagan. The aim in this section is to describe 
the bureaucratic organization concerning Africa within 
the main foreign policy-making organizations, notably 
the State and the Defence Departments.
In recognition of significance of Africa during 
the Second World War, a separate office dealing with 
African issues, especially North of the continent, was 
established in 1944 in the Near Eastern Division of the 
State Department.(79)
In 1950 the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, 
and African Affairs was created under the direction of 
an Assistant Secretary of State. This Bureau was created 
in addition to the Bureau of United Nations Affairs, the 
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, the Bureau of European 
Affairs, the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, and the Bureau 
of German Affairs, each under its own assistant secretary 
of state. Before the establishment of the Bureaux in 1950, 
they were known as the respective regional offices.
In addition to the creation of the Bureau of Near
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Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, an independent 
Office of African Affairs was also established in the
same year under its own Director, which was previously 
affiliated with the Near Eastern Directorate. In 1957, 
the year in which President Eisenhower recommended the 
creation within the State Department of a separate Bureau 
of African Affairs, the Office of African Affairs was 
established under the Deputy Assistant Secretary within 
the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African 
Affairs. Joseph Palmer was appointed as its Deputy 
Assistant Secretary. Between 1950 and 1958 African affairs 
continued to remain as part of the Bureau of Near Eastern, 
South Asian, and African affairs. In August 1958, an
independent Bureau of Africa Affairs was created within 
the State Department under its own Assistant Secretary
of State, Joseph C .Satterthwaite.
The Bureau of African Affairs, apart from the
Assistant Secreatry at its top, has a senior Deputy 
Assistant Secretary and three Deputy Secretaries. Within 
the Bureau, Africa South of the Sahara is divided into 
five zones: the Office of Southern African Affairs (AF/S);
the Office of Anglophone and Lusophone West African Affairs 
(AF/WAL); the Office of Francophone West African Affairs 
(AF/WF); the Office of Central African Affairs (AF/C); 
and the Office of East African Affairs (AF/E).
Each area zone within the Bureau is headed by either 
a Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary or a Deputy Assistant 
Secretary. The Office of Southern African Affairs is
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headed by a Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary. For each 
zonal office there is also a director, and a deputy 
director. Apart from the director, two deputies are 
assigned for Southern Africa. There is usually one desk 
officer per country, except South Africa, where three 
desk officers are assigned to deal with the Republic, 
probably because of the extent of U.S. business links 
and political interest in the country.
In addition to the State Department, the Defence 
Department is another major player in the U.S. foreign
policymaking system. Until 1956 not a single office 
specializing in Africa existed in the Office of Assistant 
Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs. 
It was only in 1957 during the Eisenhower administration 
that the Office of Regional Director for Africa within 
the Directorate of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 
was established. The regional office for Africa, however, 
continued to work within this Directorate until 1970. 
In 1970 African affairs were affiliated with the Western
Hemisphere Directorate under the direction of the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary. It was during this time when a 
separate regional office for Africa was established, both 
in the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defence for 
International Security Affairs.
In 1971, Africa was separated from Western 
Hemisphere, and was affiliated with the Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs set-up under a Deputy Assistant 
Secretary. This arrangement continued until the early
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1980s. In 1983, African affairs were taken away from 
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, and a separate Office 
of Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary/Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Africa was created within the Office of 
the Assistant Secretary of Defence for International 
Security Affairs. The first Principal Deputy Assistant 
Secretary/Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs 
was Noel C.Koch.(80) Currently the Office of African 
Affairs is working under the Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defence in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
International Security Affairs.
The major analytical arm of the Defence Department, 
the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), now has about 75-80 
analysts working on Africa.(81)
The detailed organizational structure for Africa 
within the National Security Council (NSC) and the Central 
Intelligence Agency are hard to provide for obvious 
reasons related to their confidentiality. What is known 
in this regard is that currently the "NSC has a senior 
director who divides his time between Africa and other 
matters and a full director for Africa." Within the CIA, 
whose work is divided into analytical and operational 
activities, African matters are analyzed by the Office 
of African and Latin American analysis.(82)
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1.5 U.S.-Africa Policy-making Apparatus
Larry Bowman has divided U.S. national security 
and foreign policies towards Africa into three categories. 
First, "some policies are initiated at the Assistant 
Secretary level and are approved at the very top by the 
president and his senior aids; such executive decisions 
require no legislation." Second, certain policies "are 
driven by Congressional demands." Third, some policies 
are "the outcome of intense fighting between different 
factions within government each aided and abetted by 
Congressional and nongovernmental allies."(83)
Since the heyday of African independence, 
U.S.-Africa policy-making has usually been conducted within 
the State Department and its Bureau of African Affairs. 
Two other important foreign policy-making actors, the 
Defence department and the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), developed their high level of interest in Africa 
after the abrupt collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire 
in Angola and Mozambique in 1975, followed by the power 
struggle between pro-Moscow and pro-Western nationalist 
movements in Angola. (For a detailed account of African 
specialists and policy-makers see Appendices A and B).
As has been mentioned earlier, during the Carter 
administration there was a minimal amount of receptivity 
by the State Department to contributions made by other 
departments and agencies with regard to Africa 
policy-making. Therefore, most of the Africa-related 
foreign policy decisions until the resignation of 
Ambassador Andrew Young, followed by that of the Secretary
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of State, Cyrus Vance in early 1980, were made by the
State Department's bureaucracy, what Richard Moose, the
administration's Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
called the "policy consensus", in an interview with this
author. It remain noteworthy that during the Carter
administration the entire focus of U.S. Africa policy
was on the Eastern and Southern parts of the continent.
Talking about policy-making procedure Moose said:
Anthony Lake, who was the Director of the 
Policy Planning Staff, myself and Andrew
Young were close collaborators on Africa 
policy. We worked together. There was very 
little discourse. Sometimes one wanted to 
push a little bit more than the other. Don 
McHenry was an important member to this 
group too. And we did't have inter-agency 
problems between the departments except
Commerce............I had an easier job than
anyone who was ever Assistant Secretary 
for African Affairs. I was put under an 
Under Secretary for Political Affairs. The 
first one who didn't care about Africa and 
just didn't take any position at all. He
just stayed.......... Philip Habib, now dead,
and a long-time diplomat. Habib would never 
do what I wanted. His successor was David 
Newsome. So when you had Newsome, there 
had me and never mind. The matter I reported 
to Newsome, Newsome reported to [Warren] 
Christopher [Deputy Secretary of State]. 
Christopher reported to [Cyrus] Vance. Vance 
reported to the President who was advised 
by Andy Young, and we all shared a common 
view and concern about Africa.(84)
This kind of coalition, among individuals within 
the bureaucracy regarding any particular U.S. policy 
formulation is one of the main characteristics of 
bureaucratic politics.
During the Carter administration "there was little 
or no environment for the Defence Department in Southern 
Africa", said Moose. He further briefed:
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I can't remember they [Defence] had been 
involved there [during the Carter 
administration] though they were aware. 
I mean we had to check them and they never 
made serious efforts to influence policy. 
We used the Defence Department at one time 
for some re-supply operations in Shaba [II, 
1978]. The Defence Department became interes­
ted after the war in Afghanistan [in 1979] 
and the Iranian situation got bad and Carter 
went to his Indian Ocean strategy, then 
the Defence Department’s interest in having 
bases on [the Indian Ocean] littorals.(85)
Until late 1979, the State Department, despite
the policy disagreements with the NSC, seemed to be in
full control of U.S.-Africa policy. When this issue was
raised with Moose his .response was:
There was a conflict over the Horn of Africa 
[between the State Department and the NSC]. 
There was conflict over Angola. But there 
was never conflict over South Africa. We
never had a problem for that..
I don't recall Brzezinski ever having a
word to say about South Africa, or Rhodesia,
Zambia, never........... I don’t recall.
I don’t think he ever mentioned. He just 
did not involve. He just left us alone.(86)
’The "common view" and "consensus” within the 
Carter administration regarding Africa policy came to
an 'end’ after the resignation of Andrew Young and Cyrus 
Vance. The ’foreign ministry’ was shifted from the State 
Department under Secretary Edmund Muskie to the White 
House basement under Dr. Brzezinski.
The growing Soviet-Cuban involvement in Southern 
and East Africa, the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1978, 
and finally the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan in 
December 1979, eventually changed the world perception 
of President Carter, who adopted Brzezinski's globalist 
approach and quickly moved to military plans to counter
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Soviet 'expansionism'.
Under the Reagan style of delegation of
responsibility in foreign policy-making, the Assistant 
Secretary for African Affairs "Chester Crocker had a 
remarkable degree of autonomy under both [Alexander] Haig
and [George] Shultz"(87) in dealing with African issues.
As Crocker has mentioned in his memoirs: "By the standards
of other U.S. policies in other regions we had a long 
leash and a high degree of autonomy"(88) in the making 
of U.S.-Africa policy. Throughout the Reagan administration 
the focus of U.S.-Africa policy had been on the Southern
portion of the continent.
Thus, the degree of autonomy given to the Bureau
of African Affairs in foreign policy-making continued
until 1985. By this time in a startling volte-face, the
U.S.-Africa policy-making network had shrunk to the White
House and Congress. In effect Africa policy was taken
away from the State Department in what Crocker calls "the
great foreign policy robbery." This was really the time
when the Secretary of State George Shultz, and Assistant
Secretary Crocker wanted to go in one direction while
the White House was going in another in relation to Africa
policy. In Crocker's own account, by this time:
............ the free hand we had previously
enjoyed became an object of nostalgia. 
Suddenly we found ourselves ensnared 
in the polorization, hypocrisy, and purely 
political logic that just flourished outside 
our doors in Washington. Africa would now 
became the ultimate "freebie" in American 
foreign policy.(89)
Who were the "hypocrits" behind the smoke screen?
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Crocker told this author that during 1985 and 1986, 
President Reagan was mostly listening to his White House 
Chief of Staff, Donald Reagan and the Director of
Intelligence, William Casey.(90) In his memoirs Crocker 
has also identified Pat Buchanan, the White House 
Communication Director, as another important member of 
the group responsible for the Southern African "foreign 
policy robbery" from the State Department.
The role of the Defence Department in Africa policy 
-making during the Reagan administration seems to have 
been peripheral as well, as under the Carter 
administration. On paper there were in existence "some
Policy Coordinating Committees (PCC) which were represented 
by the State Department at the Assistant Secretary level 
and in the Defence by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Africa", as told by an official in the Defence Department 
to this author. He went on further to describe the way
things were formally done. "If the issue in the PCC can’t 
really be resolved then we move up one level, what we
call it the Deputy level."(91) It is difficult to provide 
evidence of bureaucratic "pulling and hauling" on Africa 
policy between the State and the Defence Departments at
the Assistant Secretary level during the Reagan
administration. But it can be assumed that because of
the Defence’s peripheral role in the Africa policy-making 
process, none of the Africa-related issues would have 
reached to the Deputies Committee.
In sum, U.S-Africa policy-making during the first 
Reagan term was under the control of the Bureau of African
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Affairs. In its second term, especially between 1984 
and 1986 the South African issue came to the top of the 
Reagan administration's African agenda. During this time 
the significant discontent between U.S.“Africa
policy-makers, especially between the State Department 
and the White House bureaucracy created a policy vacuum 
in Washington which was filled by Congress by passing 
the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) in 1986 to 
impose sanctions on South Africa.
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Conclusion
In this chapter we have tried to discuss the foreign 
policy-making structure in the United States, the role 
of major actors in this arena, both in general and towards 
Africa, and the bureaucratic structure concerning Africa 
in the State and the Defence Departments.
We have distinguished two situations in which foreign 
policy decisions are made in Washington, D.C. emergency 
situation, and non-emergency situation. Only highly crucial 
foreign policy decisions are made by President and his 
top advisers. The rest of the foreign policy decisions 
are made within the State Department, usually with
consultations with other major actors, such as the Defence 
Department and the National Security Council (NSC).
This chapter has also identified that South Africa
has never reached a crisis situation in U.S. foreign
policy-making. One middle-level official in the Defence
Department said:
I am working since last ten years here [in 
the Defence Department] but neither of 
Secretaries said, no, here is what I want 
to do, on anything on Sub-Saharan Africa.
I know those things happen to other regions.
I know. I [have] worked in [the office of]
Middle East [affairs] before I came here. 
I know you get things back saying "disagree", 
and remarkable notes from Secretary, Under 
Secretary, not just in the Defence, in the 
State [Department as well].(92)
The presidential initiatives and interest in African
affairs has usually been in response to African events.
For example, the Eisenhower and Kennedy interest in Africa
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was in response to newly-emerging nations there and the
Congo crisis. President Gerald Ford’s response was to 
growing armed struggle among the nationalist movements
in Angola, and the Soweto riots in South Africa during 
the mid 1970s. On the other hand, Jimmy Carter responded 
to human rights violations in Southern Africa.
We have also identified that under the successive
U.S. administrations from Richard Nixon to Ronald Reagan, 
African issues had been decided mostly within the Bureau
of African Affairs. With this in mind, we now turn to 
assess the role of Congress and public opinion in the 
making of U.S. foreign policy, both general and towards 
Africa.
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CHAPTER II
ROLE OF CONGRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION IN FOREIGN 
POLICY-MAKING
Introduction
All U.S. foreign policy decisions ranging from
treaties, appointments, and declaration of war to the 
appropriation of economic loans and military assistance 
to foreign nations, made by the Executive branch, are 
subject to congressional approval. On the other hand, 
on certain foreign policy issues Congress passes acts 
which become the law of the land to be implemented by 
the Executive branch. This two-pronged congressional
role in foreign policy decision-making makes the 
Legislative body "approximately co-equal with that of 
the Executive"(1) in this regard.
However, foreign policy-decisions, such as economic 
and military assistance to foreign nations, are not usually 
insulated from the influence of interest group
organizations. Notable in this regard are the business 
groups. In addition, the role of public opinion in foreign 
policy-making mainly appears when the issue falls within 
the public limelight and interest, such as Vietnam and 
South Africa during the Nixon and the Reagan
administrations respectively.
This chapter will proceed in two stages. First,
to examine the theoretical and practical role of Congress
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in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy, followed by 
its actual involvement in Africa policy-making. Second, 
to analyse the role and influence of public opinion in 
foreign policy-making both in general and towards Africa 
in particular.
2.1 Role of the Congress
The United States' Congress created by Article 1, 
Section I of the U.S. constitution is empowered to declare 
war, to ratify treaties, to lay duties, and to regulate 
commerce with foreign countries.(2) However, the 
declaration of war, and the ratification of treaties are 
its most influential foreign policy powers.
How Congress asserts its role and influence in 
foreign policy-making vis-a-vis the Executive branch has 
always been controversial because of the unclear 
constitutional powers assigned to both branches of 
government in this field. Commenting on the vague 
power-sharing between the Legislature and the Executive,
Hans Morgenthau said the: "......constitution nowhere
makes clear with whom the ultimate responsibility for 
the conduct of foreign policy rests."(3) On certain foreign 
policy issues, the constitution is also not clear about 
delegating powers. These include for example, neutrality, 
abrogation of treaties, and the recognition of new 
governments.(4)
From the time of the adoption of the U.S.
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constitution in 1789, foreign policy-making has been
predominantly an Executive affair. However, the Legislative
branch has sporadically asserted its influence vis-a-vis
the Executive in foreign affairs. For example, between
Woodrow Wilson’s (1913-1921) second term and through the
administrations of Presidents Warren Harding (1921-23);
Calvin Coolidge (1923-29); and Herbert Hoover (1929-33).
During this period Congress demonstrated its capacity
to assert itself in the field of foreign policy. The most
dramatic example being when the Senate confronted President
Woodrow Wilson, refusing to ratify the Treaty of Versailles
of 1919 to allow the United States to join the League
of Nations.(5)
Thus long before the congressional revolts and
reforms of the 1970s, Cabell Phillips, suggested in 1949,
that Congress exerts influence on U.S. foreign
policy-making in three ways:
First, the congressional debates certainly 
influence the decision-making on issues 
which are very much in the limelight.
Second, the Congressmen remain in constant 
contact with their respective constituents, 
therefore mirror the public opinion on these 
issues, and pass those bills which are 
having grass-root support.
Third, Congress exerts influence through 
its control of the purse.(6)
In the post-War period congressional assertiveness
grew during the Nixon era, as a result of growing U.S.
military Involvement in the Far East, especially after
the revelation of secret bombing in Cambodia and Laos.
Congress overrode the presidential veto and passed the
War Powers Act in 1973 requiring "the President [to]
75
inform Congress within forty-eight hours of the
introduction of American forces into combat." It further
requires "that [President] gain congressional sanction
of his action within sixty days; and if Congress refuses
that sanction, he disengage within another thirty days."(7)
These developments led the then Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger to acknowledge the role of Congress in the
foreign policy-making process. As he observed:
The decade-long struggle in this century 
over executive dominance in foreign affairs 
is over. The recognition that Congress is 
a coequal branch of government is the 
dominant fact of national politics today. 
The executive accepts that the Congress 
must have both the sense and the reality 
of participation; foreign policy must be 
a shared enterprise,(8)
However, the 1970s "political earthquake" in 
Washington, had vibrations which not only upset the 
Executive branch, but "shook the old power structure in 
Congress as well",(9) where authority was controlled only 
by committee and sub-committee chairmen. The decision­
making power and influence of the "old guard", was 
challenged by new breed of young and more educated 
Congressmen. As a result, the power flowed from party 
leaders to individual members of Congress.(10) Unlike 
the pre-1970s presidents, who dealt largly with party 
leaders and committee chairmen in major foreign policy 
decisions, the post-1970s presidents have to ’trade* with 
almost all the individual members of Congress, what 
Zara Steiner has called the "535 potential Secretaries 
of State each of whom feels competent to take the
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initiative in foreign affairs.”(11 )
The passage of the War Powers Act marked the
beginning of a series of Acts passed by Congress during 
the 1970s to assert its foreign policy-making role vis- 
a-vis the Executive branch. These Acts oblige the Executive 
branch to take Congress into account before the final 
decisions on economic and military aid are made and
implemented, especially in the field of human rights,
and the sale of nuclear related material to foreign
countries. The notable developments in this regard were:
1. Foreign Assistance Act of 1973;
2. Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974;
3. International Development and Food 
Assistance Act of 1975;
4. International Security Assistance and 
Arms Export Act of 1976; and
5. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) 
of 1978.
The Foreign Assistance Act was amended in 1973 to 
authorize the President to deny economic or military 
assistance to the government of any foreign country which 
was engaged in practicing imprisonment of its country’s 
citizens for political purposes.(12 )
In 1974 Congress passed the Hughes-Ryan Amendment 
to the Foreign Assistance Act to prohibit the intelligence 
agency’s covert operations, except the collection of 
intelligence information by the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) in foreign countries.(13) This was followed 
by the establishment of the Senate and House Select 
Committees on Intelligence under the chairmanship of
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Senator Frank Church, and Representative Otis Pike 
respectively in 1975. The Church Committee was formed 
to investigate the CIA’s involvement in alleged 
assassination plots against foreign leaders,(14) whereas 
the main focus of the Pike Committee was on the CIA’s 
overseas operations. First, the Committee’s report provided 
evidence of the agency's failure to predict a number 
of international incidents, including the Soviet invasion 
of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Arab-Israel war of 1973, 
the Portuguese coup of 1974, and India's nuclear test 
of 1974. Second, the report proved the agency's covert
actions in the Italian parliamentary elections of 1972, 
arms support to Kurds against the government of Iraq, 
and its involvement in civil war in Angola in 1975.(15)
In addition, the promulgation of the presidential
Executive Orders of 1976 and 1978 by Ford and Carter 
respectively were, in fact mainly based on the 
recommendations pin-pointed by the above committees. 
Besides a number of restrictions, both the Executive
Orders imposed a ban on the CIA's direct or indirect 
assassination attempts.(16) Also in 1978, President Carter 
ordered the Director Central Intelligence (DCI) and heads 
of other intelligence agencies and bureaux to keep the
Senate and House Intelligence Committees regularly informed 
concerning U.S. intelligence activities abroad. Further 
the presidential order required to provide any information 
needed by above committees.(17)
In addition to the Foreign Assistance Act and the
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Hughes-Ryan Amendment, Congress passed the International 
Development and Food Assistance Act in 1975. Section 
116 of the Act reads: "No assistance may be provided under
this part to the government of any country which engages 
in a consistent pattern of gross violations of 
internationally recognized human rights."(18) The next 
legislation passed by Congress in 1975 was the 
International Security Assistance and Arms Export Act. 
(19)
After a long debate between the Executive and the 
Legislative branches during the Ford and the early Carter 
administrations, on the question of nuclear exports, 
Congress passed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act in 1978. 
The Act "require those states that import nuclear fuel 
and technology from the United States to accept the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection of 
all their nuclear facilities."(20)
Thus, the above mentioned legislation passed during 
the 1970s indicate the congressional intention to share 
foreign policy-making under powers given it by the 
constitution. The "constitution" in the words of Professor 
Corwin "is an invitation to struggle for the privilege 
of directing American foreign policy."(21)
However, in the absence of a clear constitutional 
distinction between a treaty and an executive agreement, 
modern presidents have usually concluded executive 
agreements with foreign countries, which are not subject 
to Senate ratification with two-thirds majority votes,
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rather passed by both houses with simple majority votes. 
For example, "during the first Nixon administration 1,087 
executive agreements were concluded, as opposed to only 
eight treaties."(22 )
The congressional involvement in foreign policy­
making since the early 1970s "can be deep [but] without 
being either effective or responsible", say Graham Allison 
and Peter Szanton.(23) This is mostly because it has 
too "diverse" a nature to play a leading role in foreign 
policy-making.
Kegley and Wittkopf have identified at least three 
obstacles to Congress' foreign policy-making role viz, 
"parochialism", "organizational weakness", and "lack of 
expertise."
Kegley and Wittkopf's first factor explains that 
Congressmen are mostly concerned about the problems and 
development of their respective constituencies since all 
members of the House and a third of Senate members bid 
for reelection after every 730 days. They therefore pay 
limited attention and spend less time on most foreign 
policy issues.
According to their second obstacle, the congressional 
power and authority is dispersed and fregmented. It 
has become more diluted since the 1970s reforms involving 
the decentralization of powers from committee to 
sub-committee, which in turn has reduced the importance 
and influence of the committees’ leadership.
Finally, the authors believe that the lack of
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expertise in the foreign affairs field is another hindrance 
to an effective congressional role in foreign 
policy-making. Although Congress has tried, for example, 
to fill that vacuum by creating the Office of Technology 
Assessment (OTA) to evaluate scientific and technical 
proposals, and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to 
analyse the budget options and to prepare the annual budget 
resolution; it still lacks a lot in comparison with 
the Executive branch.(24)
The post-1970s evidence suggest that Congress has 
usually taken advantage of bureaucratic friction in 
Washington, D.C, on major foreign policy issues. Those 
rivalries have proved a driving force which usually 
activates the otherwise "fragmented" Congress to step 
in as a united force in foreign policy matters. The best 
examples in this regard are the bureaucratic friction 
within the Nixon-Eissinger administration regarding the 
government’s Vietnam policy, and the leakages of secret 
information to press and Congress, which resulted in the 
passage of the War Powers Act in 1973. Another example 
in which Congress took advantage of bureaucratic friction 
was the Reagan administration’s policy towards South 
Africa. The bureaucratic rivalries in Washington in this 
regard virtually created a policy vacuum, which encouraged 
Congress to act against the administration’s South Africa 
policy. As a result, Congress passed the Comprehensive 
Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) in 1986, to inaugurate its policy 
towards the Republic. In both cases Congress overrode
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the presidential vetos.
In recognizing the congressional role in foreign 
policy-making, the Reagan administration’s Secretary of 
State, George Shultz, two months after the passage of 
the CAAA remarked in December 1986: "The administration’s
doubts about the utility of punitive sanctions were, and 
are serious. Neverthless, they are the law of the land, 
and we will enforce them."(25) Despite the congressional 
activism during the last couple of decades or so in 
foreign policy-making matters, the evidence suggest that 
the bureaucracy still control the reins of foreign policy 
because of its role in implementing laws.
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2.2 Role of Congress in Africa Policy-Making
The Congress comprises standing committees, select
or special committees, and sub-committees which, in fact
are the core of the Legislative body. It is here:
......... where expertise resides, where
policies incubate, where most legislative 
proposals are written or refined, where
many necessary compromises are made, where
the public can make its views known, and 
where members of Congress build influence
and reputation.(26)
The number of committees varies from Congress to Congress.
For example, the total number of committees and
sub-committees in both houses, at the beginning of the
102nd Congress (1991-1993) was 294, of which the Senate
comprised twenty committees (standing, special and select,
and joint) with eighty seven sub-committees. The total
number of committees in the House of Representatives was
twenty-seven with one hundred and forty-eight
sub-committees.(27)
Of 47 congressional committees, twenty eight are
engaged with foreign affairs responsibilities (see
Appendix C). Out of that, nineteen were established over
a passage of years during the 19th century, two in 1958,
and five during the 1970s, the decade of congressional
revolts and reforms. These committees, however, are "the
most powerful administrative units"(28) in the field of
foreign policy-making.
Among these the Foreign Relations Committee, and
the Armed Services Committee, in addition to other
committees shown in Appendix D, are the most important
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in the Senate. Similarly, in the House of Representatives, 
the Foreign Affairs Committee(29), and the Armed Services 
Committee are influential in this regard.
Traditionally the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
was regarded as an influential decision-making actor 
in foreign policy, because of its treaty-making power.
The role of its House equivalent Foreign Affairs
Committee on foreign policy questions quickly grew with
the emergence of U.S. economic commitments abroad in the 
post World War II period. The proposals to aid other 
nations require the consent of Congress.(30) However, 
the Armed Services Committees of both houses have 
jurisdiction over defence related policies, such as 
military assistance programmes.(31)
There are also Africa Sub-Committees in both houses. 
Throughout the 1980s the Senate Sub-Committee had been 
chaired by antiapartheid Senators, such as Dick Clark, 
Nancy Kassebaum, and Paul Simon. Also during the same 
period the House Sub-Committe had been headed by 
Congressman Howard Wolpe, a strong opponent of apartheid 
(see Appendix D) . Traditionally the House Sub-Committee 
on Africa has usually remained active in holding hearings 
on U.S. policy towards the continent. During the Nixon 
administration, the then Chairman of the House 
Sub-Committee on Africa, Charles Diggs announced that 
he could not continue to represent the United States as 
a delegate to the 26th General Assembly of the United 
Nations in 1971 because of the Nixon-Kissinger approach
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towards Africa, and resigned in protest from the 
delegation.(32)
During the early 1960s, Africa was so peripheral 
in the Senate that after the resignation of Senator Gore 
from the chair of the Senate Sub-Committee on Africa, 
no one was willing to chair the Sub-Committee. This trend, 
however, took a different turn during the mid-1970s when
the Senate Sub-Committee on Africa became much visible 
during the Angola debate. As a result, several Senators 
became interested in Africa and applied for its 
membership.(33)
Within Congress there exist a number of caucuses, 
such as the Polish-Americans, the Italian-Americans, the 
black-Americans etc. Among them the most effective in 
mobilizing public opinion has been the Congressional Black 
Caucus (CBC), comprised of black legislators. The CBC 
was formed in 1971 with a nine members who at that time
had only a small role in the congressional power 
structure. By 1991 its number had reached to twenty-six,
comprising twenty-five Democrats, and one Republican.(34)
The CBC is active in influencing U.S.-Africa policy 
through congressional pressure and private lobbying 
organizations. The idea for a foreign policy pressure 
group developed at the Black Leadership Conference, 
arranged by CBC in September 1976. The conference concluded 
with a resolution that this sort of gap in black-American 
influence on U.S.-Africa policy could be filled by
establishing a private pressure group. In the following
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year TransAfrica was incorporated in July 1977.
The CBC, however, sharpened its tools to influence 
U.S.-Africa policy shortly before the independence of 
the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea 
Bissau, With CBC at the forefront, assisted by white 
liberal Congressmen interested in, and concerned about 
Africa, Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act on 
December 30, 1974. The new section of the amended Act
said, "..........an official statement should be issued
of U.S. support for the independence of Angola, Mozambique, 
and Guinea Bissau, and of our desire to have good relations 
with the future governments of the countries.”(35) This 
was followed by the first CBC comprehensive critique of 
U.S.-Africa policy in December 1975 after the revelation 
of the covert CIA support for the Union for Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA).(36)
As has been suggested Congress has usually taken 
advantage of bureaucratic friction in Washington D.C. 
to step in to assert its constitutional role in foreign 
policy-making. In the case of Angola, among other factors, 
the bureaucratic rivalry played an important part in 
stimulating congressional interest in U .S .-Southern Africa 
policy. The bureaucratic dissension first came to the 
surface when information regarding the CIA’s involvement 
in Angola was leaked (by those who opposed the Ford 
administration's policy) to press, and Congress. This 
was followed by the resignation of Nathaniel Davis, 
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, in 1976 in protest
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against the Ford-Kissinger policy for covert military 
intervention in Angola. The last nail in U.S.-Angola policy 
was driven in by the resignation of John Stoclcwell, the 
head of the CIA’s Angola Task Force.
According to Sullivan Challenor, the CBC played 
one of the major roles in convincing Henry Kissinger in 
August 1975 to "make a major foreign policy statement 
[on Africa] and to take a fact-finding trip to Sub-Saharan 
Africa."(37) Between the CBC-Kissinger meeting of August
1975, and Kissinger’s trip to Southern Africa in April
1976, Congress cut off funds and military supplies to 
UNITA and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola 
(FNLA), in December 1975. This, however, also played a 
role in Ford-Kissinger's turn-about in U.S.-Africa policy. 
It was during this trip to Africa, that Kissinger extended 
the hand of friendship to black African states, and talked 
about majority rule in Southern Africa.
Throughout the Carter administration, the
Congressional Black Caucus "was a leading force in the 
fight to maintain U.S. sanctions against Rhodesia."(38) 
On the other hand, it is interesting to note that the 
CBC, as a united force, did not push hard for economic 
sanctions against South Africa during the Carter 
administration. In addition, the climate within Congress 
itself was not favourable in this regard as well.
With the inception of the Reagan administration 
in the White House in 1981, the United States "entered 
what might be considered a second postreconstruction phase
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during which the gains made by blacks in the late 1960s
[were] being eroded,"(39) says Herschelle Challenor. 
The efforts and appeals made by the black community both
inside and outside Congress, and by other sympathetic 
legislators to end minority rule in Southern Africa, did 
not receive much attention in the then existing climate 
in Washington. During the final year of the first Reagan 
term, Congressman Julian C.Dixon, then Chairman of the 
CBC wrote:
Africa unlike so many other geographical 
areas does not have a powerful lobby in 
the United States to guard its interests
and advocate on its behalf. It is therefore 
the responsibility of those of us in the
U.S. Congress who care about the continent 
to continue exerting pressure on Pretoria 
to force it to reevaluate constantly the 
cost of apartheid.(40)
Throughout the first Reagan term, the CBC and other 
black pressure organizations consolidated themselves and 
were waiting for a chance to overturn the Reagan 
administraion's Southern Africa policy.
The years between 1985 and 1986 were, in fact a 
period of the greatest foreign policy tension between 
the Executive and the Legislature since the Vietnam war. 
Throughout this period South Africa was on top of both 
the Reagan administration's and the congressional African 
agendas. By this time the administration's South Africa 
policy was no longer the preserve of the Democrats. On 
December 4, 1984, two Republican Senators, Richard G.Lugar
(Indiana), and Nancy L.Kassebaum (Kansas) sent a public 
letter to President Reagan asking him to speak out strongly
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against apartheid. In the following year the House of 
Representatives passed the Anti-Apartheid Act, generally 
known as the Gray-Kennedy Bill on June 5, 1985 by a vote
of 295-127, with 239 Democrats and 56 Republicans.(41) 
The Gray-Kennedy Bill, however, did not succeed in the 
Senate.
Between 1985 and 1986, President Reagan vetoed four 
foreign policy bills. The Congress sustained three and 
overrode one veto, related to South Africa policy, in 
which Congress imposed economic sanctions against the 
Republic. This bill was sponsored by a black legislator, 
Willaim H.Gray III. The Sanctions debate and its provisions 
will, however, be discussed in detail in a separate chapter 
later in this study.
89
2.3 Role of Public Opinion
"Decision-makers in foreign policy are much more 
intimately connected with their domestic than with their 
foreign environment", (42) wrote Joseph Franlcel in the 
early 1960s, when U.S. domestic and foreign policies 
were becoming significantly intertwined in the wake of
its growing military involvement in Vietnam. However, 
much has changed since then because of the revolutionary 
developments in electronic media.
How much influence public opinion and domestic 
interest groups, and organizations exercise in U.S. foreign 
policy-making is the focus of discussion in this section.
Although the term public opinion is frequently 
invoked it remains an ill-defined concept.(43) As a 
consequence of its vagueness(44) it is difficult to 
measure the extent and response given by governments to 
the preferences of their citizens in the foreign
policy-making arena. Sometimes the individual foreign 
policy issues which becomes the focus of public attention 
"can create a domestic environment that policy-makers 
are unlikely to ignore."(45) These kinds of issues are 
only brought to public limelight through protracted and 
hardworking mobilization of pressure group organizations 
and media
However, public opinion’s impact on foreign
policy-making has attracted the attention of many scholars 
who have written both for and against its role in 
policy-making process. Among those who emphasize its
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importance, and support its role are, for example, Lester 
Markel and Eugene R.Wittkopf. Markel, the philosopher 
journalist, who held the post of Sunday editor of the 
New York Times during the 1940s, wrote:
Public opinion, whether it be controlled, 
as in Russia, or uncontrolled, as in the 
United States, plays so important a role 
in foreign policy that it must be 
treated as a matter of the first 
importance.(46)
According to Wittkopf, ’’The public’s foreign policy beliefs 
importantly shape the domestic political environment within 
which presidents must formulate policy and build support 
for it.’’(47)
At least two theoretical models, the pluralist, 
and power elite, deal with public influence on foreign 
policy-making. The focus of the pluralist model of foreign
policy-making is that "individual Americans influence
policy by organizing themselves into groups to petition 
the government on behalf of their shared interest and 
values."(48) According to this model all Americans are 
members of these groups, which are often called interest 
or pressure groups. Therefore "the public is conceived
largely as a heterogeneous and varied society composed 
of many different groups with different interests."(49) 
The policy out-put, therefore is the result of a 
tug-of-war between these groups.
Some critics of this model argue that a small faction 
of influential individuals, groups and organizations is 
involved in the policy-making process based on their
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particular interests and preferences. Ordinary citizens 
are bystanders, only casually attentive to the 
policy-making conflicts.(50)
Another model which concentrates on public influence 
in foreign policy-making is the power-elite model, as 
articulated by C.Wright Mills. According to Mills, those 
individuals who head the military, corporate and 
governmental departments, in fact make decisions and
control America. The family and social interrelationships 
among the three elites are very close. Moreover, this 
group of individual decision-makers shares similar origins, 
education, career and lifestyles.(51)
Thus, the disagreement among the ruling elite model 
versions exists in relation to the conspiratorial role
of the elite. Some versions assume that elites directly 
and secretly communicate and cooperate with one another 
during the policy-making process, and that they are
therefore conspirators.(52)
In this context the Carter and the Reagan 
administrations may be treated as examples of
conspiracy-oriented theory. In the Carter administration, 
the focus was on the presence of a large number of 
Trilateral Commission members in high-level policy-making 
positions. The Trilateral Commission, ujiwcU u > a .s  es+c^ ksKecl cm. -tv* 
f ^ i W K v / e  o f  the Council on Foreign Relations, was organized 
in 1973 to coordinate economic policy between the United 
States, Western Europe, and Japan. Nineteen of the 
CommissionTs sixty-five members were appointed to top
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positions or served as official advisers in the Carter 
administration, including Jimmy Carter himself, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, Cyrus Vance, Harold Brown, and Walter 
Mondale.(53)
Similarly, in the Reagan administration at least 
a dozen top officials and thirty-one advisers were members 
of the Council on Foreign Relations. (54) These included, 
for example, George Bush, Casper Weinberger, George Shultz, 
Alexander Haig, Donald Regan, and William Casey.(55).
The power-elite theories assume there is no such 
conspiracy but rather a convergence of interest among 
economic, military, and governmental elites that lead 
them to prefer similar policies.(56) In sum, only a few 
thousand top-echelon individuals could influence foreign 
policy decisions in the United States.
However, the above models suggest that there are 
many kinds of public, not a single public. Gabriel Almond 
and many other observers who follow his pioneering work 
about the role of public opinion in foreign policy-making, 
are of the belief that U.S. public is divided into segments 
in this regard.(57) Almond divided the U.S. public into 
three parts; "the mass public", "the attentive public", 
and "the opinion elite" public. He argued that the mass 
or general public consisting of about seventy-five to 
ninety percent of the adult population is uninformed about 
specific foreign policy issues. They usually share the 
belief and values of their leaders when they elect or 
select them. Therefore this group of the public does
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not affect the day-to-day conduct of foreign policy.
The second segment of Almond's public, "the attentive 
public", consists of more or less ten percent of the 
adult population, which is informed and interested in 
the country's foreign policy. This group of people usually 
reads the New York Times , the Washington Post , and 
other equally important newspapers, and periodicals, and 
are generally associated with various interest groups 
or ethnic organizations. This segment of the public, says 
Almond, provides a liaison between the vast majority of
ordinary citizens and the "elite public".
The "Opinion elite public" Almond's third category
 is composed of one to two percent of the adult
population of the country. These are the people who in 
fact formulate the policy options through their writings 
in newspapers, books etc, and in seminars from various 
platforms. In turn, their ideas are being discussed by 
policy-makers during the policy-making process. The members 
who constitutes this category of public, for example, 
includes syndicated columists; academics; staff members 
of the most powerful House and Senate committees; such
as the armed services, and foreign affairs committees; 
the Representatives and Senators etc.(58)
During the last two decades or so, the American
public have become more interested in international
politics and foreign policy matters, mainly because of 
the tremendous developments in both printed and electronic 
media. For example, television shaped the attitudes of
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the American public through intense coverage of the mid
-1980s' violence in South Africa and the domestic 
sanctions debate against the Republic.
In addition to the role of media, the mobilization 
of public opinion is another important factor which cannot
be neglected in this area. For example, it would be fair
to cite the role played by anti-Vietnam leaders in
mobilizing the public opinion against U.S. policy towards 
Vietnam. The mobilization of public opinion in this case, 
however, seems to have been tied to the course of events 
in South East Asia because of the escalation of war during 
the Johnson and the early Nixon administrations. "The 
percentage of Americans who said it had been a mistake 
for the United States to send troops to Vietnam ranged 
from over 25 percent (in 1965) to 58 percent (in 
1969)."(59)
However, despite the rise of anti-war sentiments 
in the United States, public opinion was not the major 
driving force which compelled the policy-makers to change 
the course of Vietnam policy, rather one of the many 
factors. These included for example, "the lack of military
progress.........casualities caused by military engagement,
and great economic cost of the war."(60)
As has been discussed above, the central assumption 
of the pluralist model is that the public has an impact 
on the course of policy through interest group 
organizations. What are interest groups? David Truman 
in his celebrated book, 'The Governmental Process:
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Political Interests and Public Opinion', has defined the
term as referring to:
...... any group that, on the
basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes
certain claims upon other groups in the
society for the establishment, maintenance, 
or enhancement of forms of behavio[u]r that 
are employed by the shared attitudes.(61) 
According to the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences
it is Ma voluntary association of individuals who band
together for the defense of an "interest"........ the term
may be used interchangeably with pressure groups...."(62),
what Joseph Frankel calls "a fashionable term for sactional
organizations which exercise influence on politics."(63)
Christopher Hill suggest that pressure groups should
be distinguished from interest groups. Not all interest
groups are pressure groups. Pressure groups mostly act
on government, whereas interest groups act on society
in general. They have a wider function to try to convince
fellow citizens.(64)
Keeping the nature of American pressure groups in
view, Gabriel Almond identified seven major categories
of U.S. pressure groups which are involved in foreign
policy politics, including organized labour, such as
the American Federation of Labour, and Congress of
Industrial Organization; business organizations, such
as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and National Association
of Manufacturers; agricultural groups, such as the Farm
Bureau Federation; veteran groups, such as the American
Legion; women's groups, such as^ American Association of
University Women; religious groups, such as the National
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Council of Churches; and ethnic groups, such as Jews 
etc.(65)
How much influence a particular interest group wields 
in the foreign policy arena is hard to measure. In 
Milbrath's opinion the interest group influences are great 
when the issue is not in the limelight.(66) As opposed
to the influence of an interest/pressure group, the general 
public reaction emerges effectively when the issue is
in the limelight, such as during the Vietnam war, and 
the mid-1980s' crisis in South Africa.
As compared to other major pressure groups which 
are interested in foreign policy decision-making,"the 
ethnic groups participation on foreign policy issues 
remained low until the early 1970s."(67) These groups 
includes for example, the Jewish-Americans, the 
Irish-Americans, the Polish-Americans, the black-Americans 
etc .
Of all the ethnic minorities, the Jewish-American
lobby usually exert great influence in determining the 
course of U.S. policy towards Israel, since its creation 
in 1948. Sherman Adams, an assistant to President
Eisenhower, pointed out the influence of the Jewish lobby 
by saying:
Any attempt to give aid to Arabs always 
met with opposition behind the scenes in 
Washington, where the members of Congress
were actually aware of the strong popular 
sentiments in this country for Israel. Had
the members of Congress either underestimated
or overlooked the strength of such feeling
they would have been quickly reminded of
it by the alert representatives of the many 
well-organized pro-Israel lobbies that were
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always effective and influential in the 
capital. ( 68)
During the first half of the 1970s the influence 
of ethnic groups on foreign policy-making became more 
significant when Congress passed two pieces of legislation, 
probably under the influence of the Jewish-American and 
the Greek-American lobbies. In 1972 Congress passed the 
Jackson-Vanil Amendment to tie in the Soviet Union's 
most-favoured nations status with the Soviet willingness 
to allow its Jewish citizens to emigrate to the country 
of their choice, A second bill passed by Congress, in 
which the Greelc-Amer ican lobby played an important role, 
enforced an arms embargo on Turkey in 1974 over its 
occupation of northern Cyprus.(69)
Unlike the Jewish community, the black-American 
ethnic minority, which comprises at least 13 percent of 
the population of the United States, who have always had 
an interest in Africa, have had a little influence in 
determining the course of U.S. policy towards the continent 
of their ancestors,(70) despite their effectiveness in 
mobilizing public opinion as in case of South Africa.
Until now we have discussed the power of public, 
and interest/pressure group organizations to influence 
foreign policy decisions in the United States. With this 
in mind we have to focus our attention on the role of 
Africa-related pressure groups in the making of U.S.-Africa 
policy.
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2.4 Role of Pressure Groups in Africa Policy-Making
As has been mentioned in the previous section (2.2), 
within Congress Africa-related policy issues have usually 
been activated by the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) 
and white liberal Congressmen interested in African issues. 
Outside Congress the black American mobilization over 
U.S. policy towards Africa in the 1970s and 1980s involved 
mass activities such as demonstrations by Afro-oriented 
organizations, and black community mobilization through 
organizations, such as TransAfrica.(71) However, since 
the inception of the Carter administration in 1977, with 
its emphasis on Southern African issues, the primary focus 
of Afro-oriented organizations both inside and outside 
Congress had been on South Africa.
It must be noted that out of more or less 12 
prominent U.S. national anti-aparthied organizations whose 
primary focus was on the apartheid regime of South Africa, 
there have been three predominantly black organizations: 
the Washington based TransAfrica, the New York based 
National Black United Front, and the Congressional Black 
Caucus, composed of black-American legislators.(72)
The pressure groups in this discussion, however, 
refer to black-Amer ican ethnic groups who have been and 
are interested in U.S. policy towards Africa. The role 
of the anti-apartheid groups most of whom came into 
existence since 1962(73), will be discussed in a separate 
chapter dealing with sanctions issue later in this study.
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Traditionally the black-American organizations have 
had a little influence in making of U.S.-Africa policy. 
But "....there has consistently existed a base of interest 
of these organizations which has been delegitimized by 
racial subordination."(74)
Since the early nineteenth century, the 
black-Americans started developing an interest in Africa 
related foreign policy issues through social and political 
organizations. Notable in this regard are: the American
Colonization Society (ACS), created in January 1817; the 
Council of African Affairs (CAA), which came into existence 
in 1937; the American Committee on Africa (ACOA), founded
in 1953; the American Society of African Culture (AMSAC),
created in 1957; the American Negro Leadership Conference 
on Africa and African Liberation Support Committee (ANLCA), 
founded in 1957; and TransAfrica, established in 1977.(75) 
Until the heyday of African independence during 
the late 1950s and the early 1960s, black-Americans and 
their grass-root organizations placed special emphasis 
on, and were more interested in, cultural links with the 
continent of their ancestors.(76) From the American
Colonization Society (ACS), until the establishment of 
TransAfrica in 1977, the major protest made by 
black-Americans was during the inter-War period at the 
time of the Italian invasion of Ethiopia as early as
1935. The major focus of this protest was against the 
U.S. government’s neutral attitude in this conflict.
However, despite their lesser political clout, the
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major achievement of these organizations in the opinion 
of Peter Duignan was the establishment of the African 
Affairs Division in the State Department.(77)
The early 1970s was a period of political unheavals 
in the United States, which affected black-American 
politics as well. As a result of their internal divisions, 
the African Liberation Committee (ALSC), formed in the 
1960s, fragmented into various groups. The most successful 
of such groups is TransAfrica, Currently it is the major 
black-American political pressure group in the United 
States which tries to influence U.S. policy towards Africa 
and the Caribbean basin.
Jimmy Carter's victory in the presidential elections 
in 1976 opened up new avenues for black-Americans to 
influence the Carter administration's Africa policy. 
President Carter's early Africa policy was much influenced 
by Andrew Young, a blaclc-Amer ican, who was appointed as 
a U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations (1977-79). In 
addition, President Carter appointed more blacks to 
high-level State Department posts and as ambassadors than 
any other Chief Executive in U.S. history.(78) The most 
prominent after Young was his deputy Donald F.McHenry, 
who led the Contact Group of five Western powers, formed 
by the United Nations in 1977, to negotiate the Namibian 
settlement. However, after Young's resignation in 1979, 
because of his alleged meeting with the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) representative to the UN, 
McHenry succeeded him as U.S. Ambassador to the UN.
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Thus the black-American organizations both inside 
and outside Congress continued their grass-roots work
throughout the first Reagan term. One of the important 
developments of the mid-1980s1 was the presidential
election campaign of 1984. In this regard the presidential 
candidate "Jackson’s campaign was an important instrument 
in carrying policy issues directly to the prospective
voter.......... "(79)
The black-American ethnic group tried throughout 
the 1970s, and the early 1980s to influence the
U .S .-Southern Africa policy and to gain acceptance for 
economic sanctions against South Africa, through 
demonstrations and other peaceful mobilization and methods, 
but did not achieve its objectives because of unfavourable 
circumstances. Thus, the success of an ethnic group like 
black-Americans, which is not politically and financially 
influential like Jewish-Americans, needs favourable
surroundings in addition to public mobilization to 
influence policy decisions. Among all ethnic pressure 
groups in the United States, the black-American group 
is most probably the only one which has been trying through 
mass activities to influence U.S. policy towards Africa.
In sum, the mid-1980s1 wave of black-American 
influence on U.S.-Africa policy seems to be receding. 
This does not mean that ethnic politics will disappear; 
it could reappear again in future with the same force 
and fervour.
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Conclusion
In this chapter we have seen that Congress has 
become effective in some major foreign policy issues since 
the 1970s, such as Vietnam, Angola, South Africa, etc. 
In these cases Congress has dictated policy. These examples 
also suggest that congressional interest usually develops 
and becomes effective when the issue is in the public 
limelight and when there is a serious bureaucratic rivalry 
on a particular policy issue.
It has further suggested that interest groups, such
as business, military industrial groups etc, seem to
be effective on policy decisions, because most of the 
issues do not come to public notice. So far as the role 
of the general public is concerned, it only becomes 
effective in certain circumstances, for example, in 
relation to Vietnam, and South Africa. Unlike the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s, currently the U.S. public interest in 
foreign affairs seems to be diminishing with growing 
domestic economic pressures and unemployment. The U.S. 
public is concerned about domestic issues more than foreign 
affairs. One cannot say with certainty how long this trend 
will last.
In sum, neither Congress, nor interest groups, 
nor ethnic organizations influence the day-to-day conduct 
of foreign relations in the United States.
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CHAPTER III
STRATEGIC MINERALS AS A FACTOR IN U.S.-SOUTH AFRICA POLICY 
Introduction
The issue of non-fuel minerals imported from Southern 
Africa has always been on the policy agenda in Washington 
ever since the Second World War, with varying degrees 
of concern, heightened for example during the Korean war 
in the early 1950s, but subsiding soon after and reviving 
again in the late 1960s with the Soviet naval build-up 
in the Indian Ocean, followed by the emergence of the 
pro-Moscow governments in Luanda and Maputo in the mid 
1970s, the Soviet-Cuban military presence in Angola, and 
growing tensions in South Africa. It was in the wake of 
these events that policy-makers began to think about U.S. 
dependence on South African minerals and a possible 
disruption in the flow of their supply as a serious 
national problem. Since then a series of mechanisms, such 
as strengthening the national stockpile, research and 
development, and search for new sources outside South 
Africa, have been undertaken to deal with these 
situations.
This chapter is an attempt to examine first the 
economics and politics of strategic minerals; then the 
U.S. minerals policy; and finally the relationship between 
strategic minerals policy and other aspects of South Africa
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policy will be analysed.
3.1 The Economics and Politics of Strategic Minerals
Since the 1960s, studies by different U.S. Executive 
agencies and departments, as well as others done by various 
individuals, groups, and organizations, have developed 
a variety of terminologies to define minerals as specified, 
critical, identified, certified, and strategic. For the 
purposes of this study, however, the term strategic will 
be used. At least two factor make minerals strategic:
on the one hand, where they are imported by the industrial 
world, and on the other, they are most crucial to the 
advance of modern technology. Thus, for example, according 
to the U.S. Strategic and Critical Minerals Stockpile
Revision Act (50, U.S.C 95) strategic materials are those 
which
(a) would be needed to supply the military,
industrial, and civilian requirements of 
the United States during an emergency, and;
(b) or not found or produced in the United- 
States in sufficient quantities to meet 
such needs. (1)
In Michael Shafer’s opinion "these minerals bear 
the title strategic not because they are critical and 
irreplaceable in general, but because they are critical 
in certain specific defence related uses,"(2) such as 
jet turbines, armaments etc. The U.S. Office of Technology
Assessment in its report on import vulnerability (1985) 
employed the term strategic to cover both criticality 
and vulnerability of non-fuel minerals imported by the
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United States. The vulnerability, however, refers here
to the dependence of the United States for supplies of
these minerals mostly from one source. In the assessment
of one of the foreign minerals specialists in the U.S.
Bureau of Mines and Minerals, Washington D.C., the term
strategic ”is very dependent upon whom you talk to?”
Like the auto industry in the United States 
may be defined as an strategic industry. 
Why? Because they provide employment for
several million people. Because it is major 
industry in the [U.S] mid-west and Michigan 
and so on. So for that matter strategic 
materials would include the commodity which 
using auto industry specifically, for 
instance the platinum group metals because 
its major application in catalytic 
convertors makes it strategic. Usually 
the term implies a nation’s perception of
vulnerability to supply disruption and 
the need to safeguard industry from the
repercussions of the loss of suppliers.(3)
Thus, to make the concept clearer we should look
into the uses of five strategic minerals, under discussion 
in this chapter, which are considered critical to the
defence industries.
The main metallurgical uses of Chromium are to 
improve hardness, impart high temperature strength, and
prevent rust in steel. It is therefore, essential for
stainless steel. The aerospace industry is one of the
major users of chromium, particularly for the production
of steel and nickle-based alloys. Chromium is required 
for the production of certain alloys needed for jet engines 
and gas turbines. It is also used as a colouring agent
and in the production of refractory materials, such as
brick to line furnaces used in high temperature 
metallurgical smelting.
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Manganese is used in iron and s tee 1-making and as 
an alloying element to harden and strengthen steel. It 
is also used to make batteries and chemicals.
Six related metals constitute the platinum group 
(pgm). They are platinum, palladium, iridium, osmium, 
rhodium, and ruthenium. In the United States, Western 
Europe, and the Far East, the use of platinum in catalytic 
convertors in automobile exhaust system has created a 
large demand. In addition, these metals have a large 
application in jewellery in Japan. These metals are also 
used in other applications, for example, platinum-iridium 
alloys in computer memory devices etc. Pgm are also used 
in the production of nitrogenous fertilizers.
The main use of vanadium is as an alloy in high 
strength low-alloy steel used in high-rise buildings, 
bridges, oil and gas pipelines, especially under arctic 
conditions, and autos.
Cobalt is an essential component of various alloys 
because it imparts heat and wear resistance, high strength 
and superior magnetic qualities. It is also very important 
in the making of electrical products.(4)
Little information is available concerning the use 
of strategic minerals by the defence industrial sector. 
Pure chrome can be used to form a super-alloy for use 
in jet engines, missiles, gun and other weapons system, 
as well as in other high stress applications. Cobalt is 
also very much important to defence related industries 
because of its use in jet turbines, and high temperature
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resistive alloys. Finally, the use of vanadium in aerospace 
industry is also important in this regard.
Most of the minerals studies done in the industrial 
West are based on U.S. sources and data. Tables 3.1 to
3.5 in this section are also prepared from various U.S. 
government sources which give the percentage of total 
world production of the above mentioned strategic minerals 
from 1976 to 1988.
Table 3.1 shows that the Republic of South Africa 
is the world’s largest single producer of chromium, 
followed by the former Soviet Union as the second largest. 
Albania, Turkey, and Zimbabwe also produce chromium in 
good quantity. There are adequate prospects to increase 
the production of chromium in these countries.
According to the U.S. Bureau of Mines and Minerals 
Yearbook (1986), "no chromium ore was mined in the United 
States except for a small amount produced in 1976." The 
U.S. Bureau of Mines Bulletin 697 (1987) estimates that
South Africa controls access to 99 percent of the world's 
known chromium resources. It also has the world's largest 
resource and reserve base, as well as the largest 
production capacity. South Africa, by virtue of its 
dominant position, has the greatest influence in setting 
the floor prices of chromium and ferro-chromium (refined 
chrome).(5)
Table 3.2 indicates that the former Soviet Union 
is the world's leading producer of manganese ore, followed 
by South Africa. Manganese is also mined in Australia,
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Brazil and Gabon. Manganese production in the United States 
consist of only a small quantity of low grade material 
for brick colouring. "The only production and shipment 
of material containing 5 percent or more manganese is 
mined in Cherokee County, South Carolina, by brick 
contractors and manufacturers."(6) These domestic sources 
are very uneconomical.
Table 3.3 shows that South Africa is the leading 
producer of platinum and the former Soviet Union is the 
main producer of palladium. Canada stands third as a 
producer by virtue of its recovery of platinum as a 
by-product of nickle production. The Stillwater mines 
at Montana is the only producing pgm mine in the United 
States. The U.S. Bureau of Mines states that there are 
possible domestic pgm deposits in Alaska and Minnesota. 
According to the Minerals Yearbook (1990, p. 745) 
in the future most new production capacity for pgm is 
expected to come from South Africa.
Table 3.4 shows that South Africa is the world's 
largest supplier of vanadium ores. The former Soviets1 
vanadium production is almost equal to that of South Africa 
but is mainly consumed domestically. Other major producers 
of vanadium are the People's Republic of China, and the 
United States. The U.S. Bureau of Mines reported in 1988 
that the Wilson Spring, Arkansas deposits is the only 
domestic deposit to be mined exclusively for vanadium. 
Other potential deposits are in Colorado, Ihadho, and 
New Mexico,
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Table 3.5 indicates that Zaire is the leading 
producer of cobalt in the world, followed by Zambia and 
the former Soviet Union, number two and three respectively. 
In the case of cobalt, South Africa is not a major 
supplier, but Zaire and Zambia are the leading exporters 
of cobalt to the United States. They transport most of 
their cobalt to the United States and her industrial allies 
through South Africa. However, "there are large amounts 
of potentially recoverable cobalt in the United States, 
in particular the copper-nickle Dulath Cabbro in Minnesota, 
but none of the deposits are producing at this time."(7)
Thus, the above figures show that South Africa is 
the leading world producer of chromium, platinum, and 
vanadium. The former Soviet Union leads the world in 
production of manganese, and palladium. Canada is the 
third largest producer of platinum group metals after 
South Africa and the former Soviet Union by virtue of 
its recovery of platinum as a by-product of nickle 
production. Zaire and Zambia, and the former Soviet Union 
are the largest producers of cobalt.
Table 3.6 shows the annual data for consumption 
of these minerals as of 1987. The U.S. Minerals Commodity 
Summaries (1988) published the following figures of U.S. 
import reliance on five strategic minerals from South 
Africa during 1987:
Table 3.7 shows U.S. import reliance on these 
minerals in general and from South Africa in particular.
123
Table 3,6
Annual Consumption of Minerals
Platinum Consumption Annual Data
Former Soviet Bloc 0.7 Million Troy Ounces
U.S.A. 1.0 =
West Europe 0.4 = = =
Japan 1.0 —  = =
Chromium Consumption Annual Data
Former Soviet Bloc 1.0 Million Troy Ounces
U.S.A. 0.4 =
West Europe 0.7 =
Japan 0.5 = = =
Others 0.4
Manganese Consumption Annual Data
Former Soviet Bloc 3.1 Million Short Tons
U.S.A. 0.7 = — =
West Europe 2.0 = = =
Japan 1.4 = = =
China 0.7 =
Canada 0.2 = = =
Others 1.0 = = =
Vanadium Consumption Annual Data
Former Soviet Bloc 14.0 Thousand Short Tons
U.S.A. 4.8 =
West Europe 4.5 =
Japan 3.6 = =
China 3.0 = = =
South Africa 1.4 = = =
Others 0.5 = = =
Cobalt Consumption Annual Data
Former Soviet Bloc 13.0 Million Pounds
U.S.A. 17.0 = =
West Europe 13.0 =
Japan 0.8 = =
Others 0.3
Source: U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, ’Oversight Hearings
Before the Sub-Committee on Mining and Natural Resources of
the Committee of the Interior and Insular Affairs, 100th
Congress, First Session December 10, 1987, U.S. Government
Printing Office , Washington, D.C.
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Table 3 .7
U.S. Import Reliance Imports From South Africa
(percentage) (percentage)
Manganese 100 28
Chromium 75 47
PGM 88 51
Vanadium 54 50
Cobalt 86 71*
From Zaire and Zambia, through South Africa's 
transportation system.
In addition to imports from South Africa, the United 
States minerals import reliance on the former Soviet Union 
during the same period was as follows:
Table 3.8
U.S. Import Reliance on the former Soviet Union
1987 (percentage)
Manganese.............................................  00
Chromium..........................    02
Platinum Group Metals...............................  07
Vanadium..............................................  00
Cobalt................................................. 00
Source: U.S. General Accounting Office, ’Strategic
Minerals: Extent of U.S. Reliance on South
Africa', Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C, June 1988.
In the light of above figures for the U.S. 
percentage of world production and its consumption of 
strategic minerals, it is safe to say that U.S. domestic
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production of these minerals cannot keep pace with domestic 
industrial demand, both civilian and military. The gap 
between what the United States produces and what it needs 
is considerable in almost all categories. A high standard 
of living in the United States and her industrial allies 
is sustainable only by regular consumption of these key 
non-fuel minerals.
The Republic of South Africa has an estimated 58 
percent of the World's chromium reserves, 82 percent of 
its platinum group metals, 50 percent of its vanadium, 
90 percent of its manganese,(8) (see Appendix E) and 
deposits of almost all minerals of significance to the 
United States, the Western Europe, and Japan.
However, Japan has been the biggest customer for 
South African strategic minerals, especially chromium, 
ferro-chromium, and platinum group metals. In 1984 Japan 
reasserted itself over the United States as the largest 
consumer of platinum.(9) This upward trend continued until 
October 1985, when Japan announced that it was imposing 
trade sanctions against South Africa.(10)
Long before the passage of the Comprehensive Anti- 
Apartheid Act (CAAA) in 1986, Japan, because of possible 
future supply disruption in the flow of strategic minerals 
from South Africa, has been funding the mining groups 
in neighbouring areas and the Latin American countries. 
The chromium mines of the Philippines and New Caledonia, 
and the manganese mines of Australia and India have all 
received Japanese financial backing. "The Overseas Economic
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Cooperation Fund is also involved in a number of major 
exploration programmes in Papua-New Guinea. Shaba [Zaire], 
Malaysia, and Indonesia."(11)
Apart from the search for alternative sources of 
strategic minerals outside South Africa, the Japanese 
have established a stockpile of strategic minerals, 
comparatively smaller than the U.S. stockpile. "The 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), 
budgeted about $ 16 million to purchase stockpile materials 
in fiscal year 1989 (April 1, 1989 to March 31, 1990)".(12)
The above analysis has shown that minerals under 
discussion in this chapter are essential and critical 
for both civilian and military uses. Although their 
concentration is in South Africa and in the former Soviet 
Union, they are also mined in Southern Africa, Canada, 
Australia, and other countries as well.
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3.2 U.S. Minerals Policy: An Overview
Shortly after the First World War, and again in 
1930, the U.S. Congress held a series of hearings on 
resource supply problems, which resulted in the Strategic 
and Critical Minerals Stockpiling Act in 1939.(13) The 
passage of the Act marked the beginning of modern U.S. 
minerals policy, and has provided the basis for minerals 
stockpile activity as well. The Second World War again 
highlighted the vulnerabilities in minerals supply. In 
1946, based upon the war time experience of coping with 
shortages in raw materials supplies, Congress amended 
the Stockpiling Act of 1939, and the national defence 
stockpiling programme was begun in earnest.(14)
In the immediate post-World War II years (1946-48) 
the United States was dependent on the Soviet Union for 
almost its entire supply of chromium and manganese.(15) 
The Berlin crisis of mid-1948 raised the question of U.S. 
dependence on the rival Soviet Union for these minerals. 
The looming danger of a cut-off of Soviet supplies became 
reality when "in December 1948, it notified shippers of 
impending cut backs in chromium and manganese sales, a 
more long anticipated."(16) The Soviet embargo on minerals 
export to the United States was a political action. It 
was in response to the U.S. cut-off of export of machinery 
and scientific equipment to the Soviet Union. As a result, 
"the Republic of South Africa, Turkey, and India boosted 
their exports of manganese and chromium to the United 
States to replace supplies lost from the Soviet Union."(17)
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Ever since that time the United States has been fully 
aware of its weak non-fuel minerals position. The cut-off 
of the Soviet supplies did not seriously hamper the U.S. 
defence industryfs ability to meet Korean war needs(18) 
in the early 1950s. But the war and its defence 
requirements did create an awareness within the defence 
and other policy-making branches of the great strategic 
importance of minerally rich Southern Africa.
By acknowledging the importance of South Africa 
as a major source of strategic minerals in the region, 
the United States, just three months after the Soviet 
cut-backs of chromium and manganese, "up graded its 
diplomatic representation in the Republic to the 
ambassadorial level,"(19) in March 1949. Two comprehensive 
steps to study the country’s strategic minerals 
requirements were taken during the Truman administration 
(1945-53). First, the Defence Production Act, approved 
by Congress in September 1950, second, Truman’s Material 
Policy Commission of 1952, more commonly called the Paley 
Commission. The major emphasis of the Defence Production 
Act was to provide specific authority for allocations 
and priorities according to its Title I. And Title III 
of the Act had been focused on reducing the country's 
dependence on foreign sources and expanding the domestic 
mobilization of strategic minerals.
The Paley Commission, which was formed to examine 
where the country was heading in the next quarter century, 
concluded in its report:
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The United States must reject
self-sufficiency as a policy and instead 
adopt the policy of the lowest cost 
acquisition of materials wherever secure 
supplies may be found: Self-sufficiency,
when closely viewed, amounts to a self- 
imposed blockade and nothing more.(20)
Why did the Paley Commission recommend the "rejection 
of self-sufficiency" in the field of strategic minerals? 
And, who were the secure suppliers of strategic minerals 
outside the Communist world? The background of members
of the Commission, and the then existing U.S. policy
towards South Africa could provide the answer to these 
questions. Almost all the members of the Commission were 
aware of the fact that South Africa was the only major 
producer of strategic minerals in the so-called free world, 
with cheap labour, secure investment, and its massive 
return. "William Paley himself was the president of the 
Columbian Broadcasting System. Other members of the 
Commission included: George R.Brown, president of the
Brown Engineering Corporation; Arthur H.Bunker, president 
of the Climax Molybdenum Company (mining); Eric Hodgins 
editor for the Fortune magazine; and Edward S.Mason, Dean 
of the Harvard School of Public Administration, and the 
former U.S. Under Secretary of State for Economic 
Affairs."(21) All the Commission members were either 
businessmen or defenders of the U.S. corporate interests. 
Therefore, they saw the national interests with their 
respective corporations’ perspectives. Throughout the 
1950s and 1960s the Paley report remained an important 
instrument in the making of the U.S. minerals policy.
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It was during this time that Congress, on Truman's
recommendations, reexamined the stockpile programme and
provided substantial funds for stockpiling strategic
minerals.(22) The Truman administration’s concern in this
regard was continued by the Eisenhower administration
(1953-61). In assessing President Eisenhower’s commitment
Eckes has noted:
Through the mid-1950s, the Eisenhower admini­
stration pursued a systemic policy 
of building up material stock piles, and
the explanation for this vigorous policy 
rests with Eisenhower himself. The old
general believed raw materials were better 
than gold; "the materials within our stock 
piles represent insurance against disaster’’ 
he told friends at a White House stag dinner.
In 1956, when other members of the National
Security Council suggested the government 
economize and cut back on its mobilization 
stock pile, because raw materials reserves 
caused uncertainty in the commodities markets 
and because these inventories seemed anachro­
nistic in an age of atomic war, Eisenhower 
stood firm.(23)
Most of the materials now in the U.S. stockpile
were acquired during the 1950s.(24) Table 3.9 shows the 
stock of five strategic minerals in U.S. National Defence 
Stockpile as of 1987.
Throughout the 1960s the strategic minerals issue 
remained overshadowed by the successive administrations' 
preoccupation with the Vietnam war. It, however, reemerged 
during the first part of the 1970s when U.S. minerals
vulnerability during peace time became apparent after
the Arab oil embargo of 1973, The current consistent
initiatives taken by U.S. policy-makers regarding the
importance of strategic minerals can be marked from the
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late 1970s. Events such as the fall of the Shah of Iran; 
the Soviet activities in Afghanistan; and the Soviet-Cuban 
military activities in minerally rich Southern Africa 
and the strategically important Horn of Africa had a deep 
impact on the whole spectrum of International Relations. 
It was during the Shaba. II crisis of 1978 in minerally
rich Zaire, which caused the disruption in the flow of 
cobalt for a short period, that attention was sharply
focused on strategic minerals.
In response to the Shaba crisis Congress reacted 
quickly by revising and upgrading the prior law related 
to Stockpiles in 1979. Among other measures, the Strategic 
and Critical Materials Stockpiling Revision Act
specifically declared that stockpile of minerals are for 
the purposes of national defence, emergency, or war. Before 
the revision of the Act the stockpile of minerals had 
been used for price controls during the Johnson and 
Nixon presidencies.
From 1980, several reports dealing with supply 
vulnerability and substitutes for strategic minerals 
were prepared in the United States including:
[1] ’Import of Minerals from South Africa by U.S. and 
OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development] Countries.’ Prepared for the Sub-Committee 
on African Affairs of U.S. Senate, 96th Congress, 1980.
[2] 'Sub-Saharan Africa: Its Role in Critical Mineral
Needs of the Western World.’ A Report Prepared by the 
Sub-Committee on Mines and Mining of the Committee on
the Interior, and Insular Affairs of U.S. House of
Representatives, 96th Congress, July 1980.
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[3] 'U.S. Minerals Vulnerability: National Policy
Implications.' Report presented in the House of 
Representatives, 96th Congress, 1980.
[4] 'U.S. Minerals Dependence on South Africa.' A Report 
to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 97th 
Congress, October 1982.
[5] 'Strategic Minerals: Technologies to Reduce U.S. 
Import Vulnerability.' Congressional Office of Technology 
Assessment (OTA) Report, 1985.
[6] 'Strategic Minerals.' 101st Congress, House of 
Representatives Report, July 11, 1989.
Apart from these policy Reports, a number of Laws 
regarding the strategic minerals policy have been passed 
in the United States since the late 1970s. Notable in 
this regard were:
[1] Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act, passed 
in 1980.
[2] National Materials and Minerals Policy Research and 
Development Act passed in 1980, places increased emphasis 
on materials research and development in the United States.
[3] National Critical Materials Act was passed by 
Congress in 1984. It directed the establishment of a 
National Materials Council in the Executive Office of 
the President to assist in Executive branch strategic 
materials policy formation and coordination and to oversee 
the Federally Advanced Research and Development Programme.
In addition to congressional reports and
Legislative Acts, presidential initiatives since the 1970s 
are also an important indications with regard to strategic 
and critical minerals. Significant in this regard were:
[1] Carter's Non-Fuel Minerals Policy Review of 1977.
[2] Reagan's National Material and Minerals Programme
Plan and Report to Congress, 1982.
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[3] Creation of Office of Strategic Resources within 
the Department of Commerce, 1983.
[4] Creation of National Strategic Materials and Minerals 
Programme Advisory Committee with the Department of 
Interior, 1984.
[5] Revised Stockpile Recommendation, 1985.
[6] Executive Order which assigns the Department of 
Defence as a National Defence Stockpile Manager, 1988.
While these policy reports, Legislative Acts, and 
presidential initiatives emphasize the importance of 
strategic minerals for the economic health of the United 
States, and its dependence on South Africa, they also 
suggested further efforts in the field of research and 
development to provide substitutes for these minerals, 
and to increase domestic mining capability in this regard.
The above discussion suggests that the first and 
foremost deterrence against any disruption in the flow 
of strategic minerals supply has been and is the national 
defence stockpile, capable of meeting the defence 
requirements for three years in case of national emergency 
or war. The overall responsibility for the formulation 
of stockpile management lies on the shoulders of the 
departments of Defence, Commerce, and State.
Until the Presidential Executive Order of February 
25, 1988, the overall responsibility for buying, selling
and managing the strategic minerals stockpile was shared 
between the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
and the General Services Administration (GSA). Both were 
considered as lead agencies in this regard. In addition,
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both agencies had also been involved in mediating between 
several government agencies involved in securing material 
supply. However, due to congressional frustration at the 
split in responsibility for the stockpile between FEMA
and GSA, President Reagan appointed the Department of 
Defence (by EO 12626) as sole manager of stockpiling
responsibilities.(25) Currently the only responsibility 
of FEMA in this regard is to support research and 
development activities, such as exploration and materials 
data, recycling, substitution and material property data.
Other offices involved includes the Department of Commerce 
which prepares case studies of material problems, and
the Department of State which "is responsible for assessing 
the political reliability and economic stability of foreign 
suppliers."(26 )
Apart from the U.S. government stockpiles, a
privately held stockpile defence against short-term
interruption also exists in the inventories of strategic
minerals of major consumer companies in the country.(27)
In testifying before the Sub-Committee on Mining and
Natural Resources on December 10, 1987, Paul Krueger the
then Assistant Associate Director FEMA, said
The stockpile currently [1987] contains 
70 materials of approximatly $ 8 billion.
Stockpile inventory is stored at over 100 
government and privately owned sites in 
the United States.(28)
Table 3.10 indicates the estimates of demand for 
strategic minerals in the United States in the year 2000.
When this author asked officials about stockpile
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policy their responses were as follows:
The Bureau of Mines official: "Well I guess you can call
it psychological for the extent that it makes you feel 
comfortable, kind of like an insurance you take in case 
of something happening. At the same time it is from the 
tactical point of view that if you have stockpile then 
you don't have to be worried about labour strikes etc., 
in South Africa. If it lost months, no problem."(29)
An official in FEMA: "I think again it is the part and
parcel of the fact that..............It seems to me that
if the Korean war had not occurred..........the U.S. took
the Korean war as a signal of the Soviet intentions that 
they would get ready to launch an attack on Europe. This 
was a precursor. Given what happened after the war, the
loss of the atomic bomb secrets, and things like that......
it seems to me that shaped the thinking of the Truman 
administration, Eisenhower too [regarding the minerals 
stockpiling] .''(30)
Thus, the stockpiling of strategic minerals by these 
agencies is exclusively designed to keep the United States 
secure against any disruption in the supply of strategic 
minerals.
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In addition to the national stockpile, another
prevention against the supply disruption of minerals is
domestic mining in the United States_______although not
fully exploited yet.
There is vast unknown and untouched mineral wealth 
in the United States but "the full potential for the
resources" says Ewan Anderson, "has not been assessed
due to a number of factors including difficult terrain, 
hostile climate, lack of infrastructure, and the influence 
exercised by environmental interests."(31) According to 
an official in FEMA "since December 1984 firms in the 
United States have been allowed to finish their exploration 
on wilderness areas previously claimed by states." He 
further went on to say, "it is a very difficult
process...... you can get mining engineers, geologists
that are in the business of looking for viable deposits. 
It takes so long. It’s going to take you four, six may 
be ten years to open the deposit."(32) (See Appendix F)
Although domestic sources for cobalt and chrome do 
exist, there are no minable sources for manganese. In 
addition, a search for sources of minerals in U.S. has 
spread from land to the continental shelf and to the sea 
bed. "The development of off-shore resoureces is of long 
term significance and the United States expects to commence 
exploration in the mid 1990s."(33)
It is important to note that after eight years 
of deliberation, the United Nations' General Assembly 
adopted the Law of the Sea Convention on May 31, 1982,
139
and declared the ocean resources of the world to be the 
common heritage of mankind, what Joseph Nye calls the 
"international seabed mining regime." According to Nye, 
these regimes deal with everything from monetary issues 
to international trade, management of national resources 
to conservation of species and to the control of 
armaments.(34) He has pointed out that the existence of 
international regimes allows for greater moderation in 
foreign policy and reduce the degree of the constant risks 
that statesmen encounter.(35)
The United States has not accepted the "rules" and
"norms" of the Law of the Sea Convention. Besides other 
objections, it opposes the treaty on selling its advanced 
mining technology to the international sea bed authority 
and fears that the treaty could serve as a precedent
for international production control on landbased
minerals.(36)
U o
Successive U.S. minerals policies and various 
mechanisms to cope with problems of disruption in supply, 
gave birth to a serious debate on the question of U.S. 
dependence on South African strategic minerals. In this 
regard various interested individuals, groups, and 
non-governmental organizations have been engaged in 
research both inside and outside the United States, 
especially in the academic world.
One school of thought, which has influenced the
perceptions of U.S. policy-makers towards South Africa
since the 1960s, is what might be called the "alarmist"
group of writers, Congressmen, and bureaucrats, which
in turn was motivated by business group organizations.
This school of thought, in fact the descendent of the Paley
Commission of 1952, has painted a gloomy picture of U.S.
import dependence on South African minerals. It was
inclined towards the white minority regime of South Africa
and had always supported the status quo on the one hand,
and bitterly opposed U.S. sanctions aginst the Republic,
on the other. Since the 1960s the group had been
’headed’ by a former Congressman from Nevada, James
D.Santini, Chairman of the House Sub-Committee on Mines
and Minerals (1974-82), a person who had always advocated
the "resource oriented foreign policy of the United
States." After his fact-finding trip to Zaire, Zambia,
and South Africa in 1980, Santini recommended that:
Zaire and Zambia were too unstable to be
relied upon for strategic minerals and that 
America thus has a vital interest in the 
survival of South Africa as a Western ally. 
(37)
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In the literary field, G.H.Black, for example, is 
the main advocates of this school. In addition, various 
organizations, such as the Foreign Policy Association, 
the Ford Foundation Southern Study Group, the American 
Geological Institute, and magazines, such as Fortune, 
and Business Week have all focused on the "dangerous 
reliance" of the United States on South African strategic 
minerals. Another concern of the alarmist school was 
of a possible formation of cartel among Southern African 
mineral producers to be used as a political weapon against 
the West as had been done by the Arab oil-producing 
countries of the Middle East.(38) Directly or indirectly, 
they have all been supporters of the status quo in South 
Africa.
However, the alarmist way of thinking, which had 
dominated U.S.-South Africa minerals policy since the 
early 1960s, was challenged by a different school of 
thought, in the late 1970s, both inside and outside 
Congress. This school has questioned the "conventional 
wisdom" of the "dangerous reliance" of the United States 
on South African strategic minerals. The Congressional 
Black Caucus (CBC) and other pro-sanction groups in 
Congress, academics, such as Michael Shafer (Harvard 
University), Julian Simon (Illinois University), Hanns 
Maull (University of Munich), and the Scandinavian 
Institute of African Affairs, Uppsala, Sweden, for example, 
are the advocates of this school. They are of the opinion 
that the United States has not been "dangerously reliant"
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on South Africa, and that alternative sources do exist 
in other countries of Southern Africa as well. They argue 
that substitutes for almost all the strategic minerals 
under discussion, except platinum and chromium, are 
available to a certain extent, and could be recovered 
through recycling methods. They further point out that 
in the event of short or, even mid-term disruption in 
the supply of these minerals, for a variety of reasons 
the United States minerals stockpile could fulfill both 
civilian and defence requirements. Thus, the major focus 
of their criticism against the alarmist thinking is that 
It has ignored the important factor of price elasticity 
effects on the supply and demand of these minerals.
In support of their arguments, this school provides 
past examples of four major disruptions, in the flow of 
non-fuel minerals to the United States. The first cut 
off of supplies of chromium and manganese was from the 
Soviet Union during the late 1940s. This was followed 
by disruption in flow of Canadian nickel due to a miners’ 
strike in 1968, the Arab oil embargo of 1973, and 
disruption in the flow of cobalt from Zaire during the 
Shaba II crisis of 1978. According to this group, these 
instances did not, in any way create the conditions for 
a national emergency in the United States.
Thus, the above discussion suggests that U.S. 
dependence on South African strategic minerals can be 
reduced by looking for an alternate sources outside South 
Africa, by creating substitutes for these minerals through
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research and development, and by accelerating the methods 
of recycling. Above all, the main deterrence against 
minerals disruption is the existence of the national 
defence stockpile.
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3.3 Strategic Minerals and South Africa Policy
The successive minerals policies towards Southern 
Africa have always been formulated against the perceived 
background of the region’s unstable nature and its crucial 
minerals importance. One common thread which runs through 
these policies was Washington’s diplomatic efforts to 
defuse regional tensions, especially in South Africa and 
to save the region from violent change which would damage 
the Western access to minerals. Despite this common 
approach, the degree of presidential interest in minerals 
policy varies from president to president. The notable 
difference in this regard was between Jimmy Carter and 
Ronald Reagan’s personal initiatives.
Though the passage of important Acts and policy 
reports concerning strategic minerals during the Carter 
administration clearly indicate the importance of minerals 
import, but the President’s personal attention was focused 
more on the issue of human rights violations in the region 
and his early vocal condemnation of apartheid in South 
Africa.
Throughout the administration’s tenure the Executive 
and the Legislature did not make any shift in minerals 
policy, both in general as well as towards South Africa. 
Within Congress the "alarmist” group under the leadership 
of Congressman Santini was still influential in this area. 
Carter Non-Fuel Minerals Policy Review of 1977 was in 
fact the direct result of a meeting between President
145
Carter and Congressman Santini, in which the administration 
recognized the importance of strategic minerals for the 
overall economic health of the United States, and its 
producer South Africa in the ’free world'.
However, Reagan was the first President after 
Eisenhower, who showed a keen interest in strategic 
minerals because of their defence related importance. 
"Several key nominees [of the President elect Reagan], 
including those who became the Secretary of Defence, the 
director of the CIA, and the Secretary of State, had shown 
great interest in the subject of strategic minerals."(39)
Like its predecessors’, the foundation of the Reagan 
administration’s South Africa policy was based on the 
country's mineral wealth and its geographic location.
Just three months after coming into power, Reagan in an 
interview with the CBC television on March 3, 1981 declared
his administration's perspective towards South Africa
by saying: " ............ can we abandon a country that
strategically is essential to the free world in its
production of minerals........ "(40) Reagan, who was
uninterested in African affairs, made another statement
in 1982 by declaring: "The United States is a naval power
by necessity, critically dependent on the transoceanic
import of vital strategic minerals."(41) His personal 
concern in this regard had been shown by the Secretary
of State George Shultz in early 1985 in a major policy
address: "South Africa is not a small island. It is a
regional powerhouse endowed with vast minerals
r e s o u r c e s .........."(42)
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Like any policy formulation, the minerals policy 
is also made at two levels. At the upper level certain 
broad-based guide lines are established; then it is left 
in the hands of middle and lower-level officials to 
formulate and implement them.
Thus, in the case of U.S.-South Africa minerals 
policymaking, which has been and is part of an overall 
minerals policy, a number of executive departments and 
agencies have remained involved. The responsibilities 
of these selected agencies are divided into three broad 
categories: policy development, research and development,
and the securing of materials supplies and their 
maintenance (stockpiling). In previous sections we have 
explained in detail about strategic minerals supplies, 
especially from South Africa, stockpiling arrangements 
and efforts made with regard to domestic mining. In this 
section we have to look into the involvement of agencies 
in the policy development process, which in turn is divided 
into five categories; policy coordination, budget review, 
research and development coordination, problem assessment, 
and statutory responsibilities.
On the policy coordination side two agencies: the
Cabinet Council and the National Critical Materials Council 
(NCMC) are involved. The NCMC, established in 1984, 
"consist of 25 members to be appointed from
representatives of industry, small business and 
consumers,"(43) to assist and advise the President on 
strategic materials policy. The NCMC is also involved
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in other policy development areas, such as budget review, 
research and development coordination, reports to Congress, 
problem assessment, and statutory responsibilities.
The role of the Defence and the Commerce Departments 
in policy development is in three areas: reports to
Congress, problem assessment, and statutory
responsibilities.
The research and development coordination 
responsibilities lies with the Departments of Defence, 
Commerce, and Interior, the Bureau of Mines and Minerals, 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 
and the National Science Foundation.
Within the Department of the Interior, the Bureau
of Mines and Minerals is the most important on the
analytical side. An official in Bureau said:
We were involved in defining each of these 
minerals and we were involved in recommending 
to the State Department. Our role was to 
technically evaluate the situation and make 
recommendations that, yes, we use these
commod ities here in the United States. 
Here in Bureau [we] look to those supply 
and demand, the usage, and in touch with
the consumer and supplier and so on.(44)
During the period under discussion in this study
strategic minerals policy has always remained insulated 
from public pressure. Throughout their struggle, the Africa 
related pressure groups, such as TransAfrica and Free 
South Africa Movement (FSAM), focused their attention 
on disinvestment and divestment, but never insisted on 
a ban on South African minerals import. This was partly 
because of their recognition of the strong influence of
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business and defence interest groups on minerals 
policy-making, and partly because of their perception 
that they would not be able to mobilize public opinion
on this issue. In addition, the minerals issue is purely
a technical matter beyond the reach of public and Africa 
related pressure groups, only to be left in the hands 
of specialized agencies and bureaucrats.
In the opinion of one of the activists of FSAM
£
" .......... these issues were never looked at separately in
the movement context. They were all part of
one............All the issues had to some extent a kind
of a one thing of equal importance."(45) But the
anti-apartheid record suggest that all these issues were
not of "equal importance", rather attention was focused
on investors to sever financial links, and on consumers
to boycott those companies and corporations doing business
with the racist regime. For example, in January 1986 FSAM
organized a boycott of Shell Oil to pressurize its parent
company, Royal Dutch Shell, to close down the petroleum
and mining operations of Shell South Africa. This action,
however, was supported by president of the United Auto
Workers Union (UAWU) by cutting off their Shell credit
cards. Neither the president of the UAWU, nor the 
e
anti-aparthid movement talked about the boycott of platinum 
A
imported from South Africa, which was used in catalytic
convertors of automobile exhaust system. It would have 
been difficult for anti-apartheid movement to mobilize 
public opinion on this very technical question of minerals.
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In early 1988, TransAfrica published a report card 
based on responses of presidential candidates of both 
parties regarding their would-be administration’s Southern 
Africa policy. With regard to South Africa, questions 
were asked about the U.S. ban on computer sales and oil 
company investments, and prohibiting diamond imports in 
the United States, but nothing whatsoever was asked about 
strategic minerals.(46)
The same tendency to ignore the minerals issue was 
evident in the tougher sanctions bill passed by the House 
of Representatives in August 1988, which excluded strategic 
minerals. The second of the six new sanctions banned "all 
imports from South Africa; except for strategic minerals
essential for the economy or defence.........”
Finally, the interest group organizations, such 
as business groups, were as much active and effective 
in minerals policy-making as they were during the previous 
administrations. This was despite the fact that by this 
time it was clearly established by certain Congressmen, 
individuals, and organizations, not only in the United 
States but other countries as well, that the United States 
was not "dangerously reliant" on South African minerals.
The degree of influence of commercial groups in 
policy-making in the United States can be realized when 
the presidential candidate, who latter became the 
President, pointed the finger at the President of the 
United States. Thus in the presidential debate of 1976 
Jimmy Carter disclosed that President Ford, under pressure
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from the atomic energy lobby, put pressure on Congress
"to hold up non proliferation legislation until the 
Congress agreed for an 8 billion program[me] for private 
industry to start producing enriched uranium."(47) Ford, 
moreover, did not deny the charges.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have argued that South Africa
is the leading producer of four strategic minerals out
of five under discussion: namely chromium, manganese,
platinum group metals, and vanadium; with, cobalt exported 
to the United States from Zaire and Zambia through the 
South African transport system. We have also identified 
that the United States has never remained "dangerously
reliant" on South African strategic minerals, as has been 
portrayed by interest groups and their clientele both
within the bureaucracy and Congress.
In the case of cobalt, manganese, and vanadium,
alternate sources outside South Africa exist in Southern
Africa, Russia, the Peoples' Republic of China, Australia,
Gabon etc. So far as platinum and chromium are concerned, 
no alternate sources outside South Africa and Russia exist 
at the momemt. In addition, no substitutes for platinum
and rhodium are available currently.
On the decision-making front, the Executive and
the Legislature have always been cooperative in this
regard; whereas the public was never mobilized on this
issue. c\y\4V— apci.r’VWe.v'cl cj roups.
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CHAPTER IV
U.S.-SOUTH AFRICA NUCLEAR RELATIONS 
Introduction
In addition to South African strategic minerals
required for the U.S. defence and civilian needs, the 
collaboration between both the countries in nuclear matters 
was also connected with a related strategic mineral
 uranium needed by the United States for building
its atomic arsenal in the struggle with the rival Soviet 
Union. South African raw uranium played an important role 
in the shaping of early U.S. policy towards South Africa, 
until it became available from other sources outside the 
Republic, since the late 1960s, including domestic mining 
in the United States.
U.S.-South Africa nuclear relations can roughly
be divided into two periods. First, the years of open 
cooperation in this field from 1950 until the mid-1970s. 
Second, a period of non-cooperation between 1977 and 1986 
when the South African nuclear programme began to be
perceived as a problem. During this period the Carter
and the Reagan (probably from 1983 onwards) administrations 
attempted to persuade South Africa to abide by the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968.(1)
The focus in this chapter is on the period between 
1977 and 1986, which started with the Carter
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administration's concentration on the South African nuclear 
programme. This was followed by the U.S. Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Act in 1978. The Act prohibited the 
export of nuclear-related material and technology to
non-signatories of the NPT, including South Africa. The 
period ended with another showdown when Congress imposed 
sanctions against the Republic in 1986, which among other 
things, banned all nuclear related material including
computers.
Before examining the limits of their nuclear
relationship, it is necessary to discuss briefly the 
historical perspectives of nuclear collaboration between 
both the countries.
4.1 Historical Background, 1950-1976
At the time when a new world order was emerging 
after the Second World War, the U.S. atomic monopoly was 
broken by the Soviet Union in 1949. This was followed
by Great Britain (1952), France (1960), the People's 
Republic of China (1964), and India (1974), which tested 
atomic devices and became members of the so-called nuclear 
club. As a result, a keen competition to acquire the most 
sophisticated and fatal weapons started amongst the
nuclear powers.
In order to build up its strategic arsenal, the
United States required large dependable supplies of
natural uranium. South Africa was one of the leading 
producers of this mineral, where uranium was discovered
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on the Witwatersrand during the mid-1920s. Until the Second 
World War, little attention was paid to the discovery 
of uranium in South Africa. After the War the United 
States and Great Britain began negotiations with the 
government of South Africa, which resulted in an agreement 
in 1950 between the three countries. According to the 
agreement, the United States and Great Britain were to 
provide capital and nuclear expertise in exchange for 
South African uranium.(2) The terms of the agreement 
specified that South Africa was to sell the entire 
production of its uranium to the United States and Great 
Britain. The key strategy behind the deal was to reduce 
the likelihood of the spread of nuclear weapons to other 
nations. Partly because of the strategic nature of uranium, 
then a scarce mineral, and partly because of security 
considerations, no further information regarding the
tripartite agreement was made public. Thus, uranium became 
a leading factor in the first phase of post-World War 
U.S.-South Africa relations.
With the help of the United States and Great Britain, 
South Africa opened its first uranium processing plant 
at West Rand Consolidated Mines in 1952. This was followed 
by Deggafontein Mines Limited, Blyvooruitzicht Gold Mining 
Company Limited, and Western Reefs Exploration and 
Development Company Limited. These plants extracted uranium 
from gold ores, relatively rich in uranium, followed 
by eighteen more plants of the same nature. The South 
African gold ores represented one of the world's largest
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sources of uranium.(3)
By the end of the 1950s, South Africa’s uranium 
production reached to its peak of 4954 tons annually. (4) 
In the following decade, with the declining demand for 
uranium, mostly because of the growing U.S. domestic 
production, many plants were closed down in South Africa.
The 1950 tripartite agreement was followed by the 
famous Eisenhower speech in the United Nations’ General 
Assembly on "Atom for Peace" in 1953, which Joseph Nye 
has described as the beginning of the "international 
nuclear regime."(5) In his speech, Eisenhower also 
recognized the importance of uranium supplying 
countries(6), thus specifically indicates the significance 
of South Africa, then the main producer and supplier of 
raw uranium in the Eon-Communist world.
One year after Eisenhower's speech of 1953, the 
U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which strictly prohibited 
any nuclear cooperation with other nations, including 
the exchange of information, was revised. This established 
the legal basis and conditions for U.S. atomic cooperation 
with many other nations, allies as well as friendly 
nations. The amendment was made two years after the British 
atomic test which made Washington realize that the United 
States could not control the spread of nuclear weapons. 
Three years later, on July 8, 1957 the United States
and South Africa entered into a ten-year agreement on 
the peaceful uses of atomic energy, which marked the 
beginning of an era of nuclear cooperation between both
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countries. The 1957 agreement was amended and extended 
on June 12, 1962, and July 17, 1967. It was later renewed
on June 20, 1974 to extend until the year 2007.(7)
The agreement proved to be beneficial for South 
Africa in three respects. First, it provided a launching 
pad for the emergence of South Africa’s uranium industry. 
Second, it cleared the way for its access to Western 
nuclear know-how. Finally, it achieved the opening of 
training facilities for the members of its Atomic Energy 
Board (AEB)(8) in the field of advanced nuclear technology. 
Training for AEB members was provided in the Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory, and the Argonne National Laboratory, 
in Tennessee, and Illinois, U.S. respectively.(9) The 
close cooperation between both the countries in this field 
was further extended in 1958, when a joint U.S.-South 
African team observed a secret U.S. nuclear test off the 
South African coast. In addition to obtaining training 
for AEB members and access to U.S. nuclear information, 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)(10) 
membership was also of great importance for South Africa 
in terms of acquiring the latest information on nuclear 
technology through its library and technical 
assistance.(11)
Under the terms and conditions of the 1957 agreement, 
the United States government had to construct a research 
reactor in South Africa. Allis Chalmers, an American firm, 
designed and built the South African research reactor 
to be known as SAFARI-I (South African Fundamental Atomic
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Research Reactor) near Pretoria, which came into service 
in 1965. The United States provided 231 pounds of enriched 
uranium for SAFARI-I between the period 1965-74, enough 
to make ten medium sized nuclear bombs.(12) Apart from 
Allis-Chalmers, other U.S. firms, such as U.S. Nuclear, 
Gulf Oil, and Texas Nuclear were instrumental in providing 
nuclear material to South Africa. "In effect the entire 
range of U.S. research and development on nuclear power 
was made available to South Africa for SAFARI-I,"(13) 
delivered under the Eisenhower's "Atom for Peace" 
programme, which in fact, made South Africa's nuclear 
development possible. In 1981, Dr. de Villiers, Chairman 
of the AEB, who succeeded Dr. Abraham J.A.Roux, the 
founding father of the South Africa's nuclear research, 
described the involvement of SAFARI in three major research 
programmes: production of isotopes for use in medical
research; neutron-activation analysis for medical purposes; 
and fundamental research in material testing.(14)
The growing nuclear proliferation in the world during 
the 1960s aroused considerable attention and concern in 
the United States and the Soviet Union. To limit the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world, which "both 
the superpowers believed would threaten their control 
over world order",(15) the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) was signed in London, Moscow, and Washington, D.C, 
in June 1968. Two other members of the nuclear club, 
France, and the People's Republic of China refused to 
sign the Treaty.(16) Article I of the Treaty reads:
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Each superpower State Party to the Treaty 
undertakes not to transfer to any recipient 
whatsoever nuclear weapons or control over 
such weapons or explosive devices directly, 
or indirectly, and not to anyway assist, 
encourage or induce any non-nuclear weapon
State to maunfacture or otherwise acquire
nuclear explosive devices, or control over 
such weapons or explosive devices.
Article II of the Treaty restricted all the 
non-nuclear signatories (currently more than 140 states)
from acquiring nuclear weapons, related technology, and
material by any means whatsoever. Suspected nuclear 
weapon states, such as Argentina, India, Israel, Pakistan, 
and Taiwan have not signed the treaty yet.
Despite the U.S. non-proliferation policy, 
cooperation with South Africa in the nuclear field 
continued even after the NPT. Although it is difficult 
to distinguish between peaceful nuclear technology and
its nuclear weapons uses, it has been suggested that the
United States had violated and breached its obligations 
as a nuclear supplier signatory of the Treaty. An official 
said :
No. I never saw it that way. I am sure some­
body can make the argument that wanted to. 
They can try to make the argument. But I 
don’t think. For example, Ambassador Kennedy 
[Richard, currently working in the State
Department] and others who worked on that
[NPT] they say, if someone who is not a 
party to the Treaty asks for technical 
advice, especially regarding a physical
security, safety etc, we [U.S.] will give
them. Even now we will give them, to 
Argentina, Brazil Chile, some other
countries...(17)
Despite these claims, there were numerous examples
of nuclear cooperation between both countries. In spite
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of South African Prime Minister Vorster's announcement
in July 1970 that his country had developed a new and
"unique” method of enrichment, "computers were licensed
for export in 1971, 1972, and 1973 for the use in South
African enrichment plant"(18) at Valindaba, near the
National Nuclear Research Centre at Palindaba, in the
Transvaal. A year later, the U.S. Government approved
a sale of special computers to go to South Africa in
1974 to help enrich its own uranium through Foxoboro
Company of Foxoboro, Massachusetts. These computers were
specially designed for nuclear research work.(19) Inside
the Foxoboro Company, the sale went under the code name
"Project Houston" in order to "discourage questions."(20)
At the time of this sale, the United States was aware
that the Republic had a surplus of more than 80 pounds
of highly enriched uranium, enough for about five nuclear
weapons.(21) In the same year, Dr. Albert of the South
African Atomic Energy Board declared that:
Any third year student in physics has the 
know-how to make the atom bomb, and a fourth 
year student can do it better. Obviously, 
any nuclear body here or elsewhere will
be able to do it even better than a fourth 
year student.(22)
Dr. Albert’s comments seems to have been intended 
to hint that South Africa had a nuclear capability, and 
was ready to work with Washington in its struggle to 
contain the influence of international Communism. They 
were also an indication to South Africa's neighbouring 
countries and its black nationalists of the availability 
of "an ultimate deterrent" against confrontation with
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the white minority regime.
U.S. deliveries of enriched uranium and other related 
assistance to South Africa continued until 1975, when 
court action in the United States by the Congressional 
Black Caucus, forced a temporary halt in supplies.(23) 
(See Appendix G ) . In response to growing congressional 
activism in 19?5(24) to pass non-proliferation 
legislation, the Ford administration took the first 
initiative in May 1975 when it called for a conference 
of nuclear suppliers to curb nuclear spread. They met 
six times between May 1975 and April 1976.(25)
The concern over South Africa's enrichment plant 
as a threat to nuclear proliferation became an important 
factor in U.S. nuclear policy during the final year of 
the Ford administration. The cessation of the shipments 
of enriched uranium for its SAFARI and Koeberg reactors, 
and the forced withdrawal from its contracts to obtain 
two General Electric power plants for Koeberg because 
of congressional opposition, in fact became a leverage 
to prevent the Republic from acquiring nuclear weapons 
and to accede to the NPT. But the leverage did not work 
at this stage. In response to U.S. pressure, Prime Minister 
Vorster in an interview in March 1976 refused to sign 
the NPT. Soon after his interview the South Africa Electric 
Supply Commission announced in May 1976 that an agreement 
had been signed with a French consortium to obtain a power 
plant. By that time the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of State in his testimony told the Senate Foreign Relations
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Committee that Pretoria had "the technical ability to 
take steps toward[s] making a bomb."(26)
It was during this time that uranium oxide prices 
climbed sharply from less than U.S. $ 8 per pound in 1974 
to U.S. $ 40 per pound in 1976 because of the construction 
of nuclear power plants in many countries. As a result, 
South Africa started renovation and reopening of its 
existing uranium plants. The price increase and the
soaring demand for uranium further reduced the U.S. 
leverage on South Africa to adhere to the NPT and to accept 
international safeguards on all of its nuclear facilities. 
Consequently, the United States cancelled all its 
preexisting contracts in this sphere.
By now South Africa had attained considerable 
independence, and diverted to France and West Germany
for further assistance in the field of nuclear technology, 
as well as established close contacts with fellow pariah 
states, such as Israel and Taiwan.(27) The government 
of South Africa transferred to French and German 
suppliers because they "didn’t trust American suppliers
[and] because they knew about our [U.S.] politics,"(28) 
said Chester Crocker. The Congressional Black Caucus and 
some liberal Congressmen, and anti-apartheid groups had 
already started sharpening their tools against U.S.-South 
Africa nuclear cooperation. In addition, nuclear
proliferation had also became one of the major issues 
of the 1976 presidential election campaign in the United 
States.
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During the last days of the Ford administration, 
the Uranium Enrichment Corporation of South Africa had 
approached a professor at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology (MIT) in November 1976, requesting him for 
a training position for one of their personnel in laser 
isotope separation technology, which was then a new method 
for enriching uranium. In his statement before the House 
Sub-Committee on Africa, Ronald Seigal, a Research Staff
Officer at the MIT, publicly noted that "the request was 
turned down after informal consultations with some [U.S.] 
government agencies." He further added "we understand 
that various other places, such as Los Almos, and other 
government laboratories working in this area were also 
approached."(29) It is not known whether they succeeded 
in achieving access to those laboratories.
In 1976 the then chairman of the AEB, Dr. Roux
acknowledged the U.S. assistance and help in nuclear field 
by saying:
We can ascribe our degree of advancement 
today in large measure to the training and 
the assistance so willingly provided by 
the U.S.A during the early years of our
nuclear programme, when several of Western 
world's nuclear nations cooperated in initia­
ting our scientists and engineers into
nuclear science........... even our nuclear
philosophy, although unmistakably our own, 
owes much to the thinking of American nuclear 
scientists.(30)
Against this background, Crocker told the author:
In fact what the West did in my view since 
1960, was roughly to create South Africa 
a pariah state. A state which began to feel 
increasingly isolated and to behave like 
an isolated regional superpower. And the 
more isolated it was, the more irresponsible
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it was in many ways. So you saw the huge 
investment in their nuclear programme to 
build up the capacity of their own enrichment 
process which they imported basically from 
Germany.(31)
According to the United Nations Special Committee 
report on apartheid, at least 90 South African nuclear
scientists had completed their assignments in the United
States by mid 1977.(32)
Until the 1975 U.S. court decision to suspend the 
provision of enriched uranium to South Africa, and the 
advent of nuclear non-proliferation as an issue in the 
1976 presidential election campaign, the nuclear 
cooperation with South Africa was believed by the Nixon 
and the Ford administrations to be an essential factor 
in their relations. The nuclear relationship was believed 
to be an important instrument for influencing the 
government of South Africa to carry on its policy of doing 
nothing in the marketing of its large production of 
natural uranium, which, in the opinion of the Republican 
presidents, would have increased the number of nuclear 
weapon states in the world.(33) According to the National 
Security Study Memorandum-39, this kind of assurance was 
given by the then South African government, i.e that "it
would do nothing in its uranium transactions to increase
nuclear proliferation."(34)
Despite these assurances South Africa continued 
to supply uranium to some ’selected1 importers, such as 
the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Israel, Iran, 
Japan, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. These countries
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could have been considered by Washington as 'responsible' 
members of the international community or, simply the 
U.S. pressure did not work to stop South Africa from its 
'selective' uranium exporting policy.
Thus the era of open nuclear ties between both 
countries ended during the mid-1970s, and an age of 
non-cooperation on these issues started with the advent 
of the Carter administration to the White House in 1977.
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4.2 The Carter Administration and the South African 
Bomb
In May 1975 Governor Jimmy Carter, who was then 
planning to run for the presidential election made non­
proliferation one of the major election issues. In his 
speech in the United Nations he advocated a complete U.S. 
moratorium on the testing of all nuclear devices. Carter 
further proposed: "that we [U.S.] not ship any more atomic
fuel to a country that refuses to comply with strict 
controls over the waste which can be reprocessed into 
explosives." He also advocated that the United States
" ......stop the sale by Germany and France of processing
plants to Pakistan and Brazil,"(35)
When Carter entered in the White House as President
in 1977, at least six countries____ Brazil, Pakistan, South
Korea, Taiwan, Israel, and South Africa were trying
to or had already acquired nuclear technology. Pakistan, 
South Korea, and Taiwan (which bought their nuclear plants 
from France), and Brazil (which had a deal with West 
Germany for nuclear reactors and enrichment technology), 
headed the administration's priority list. The United 
States was much concerned about Brazilian efforts to go 
nuclear because it did not want to see a nuclear power 
in its own backyard. Between January and March 1977 Carter 
sent Vice President Walter Mondale, Secretary of State 
Cyrus Vance, and Deputy Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher to Bonn to convince Germany to cancel its 
nuclear deal with Brazil. The deal, however, went astray
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because Brazilians couldn't afford the reactors. (36) 
The case of Israel was different from the other countries.
"Neither Congress nor the administration any
administration would press the Israelis for
information........... The intelligence community was warned
against giving information about Israel's program[me] 
to other agencies."(37) So much so, the Symington Amendment 
"which bans [U.S.] aid to countries that buy or sell 
uranium enrichment and reprocessing equipment without
attaching various safeguards.......... was written in a
fashion that exempts Israel from the penalty."(38)
The case of South Africa was yet another situation. 
As one of the biggest uranium producers in the world, 
South Africa disclosed the operation of uranium enrichment 
plant in 1975. The Carter administration was concerned 
that "it would be a serious blow to non-proliferation 
efforts, creating a situation where a country outside 
international nuclear agreements becomes an 'out law' 
nuclear supplier to any country that wanted to buy enriched 
uranium for peaceful or military purposes."(39)
Long before the emergence of the Carter 
administration, South Africa had already explored the 
possibilities of nuclear cooperation with West Germany 
and France. For example, West Germany and France started 
training South African nuclear scientists in 1962 and 
1966 respectively. In 1969 West Germany began training 
South African scientists in the jetnozzle techniques for 
uranium enrichment. Outside Europe, Israel was its major
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partner in this area. Both countries signed a scientific 
agreement in 1976, possibly including the nuclear 
field.(40)
In 1977 the technological capability of
South Africa included
[1] SAFARI-I research reactor, fuel supplied by the 
United States from 1965 through 1976, under subject to 
IAEA safeguards.
[2] SAFARI-II research reactor, designed in South Africa, 
went critical in 1967.
[3] Uranium enrichment plant at Ucor, Valindaba, which 
was mostly the result of scientific cooperation with West 
Germany, became operational in 1975.
[4] Two nuclear reactors for electricity generating at 
Koeberg, supplied by France, became operational in 1982 
and 1983 respectively.
[5] By mid 1977 more than 155 American nuclear 
technologists and scientists had visited South Africa 
to provide assistance and training and 90 South Africans 
had visited the U.S. to receive training and practical 
experience.(41)
Against this background the Carter administration
had probably one form of pressure to convince the South
African government to abide by the NPT, namely to cease
the supply of enriched uranium for SAFARI-I, and to stop
enriching South African uranium for its French supplied
two nuclear reactors at Koeberg,
The administration's early nuclear policy towards
South Africa, represented a major change in U.S. strategy
in this regard. Carter's predecessors in the past had
'pushed' South Africa to adhere to the NPT, but did not
threaten to stop the supply of uranium fuel. The Carter
administration, despite putting pressure and cutting off
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fuel supplies (for SAFARI-I) and other related material, 
preferred to keep dialogue open with South Africa "in 
order to prevent it from any such 'irresponsible' 
behaviour."(42)
The efforts taken by the early Carter administration 
to bring South Africa into the NPT fold were shattered 
when on August 8, 1977, the Soviet news agency TASS
announced that South Africa had completed arrangements 
to detonate a nuclear device in the Kalahari desert. This 
not only caused serious concern in the United States and 
the West, but exposed the inefficiency of the U.S. 
intelligence agencies. In the opinion of Professor William 
Zartman: "I don't think we were aware of the exact state
of the South Africans in nuclear activities."(43)
Soon after the Kalahari incident, the U.S. 
Ambassador in Pretoria was directed by the State Department 
to ask the South African government for assurances in 
this matter. The South African response was made public 
by President Carter in his press conference on August 
23, 1977:
In response to our direct inquiry and that 
of other nations, South Africa has informed 
us that they do not have and do not intend 
to develop nuclear explosive devices for 
any purposes, either peaceful or weapon; 
that the Kalahari test site, which has been 
in question, is not designed for use to 
test nuclear explosions, and that no nuclear 
explosive test will be taken in South Africa 
now or in the future.
President Carter went on to say:
We will also renew efforts to encourage 
South Africa to place all their nuclear 
power production capabilities under inter­
172
national safeguards and inspections and 
encourage them, alongwith other nations, 
to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty.(44)
Why did the Carter administration accept the South 
African assurances? The administration was aware that 
confirmation of South Africa's development of nuclear 
weapons would damage its global nuclear posture,(45) 
on the one hand, and would be counter-productive in
Africa, on the other. Accepting the South African
assurances, the Carter administration "rejected an African 
call at the UN/OAU meeting in Lagos for an end to nuclear 
collaboration with South Af rica .''( 46 )
However, just one week after President Carter's
declaration at a press conference about the "South African
assurances", the Republic’s Finance Minister Owen Horwood
said in a political gathering in Durban on August 30,
1977 that South Africa "reserves the right to deviate
from its assurances." He went on further to declare:
I think it is time we told Mr. Carter, and 
a few other people, that if we did at any
time wish to do other things with our nuclear
potential we will do so according to our
own decision and our own judgement.......
President Carter does not ask us when he 
wants to do anything. If he thinks he is 
free to dictate to us, then he is simply 
saying 'might is right' and that he can
prescribe moral norms and lay down the law
to everyone else simply because he is head
of a great country of 225 million people. 
I reject that position entirely.(47)
Despite the early Carter administration’s persuasion, 
South Africa did not show any inclination to join the
NPT or accept the requisite International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) safeguards for its nuclear facilities.
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In addition to its nuclear cooperation with West Germany 
and France, and with the fellow pariah states of Israel 
and Taiwan, the South African government knew that the 
Carter administration’s efforts were focused more on the 
Rhodesian settlement and the Namibian independence issues 
than on the Republic. Moreover the fact that Washington 
had to acquire South African help and cooperation in 
both the cases, only made the white minority regime more 
defiant of U.S. pressure. In turn, these situations further 
reduced the administration's leverage to bring South 
Africa within the NPT fold.
In addition, South Africa never wanted to open up 
its uranium enrichment plant at Palindaba for international 
inspection for a number of reasons. First, it considered 
that joining the NPT would damage its secrecy, and the 
future prospects of uranuim enrichment commercialization. 
"The South African officials had already estimated in 
1975 that it could bring the country an additional U.S. 
$ 400 to 500 million a year from enriched uranium
sales."(48) Second, South Africa was demonstrating its 
explicit capacity to defend itself without outside help 
and cooperation by criticizing and defying the U.S. 
pressure. Further, this was an important psychological 
factor to boost white morale in the Republic.
However, in pursuit of the Carter administration's 
nuclear non-proliferation policy, Congress passed the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) in 1978. According 
to the Act, the United States could not license the export
174
of nuclear fuel or reactors to any state which did not 
accept international safeguards on all of its nuclear 
facilities. The passage of the Act was to convey the 
message to South Africa to accede to the NPT so as to
create the possibility of resolving the differences on 
the then existing nuclear enrichment service control 
between both countries. In response to the Act, South
Africa announced that it would pursue its independent 
enrichment process.
The Carter administration's vulnerable position
with regard to South African nuclear development is
reflected from the President's letter to Douglas Fraser:
The question of our nuclear relationship
with South Africa is extremely difficult,
and must be seen in the light of our overall 
nuclear non-proliferation objectives as 
well as bilateral considerations. In our 
view there is serious danger that a complete 
break would result in South Africa following 
a go-it-alone path, which would have serious 
repercussions for the stability of Southern
Africa and defeat our efforts to stop the
spread of nuclear weapons.(49)
It seems significant that before the passage of 
the NNPA South Africa had already acquired the nuclear 
technology. Seven months after the passage of the NNPA,
the South African Prime Minister Vorster visited the United 
States. In his televised interview with the ABC on October 
23, 1978, Vorster claimed that "he has never promised
Carter that South Africa would not develop nuclear arms," 
though he reiterated: "We are only interested in peaceful
developments on nuclear facilities."(50)
Eleven months later, in September 1979, South Africa
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was once again involved in controversy when a detonation 
took place somewhere in the Indian or the South Atlantic 
Oceans, suspected to be an Israeli-South Africa venture. 
Five weeks later President Carter in a press conference 
said: "We have been and are continuing to try to follow
up that initial observation. There is no certain answer 
yet that anyone can derive."(51) By this time the African 
National Congress (ANC) reacted very quickly and sharply. 
They had put the entire responsibility for that scenario 
on the Western countries. The South African Foreign 
Minister, Roelof Botha (Pik Botha) denied knowledge of 
any nuclear test conducted by South Africa. He said in 
a press conference, "I know absolutely nothing about the
matter_____ why don't you ask the Russians, or Chinese,
or even the Americans for that matter?"(52)
The American answers and conclusions were various 
and different. A panel of scientists formed by the White 
House came to the conclusion that the flash was not from 
a nuclear explosion. On the other hand, the Defence 
Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the U.S. Naval Laboratory, 
reached different conclusions.(53) Apart from these 
agencies, the State Department received an intelligence 
report from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of a 
low-yield nuclear blast on September 22, 1979 in an area
which included South Africa. A Carter administration's 
official said the alleged South African nuclear explosion 
in the South Atlantic:
I still have not seen any convincing basis
for that. I was instrumental in getting
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arrangements for the U.S. to base collection 
aircraft in the area and we covered it,
and we covered the area very extensively. 
With the kind of air sampling collection 
activities we should have found any
evidence of such a blast,had it occured. 
We never found evidence. Is that 
conclusive? Probably not. But it supports
my belief in the absence of any evidence 
that nothing happened. I am prepared to
believe that there was some formal 
collaboration between Israel and South
Africa. But I don't have anything solid 
to support that. We know that Israel and 
South Africa collaborated on many other 
types of weapons projects and had 
intelligence. exchanges and personnel 
exchanges. I am prepared to believe that 
two of them collaborated. But we
cannot.......... but it is totally outside
the knowledge or approval of the U.S. gover­
nment . ( 54)
Another official said:
As far as I know there was none. Never was 
any. Certainly not. Since I have been around 
I read all those files [in the Defence Depart 
ment] about this unexplained light in the 
sky [in September 1979]. People think perhaps 
it was an Israeli or South African nuclear 
test. I don't know whether it was or not. 
(55)
According to Crocker, some U.S. experts had concluded 
that it was a South African neutron bomb test, in 
collaboration with Israel,(56)
This time South Afrca's reaction was very harsh. 
In his remarks in October 1979, Foreign Minister Botha 
said :
It is like a cowboy not knowing how to
handle his gun or walk tall any longer.......
I say to you [Carter] stop displaying this 
nervousness [in world affairs] accept the 
role of an anti-Marxist state. You are 
frightening your friends and appeasing 
your enemies.(57)
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Thus accepting the minimal degree of influence on
South Africa in this regard, the Carter administration
by this time virtually stopped pushing the Republic further 
into a corner and voted against its expulsion from the 
IAEA in December 1979. The non-aligned and Eastern bloc 
countries defeated the Western and industrialized nations’ 
move to save South Africa’s membership. Two years earlier, 
in June 1977 South Africa was already unseated from the 
IAEA’s Board of Governors. However, the reason for U.S. 
support in favour of the continuation of South Africa’s 
membership in IAEA was two-fold. First, by this time the 
Carter administration had realized that South Africa would 
not accede to the NPT. Second, with the emergence of the
new world situation and the growing superpower tension, 
especially after the Soviet military intervention in
Afghanistan in December 1979, the issues such as 
human rights and nuclear proliferation were overshadowed 
by security policy issues. In turn, the superpower tension 
reduced the U.S. pressure on suspected or potential nuclear 
powers, notably South Africa and Pakistan.
Three months after Botha's remarks, President Carter 
in his State of the Union message in January 1980, came 
out of his "nervousness", "accepted the role of an anti- 
Marxist regime", and turned aside from an accomodation 
policy with the Soviet Union to the realism of power 
politics. His early tough policy stopping nuclear spread 
in the world was lost in the deserts of Rajasthan, when 
the "Senate on September 24, 1980 upheld the President's
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decision to ship 38 tons of nuclear fuel to India for
its Tarapur power plants_____ a major foreign policy victory
for President Carter,"(58) but a great defeat for Jimmy 
Carter. The shipment of nuclear fuel to India was granted, 
despite the fact that India refuses to sign the NPT and 
to open up all of its nuclear facilities to international 
inspection.
It can therefore be argued that President Carter, 
who made the nuclear proliferation issue one of the main 
slogans of his presidential election campaign in 1976, 
had to tone down his criticism on nuclear issues. Nuclear 
proliferation was no longer a foreign policy priority 
of his administration by the end of his term in office. 
In sum, the Carter administration's early pressure on 
the Republic in this regard could be considered a well 
calculated move to satisfy the growing domestic pressures, 
both inside and outside Congress. These forces were less 
critical of the administration because of its approach 
of open condemnation. For example, the Democratic 
controlled House Sub-Committee on Africa held only one 
exclusive series of hearings on U.S.-South Africa nuclear 
relations between June 30 and July 12, 1977.(59)
In addition, during his administration these pressure 
groups were still in their formative phase and had been 
engaged in mobilizing public opinion on this issue. 
Carter's personal interest in non-proliferation thus 
encouraged these groups and brought the issue into the 
public limelight.
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4.3 U.S.-South Africa Nuclear Collaboration, 1981-1986
Unlike the - Carter administration, the Reagan
administration connected nuclear issues with the global
strategic aims of the East-West confrontation and supported
the national security constraints of friends and allies
all over the world, regardless of their respective form
of government and human rights record. The administration
thus, revived the Nixon-Kissinger version of detente.
Within the framework of armed diplomacy, the Republic
of South Africa, alongwith other U.S. 'friends', had
benefitted militarily and politically under the
administration’s security programme. Since the Republic
of South Africa was regarded as a main actor to contain
Soviet influence and designs in Southern Africa, its
nuclear programme was perceived as an "internal matter".
The remarkable development in U.S.-South Africa relations,
which reached their lowest ebb during the Carter
administration, was the adoption of the policy of
constructive engagement. The dominant theme of this policy
was not abrupt breach with previous U.S. policies towards
Southern Africa, but the nuclear cooperation between both
the countries reemerged with the inception of the Reagan
administration. When this author asked Crocker about
this his response was:
I am not aware of a nuclear cooperation 
during the years I was in the government 
[1981-89]. In fact there was a lot of nuclear 
pressure pressing them [South Africa] hard 
to sign the NPT from 1983-84 all the way
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around until the end of the Reagan adminis­
tration . ( 60 )
Crocker's response suggest two things. First,
that nuclear collaboration reemerged between both
countries with the inception of the Reagan administration,
in contravention of the official U.S. policy, at least
between the period 1981 and 1983-84. Second, it seems
that during the same period the United States did not
put pressure on Pretoria to abide by the NPT. According
(60
to Crocker s secret policy paper prepared for a meetingA
with the South African Foreign Minister Roelof (Pile) Botha: 
"The discussion with South Africans will cover three 
discrete areas: Namibia, U.S.-South Africa nuclear
cooperation, and general bilateral issues................ OES
Assistant Secretary [U.S] Jim Malone will conduct separate 
discussions with Brand Fourie [South Africa] on the nuclear 
issues."(62)
Another State Department's secret memorandum prepared 
for the same meeting pointed out that South Africa would 
request two things: either to lift the ban and fulfill
the 1974 fuel agreement for the Koeberg reactors, or to 
allow export permits to be issued for fuel delivery through 
France. On the South African position regarding the NPT,
the same paper said "..............South Africa cannot
in the interest of its own security sign the NPT and thus
set the minds of its would be attackers at rest......... "
(63)
The Reagan administration, instead of allowing 
South African uranium enriched in the United States to
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be sent directly to the Republic for its Koeberg power
reactors, found certain loopholes in the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Act. The Act did not cover the brokering 
ventures of U.S. companies, which were not required to 
report any deal to the U.S. Department of State or seek 
its permission in advance for the sale.
In 1981 two American firms, Edlow International
Inc., and SWUCO had served as brokers for enriched uranium
for the Koeberg plant obtained from a Swiss utility through
a French enrichment plant.(64) Crocker’s comment on the
loopholes in the Act was:
That was part of the price of realism.
Because if we didn’t allow that to go ahead
and do it anyway probably......... But that’s
true there was third party possibility.
And the French had no shame. French would
sell to anybody, including you guys [Paki­
stan] . ( 65 )
It cannot be said with certainty whether this was 
an oversight of the framers of the Act or a deliberate
loophole to open up commercial avenues for U.S. companies 
in case of public and political resentment in the United 
States against trade links with South Africa.
In addition to the above mentioned indirect sale 
through U.S. companies, South Africa had also succeeded 
in buying enriched uranium, most probably from Italy and 
West Germany during the same period. The People's Republic 
of China was also considered as a fuel supplier to South 
Africa through European brokers. It had long been suspected 
of having secret nuclear contacts with Pretoria.(66)
However, one particular direct export, helium-3,
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a by-product of the U.S. nuclear weapons programme to
South Africa, had been a matter of great concern to
Congress during the early years of the Reagan
administration. In 1982, Charles H.Percy, then Chairman
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings,
especially on the proposed export of helium-3 and other
nuclear material and technology to South Africa. Richard
Kennedy, then U.S. Under Secretary of State for Management,
in his testimony responded to the questions asked by
Senator Percy this way:
Q. Why are we exporting helium-3 to South 
Africa?
A. No decision has been reached. It is
still under careful consideration.
Q. Is it true that helium-3 can be used
to make tritium?
A. The answer to this is yes.
Q. Does it mean that helium-3 can be used 
in a nuclear explosion?
A. Helium-3 can be used to make tritium, 
which can be used in a nuclear explosive. 
Q. What is our policy with respect to 
nuclear cooperation with South Africa?
A. We don't have any nuclear cooperation 
essentially with South Africa at this point 
(67)
One year before Kennedy's testimony, in which he 
denied "any nuclear cooperation with South Africa", the 
Reagan administration did facilitate the indirect supply 
of enriched uranium to South Africa, coupled with the 
exchange of visits between nuclear scientists of both 
countries. Two South African scientists visited a United 
States facility in 1981, followed by a visit of four U.S. 
scientists to Valindaba, South Africa's unsafeguarded 
uranium enrichment plant.
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In addition to hearings, Senator Percy asked the 
Commerce Department for further information regarding 
the proposed export of helium-3 and related material. 
In response, the Commerce Department disclosed that between 
January 1981 and May 1982, the Department approved five 
export licenses for purchase for South Africa’s nuclear 
programme. Those included computers, multi-channel 
analysers, and vibration test equipment. The computers 
main function was said to be in nuclear weapons 
research.(68)
Unlike the Carter administration’s policy, which 
kept dialogue open with South Africa without supplying 
computer technology and related nuclear material, the 
Reagan administration believed in supplying a ’limited' 
nuclear export and technology to South Africa as a means 
of encouraging a constructive nuclear dialogue with her. 
Based on that policy, the first Reagan administration 
eased export restrictions on nuclear equipment to South 
Africa. A study by the U.S. General Accounting Office, 
commissioned by Representative Howard Wolpe, then Chairman 
of the House Sub-Committee on Africa, revealed that South 
Africa was the third largest recipient of such exports 
in 1982.(69) These exports, among other nuclear related 
equipment, included "high tec computers which could be 
used to model nuclear explosions."(70) This was followed 
by delivery of the Department of Energy (DOE) enriched 
uranium in August 1983. Four months later, in December 
1983, Framatome of France and the Fluor Corporation of
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the United States were granted the maintenance contracts
for the Koeberg power plant.(71)
Despite all this evidence of direct and third party 
trade to transfer nuclear technology, Reagan officials 
dealing with South Africa in different Executive
departments and agencies, had either been denying any 
nuclear cooperation, or defending the exports and policies 
of the administration towards the Republic. The following 
are some examples which clearly indicate the lack of the
presidential leadership on the one hand, and the nature
of the organizational interests in Washington, on the
other.
George Bradley, the Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary for International Affairs, Department of Energy:
In case of South Africa it has remained 
the firm policy [of the Reagan
administration] that no direct export of
nuclear fuel and significant nuclear
equipment to that country should take place 
unless and until it accepts complete safe­
guards, and have continued to urge South 
Africa to adhere to the NPT to achieve that 
objective. (72)
Bradley's statement also indicates that the 
administration did facilitate indirect or third party 
sales of nuclear fuel and other related equipment.
As opposed to Bradley, Carlton Throne, Chief of the
International Nuclear Affairs Division had this to say:
We believe this approach [of supplying 
nuclear technology] is the best means of 
encouraging a constructive nuclear dialogue 
with South Africa while assuring that any
items provided by the U.S. are provided 
under strict possible controls against their 
misuse.(73)
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According to James R.Shea, Director, Office of the
International Programmes, Nuclear regulatory Commission:
.......... few export transactions that have
occurred [1981-82] with South Africa in 
nuclear related areas which are significant 
from a non-proliferation standpoint.(74)
Finally, George Trail, the U.S. Consul General in
Johannesburg, described in September 1983, "that trade 
with South Africa was still subject to very tight 
restrictions imposed by Congress on the sale of such
sensitive items as arms, nuclear materials and computers." 
(75) These "sensitive items" had already been exported 
to South Africa during the first two years of the Reagan 
administration.
When this author asked Crocker, his response was:
So we talked to them [South Africans]
about nuclear issues, pressing them. We 
said to them if you sign [NPT] it would 
become possible for us to resume normal
safeguarded nuclear commerce with you. 
So it was a quid pro quo kind of 
discussion.(76)
But the above examples clearly suggests that "normal 
nuclear commerce" with South Africa was already going 
on despite the April 1981 South African official
announcement that it had "recently succeeded in producing 
a limited quantity of 45 percent enriched uranium 235, 
which has been processedinto fuel elements."(77) Four 
years later, "Pretoria acknowledged it could build a 
nuclear weapon if it chose, but that it had no need for 
one."(78 )
At least two factors contributed towards U.S. nuclear 
exports to South Africa during the first Reagan term.
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First, the Republic of South Africa was considered as 
an staunch ally and a bulwark against the growth of 
Communism and the Soviet influence in the region. It was 
clear that the Soviet Union under the Brezhnev Doctrine 
(1968)(79) played a significant role in Southern Africa 
with the goal of influencing South Africa, This was 
obviously evident in its activities in Angola in the shape 
of about 50 thousand Cuban troops. This, however, played 
an important role, especially under the first Reagan 
administration in the policy aimed at removing the Soviet 
influence from the region. According to a U.S. Senator 
Nancy L .Kassebaum. "I don’t think that the Soviet Union 
was ever a major factor in South Africa, because we never
saw South Africa going to go to the Soviet side.”(80)
But certainly it was a factor in the region. An official 
in the State Department told this author, ”1 tell you 
what it did do, it distracted people from South Africa 
for years.”(81)
The question that comes immediatly to mind is how
far was South Africa able to check the Soviet and
Communist growth and influence in the region, keeping 
the Republic’s vulnerable position in view? Or was South 
Africa in a position to drive the Soviet-Cuban troops 
and advisers out of Angola? Crocker's position was 
different from the rest of the Reagan administration 
on this issue. He recalled that,
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...... there was a time, I think they believed
they could actually break the Soviets in 
Angola. And we told them that was impossible. 
You do not break the Soviets in Angola. 
The Soviets may break themselves in Angola. 
(82)
Another factor which had been considered by the 
Reagan administration (at least in private) was the 
notion that if the United States did not sell nuclear 
material to South Africa, then other nuclear exporting
nations would do so.
Meanwhile there had been a growing feeling among
black South Africans during the Reagan administration
that either in the event of a defeat in a conventional
war with its neighbours, or because of the growing black
threat for whites within South Africa, the Republic would
use nuclear weapons as a last resort.(83) In 1986, Bishop
Desmond Tutu expressed his concern:
I myself actually fear that in the end 
because they [South African regime] are 
so irrational that they seem to have a
Samson complex........... They are going
to pull down the pillars and everyone must
go down with them........ ....as most of
us believe, they do have nuclear capability. 
I don’t put it past them to have their 
own version of a scorched earth policy. 
(84)
Unlike the Carter administration, the U.S. nuclear
policy towards South Africa under the first Reagan term 
was brought to public attention by Congressmen sympathetic 
to the black cause in South Africa, and the Afro-American 
pressure groups, such as TransAfrica, and the Washington 
Office on Africa. In this they were joined by certain 
elements within the bureaucracy who usually opposed the
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Reagan administration’s nuclear policy towards South 
Africa, and in turn formed a tripartite ’alliance’ to
make the growing nuclear cooperation between both 
countries into a public issue. As a result, a substantial 
number of congressional hearings regarding the export 
of nuclear related goods and technology in general, as 
well as towards South Africa, were held in both houses
of Congress during 1982, and 1983.
During that period the Commerce Department approved 
licenses for the export of nuclear related equipment, 
and the export of helium-3 to South Africa. Consequently, 
these exports were terminated because of the growing 
congressional pressure and public protests organized by 
the Washington Office on Africa during 1983, under the 
name of the Campaign to End U.S.-South Africa Nuclear
Collaboration.(85) Further, the public outcry, plus the 
threat of congressional sanctions against South Africa, 
forced the administration to tighten export controls. 
The mounting public pressure resulted in the passage of
the sanctions bill by Congress in 1986 which terminated 
nuclear cooperation with South Africa.
In sum, the Reagan administration’s ’limited’ nuclear 
cooperation with South Africa did not succeed in 
convincing the Republic to abide by non-proliferation. 
The administration's focus, however, was on the Namibian 
independence issue rather than domestic political change 
in South Africa. In this pursuit, because Washington needed 
South Africa's cooperation, it did not put pressure on
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the Republic in this regard. Even if South Africa had 
joined the NPT it would have not eased the growing 
domestic pressure on the Reagan administration. By now 
the balance had already been shifted to Congress and the 
public, which wanted the imposition of comprehensive 
sanctions against the Republic.
Conclusion
The early U.S-South Africa uranium extraction 
cooperation, which entered into a phase that embraced 
the transfer of nuclear know-how and material to South 
Africa, fostered South African nuclear development. South 
African nuclear capability is the result of scientific 
exchange and technology(86) with the United States between 
the period 1950 through the mid-1970s. Throughout this 
period South Africa benefitted from the United States 
in this field.
From the mid 1970s until the passage of the NNPA 
in 1978, the U.S.-South Africa nuclear policy was a part 
of the general nuclear export debate between the Ford 
/Carter administrations and Congress, which concerned 
the policies, rules, and decision-making in this 
regard.(87 )
Thus, both the Carter and the Reagan administrations 
perceived nuclear relations with South Africa from 
different perspectives, and tried to bring the Republic 
within the NPT fold. What differentiated the Carter 
administration from its successor was that nuclear related
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material which reached South Africa between 1977 and 
1980 was "outside the knowledge or the approval of the 
U.S. government," whereas during the Reagan administration 
nuclear related material was sent to South Africa with 
the consent of top level policy-makers, probably including 
the President himself. But nuclear material which reached 
South Africa during the first Reagan term, however, was 
not the major lifeline through which South Africa gained 
its nuclear strength. By then the sources were diverse 
and many, including its domestic capability.
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CHAPTER V
U.S-SOUTH AFRICA DEFENCE AND INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION 
Introduction
"An army without secret agents is like a man without 
eyes and ears", wrote Sun Tzu, a Chinese philosopher in 
4th century B.C. Throughout the recorded history of 
conflict, secret agents have been used to gather 
information about enemy/enemies1 movements, both war
and peace time. What has made contemporary espionage 
different from the early period are various technological 
developments.
The Soviet domination of the East European countries 
and the commencement of the U.S. containment doctrine 
in the aftermath of the Second World War marked the 
beginning of the Cold War era. The West was particularly 
concerned about the growth of Communism and its possible 
control of the Third World resources needed for Western 
industrial development and survival.
In Africa, the Southern subcontinent was the most 
important because of its strategic minerals production, 
discussed in chapters three and four. To secure free access 
to those minerals, and to keep an eye on oil shipping 
lanes connecting the Middle East with the West, against 
possible Soviet interruption, the United States needed 
the cooperation of countries in the region. The
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geo-strategic location and military capability of South 
Africa made it most attractive for the United States
 a suitable area to which she could reach out to share
intelligence and develop cooperation against the 
manoeuvrings of a common enemy______the Soviet Union.
Our knowledge of the long-standing intelligence 
cooperation between the U.S. intelligence community, 
especially the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the 
Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), and their South African 
counterpart, the Bureau for State Security (BOSS), later 
the National Intelligence Service (NIS) is very limited. 
That on the basis of the available secondary sources, 
coupled with empirical evidence of a primary character, 
it can be said that the CIA’s activities in South Africa 
were extensive. First, the agency and its South African 
counterpart participated in joint covert operations in 
the Congo in the 1960s, and in Angola against the ruling 
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in 
the mid-1970s. Their liaison also covered information 
sharing regarding the Soviet movements in Southern Africa, 
and the Indian and the South Atlantic Oceans. Second, 
since the early 1960s, the CIA, on the one hand, cooperated 
in intelligence sharing concerning the African National 
Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) 
movements with the South African intelligence entity, 
and on the other, tried to groom a future Black leadership, 
such as Chief Gatsha Buthelezi. Finally, since South 
Africa’s official announcement of its uranium enrichment
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plant in 1970, its nuclear weapons programme had been 
a matter of concern and interest for the U.S. intelligence 
community, especially the CIA.
This chapter addresses two basic questions. [1] 
How important was U.S./South Africa intelligence 
cooperation in Southern Africa? [2] How far did the U.S. 
intelligence agencies pursue their own policies in the 
region? Before analysing these issues, it is important
to outline briefly the historical evolution of the 
intelligence organizations of both the countries.
5.1 Historical Development
Intelligence means the gathering of political, 
economic, and military information and other data
concerning the activities of a potential enemy,(1) 
Information can be accumulated independently or in 
collaboration with other friendly intelligence agencies. 
There are of course various ways of gathering the
required information. Intelligence is as old as war 
itself. In the recorded human history of five thousand
years, the conduct of espionage could be found in ancient 
China and India in the distant past, as well as in 
Greek city states. The Chinese strategist, Sun Tzu (quoted 
above) in his book 'The Art of War', described the
employment of secret agents as follows:
 Now there are five sorts of secret
agents to be employed. There are native, 
inside, doubled, expandable, and living.
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 When these five types of agents are
all working simultaneously and none 
knows these methods of operations, they 
are called "The Divine Skein" and are 
the treasure of a sovereign.(2)
Broadly speaking, it was only after the Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648 that the "treasure of a sovereign" 
began to take shape in the modern nation states.
Since its birth in 1776 until the Second World War 
(1939-45), because of its "isolationist" policy in world 
affairs, the U.S. intelligence bureau had only to gather 
information during war times. There was no peacetime 
intelligence service in the country throughout that period. 
It was only during and after the Second World War that 
the "United States learned the art of clandestine 
intervention from the British Secret Service, which had 
several centuries' experience applying such methods in 
the Crown's colonies and protectorates."(3) Thus, five 
months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on 
December 7, 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt (1933-45)
decided to create a peace time intelligence bureau on 
July 11, 1941. This was then known as the Office of
Coordination (OCI). After its failure to gather advance 
information of the Japanese attack, the OCI was reorganized 
in June 1942 to became the Office of Strategic Service 
(OSS).(4)
The U.S. intelligence community became more assertive 
after the War when the United States and the Soviet Union 
emerged as two great rival powers in the world. As a 
result, the first well-organized, peace-time intelligence
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service in the United States the CIA  was created
under the 1947 National Security Act. In addition, the 
National Security Council (NSC), an advisory forum to 
the President of the United States on national security 
threats and goals, was also created under this Act. "Since 
then the intelligence community has been a key element 
of U.S. foreign and national security policy."(5)
The U.S. intelligence community is divided into 
defence and civilian agencies. The agencies within the 
Department of Defence include:
[1] National Security Agency (NSA)
[2] Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA)
[3] Army Intelligence
[4] Naval Intelligence
[5] Air Force Intelligence
The civilian agencies consist of:
[1] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
[2] State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research (BOIR)
[3] Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
[4] Division of Intelligence (Atomic Energy 
Commission)
[5] Treasury Department’s Intelligence Agency
What differentiate the CIA from the rest of the 
U.S. intelligence community is its "Directorate which 
covers three basic types of clandestine operations: 
espionage, counter-espionage, and covert act ions . ’’ ( 6 ) 
The agency is infamous for its alleged assassination plots 
against foreign leaders, masterminding coups d ’etat, 
and arming anti-Communist guerrilla organizations around 
the world.
In the wake of the Vietnam defeat and the Watergate
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scandal during the early 1970s, the U.S. Senate 
Investigative Committee under the leadership of Senator 
Frank Church, and the House Select Committee on 
Intelligence under the chairmanship of Representative 
Otis G.Pi Ice were appointed by mid-1975 to review the covert 
activities and operations of the U.S. "invisible kingdom". 
Philip Agee, who had spent twelve years as a CIA agent
and insider, has pointed out that "the Pike report has 
turned a blind eye on CIA’s liaison operations with foreign 
intelligence and security services." In Agee’s opinion,
"the Committee considered the matter too hot to handle."(7) 
The important aspect of the CIA's cooperation with fellow 
agencies in friendly countries had also been ignored by 
the Church Committee(8), which had focused its attention 
on alleged CIA involvement in assassination plots against 
foreign leaders. These included, for example, Patrice
Lumumba (the Congo), Fidel Castro (Cuba), General Rene 
Schielder (Chile), and President Ngo Din Diem and his 
brother Ngo Din Nho (South Vietnam).
Unlike its American CIA___ which has nothing to
do with the internal security of the United States, the 
South African National Intelligence Service (NIS) had 
not only to preserve the internal security of the country, 
but to insulate it from external covert threats as well. 
With the inception of the Nixon administration in January 
1969, the relations between both the countries were placed 
within the broader framework of strategic considerations. 
It was during his administration that close contacts
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were established between the CIA and the friendly
intelligence agencies worldwide. As a result, the CIA 
was much influenced by the host countries' intelligence
agencies in framing its intelligence activity. Within 
this framework of broader cooperation, the Republican 
Intelligence (RI) of South Africa was reorganized with 
the help of the CIA. Consequently, the Bureau for State 
Security (BOSS) was created in May 1969, under the heavy 
hand of General Van den Bergh, Coincidently, Richard 
Nixon's National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger was 
authorized to prepare a secret Southern African policy
paper the National Security Study Memorandum-39 during
the same period.
However, due to the Muldergate scandal, and the 
subsequent resignation of Prime Minister Vorster in
September 1978, General Bergh had to resign, BOSS was
restructured, and renamed as the Department of National 
Security (DNS). During the mid 1980s, the intelligence
service was once again reconstituted and currently 
functions under the name of the National Intelligence 
Service (NIS).
Another factor which strengthened the ties between 
the two countries in this regard was the development of 
the space technology by the end of the 1950s, when the 
Soviet Union launched Sputnik-I, the first space capsule 
to orbit the earth. The Soviet space monopoly was broken 
by the United States a year later in 1958, which soon 
after started negotiations with South Africa for the
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construction of satellite tracking stations.(9) The
cooperation between the South African Council for
Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and the U.S.
space agencies, however, had already been started soon
after the Sputnik-I launch. As a result, both countries
entered into an agreement on National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) satellite tracking stations,
signed on September 13, 1960 in Pretoria. The object of
the agreement as announced was to "cooperate for peaceful
uses of outer space and the facilities established shall
not be used for purposes of a military nature." The
importance of the U.S. space programme's reliance on South
Africa was submitted to President Nixon in a secret
memorandum fourteen months before the formal agreement
was signed between both the countries. The document reads:
The NASA unmanned planetary exploration 
spacecraft, as they have in the past, must
continue to depend heavily upon the tracking 
stations located in South Africa in achieving
mission success..... The South African
NASA tracking facilities is a vital element 
in a global network of stations which 
provides the total communications link with 
our planetary-bound flight spacecraft.
The NASA station was located in South 
Africa, both because it had the proper 
geographic location in relation to the other 
stations of the Deep Space Network (which 
are spaced 120 [degrees] apart and because
it is uniquely located to allow the precise 
tracking of Cape Kennedy launching spacecraft 
during the critical phase just after the 
spacecrafts are placed into planetary bound 
trajectories (post injuction-phase)(10)
Throughout the contract period, the programme was 
conducted by NASA and the CSIR, the cooperating agencies 
of both countries. In addition to NASA's tracking stations,
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"the United States had established a Defence Department 
(DoD) tracking station near Johannesburg for the purposes 
of South Atlantic Missile Test Range."(11)
The United States decided to close down its 
facilities in 1974 and did not renew the contract with 
the Republic. At least two factors contributed towards
the closure of tracking stations. First, growing 
congressional opposition during the Nixon era, and second, 
the NASA and the DoD reached the conclusion that the 
stations in South Africa were no longer required for 
research and development of missiles.(12 )
5.2 CIA-NIS Covert' Operations: An Overview
The closer intelligence cooperation and information 
sharing between both the agencies dates back to the
1950s. It was during the Truman administration that the 
CIA began developing its relations with its South African 
counterpart,(13) alongwith the Western European
intelligence services, and with its Turkish, Yugoslav, 
Taiwanese, and Thai counterparts(14) to contain the growth 
and influence of Communism.
The first CIA-South African intelligence agency
covert operation was in the Congo in the early 1960s,
which became the centre of international attention and 
the first arena of East-West Cold War competition politics 
in Africa. "Colonel Mike Hoare, a South African citizen 
had led 500 mercenaries to help the CIA to put down the 
Communist inspired insurgents in the Congo."(15) Thus,
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the Congo crisis marked the beginning of the first U.S. 
coherent policy towards Africa on the one hand, as well 
as providing the first Soviet foothold in the continent, 
on the other.
In additon to their covert activities, the CIA was 
pretty (much involved in creating a rift in black unity
in South Africa so as to break their united force. 
According to Gordon Winter, a former BOSS intelligence
officer, who defected from the Bureau in May 1979, "He
[Bergh] said [to Winter] the CIA had helped to create 
the split in the African National Congress in 1959 which 
had given birth to the Pan-Africanist Congress."(16)
During the late 1960s, the CIA and its South African
counterpart were involved in covert operations as far
as Eastern Nigeria, where the Ibo region split off from
the federation and became the independent state of Biafra
in 1967. After three years bloody civil war Nigeria was
reunified in 1970. Winter gives the inside story:
Years later [after the civil war] I was
told at high level in BOSS that Mr. Botha 
[then Defence Minister] had been asked to 
send the troops by American CIA, which had 
masterminded Colonel Chukwuemeka 0jukwu's 
proclamation of 30 May 1967 that Biafara
was to be an independent state. I was told 
that P.W.Botha had also sent a special
contingent of experienced South Afircan 
fighter pilots to Biafara. I was so facinated 
by this information that I did some private 
research on the subject, and uncovered the 
fact that several South African pilots had
flown Czech made jet fighter bombers for 
Biafara. They did so well that six Egyptian
MIG fighters were captured and then used 
by the Biafarans in air battle.(17)
As opposed to the CIA-B0SS support to oil-rich
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Biaf'ra, the federal government of General Yukobu Gowan 
was militarly supported by the Soviet Union not only to 
gain Nigerian oil concessions but also to secure a firm 
foothold in West Africa. Just like cobalt in the Congo, 
the security of the oil supply from Nigeria to the West
was the main concern at stake and the reason for
involvement.
The long-standing intelligence cooperation between
both countries became more evident during the
Nixon-Kissinger era when covert activities were seen as 
a fundamental part of their foreign policy conduct to 
overthrow the Marxist regimes in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America. According to Stephen Talbot, the National Security 
Study Memorandum-39 (NSSM), which guided U.S. policy
towards South Africa, was based in part on CIA reports, 
which in turn were reliant on data provided by BOSS and
the Portuguese secret police.(18) Talking about the
CIA-BOSS cooperation during the Nixon administration,
Moose said:
........ certainly during the Nixon adminis­
tration there had been collaborated 
intelligence operations, or there had been 
exchanges of intelligence between the United- 
States and South Africa. The South Africans 
provided the intelligence about the air
and naval spaces around South Africa to
U.S. government. They provided some informa­
tion about Communist and Marxist or other 
subversive activities in the region. The 
United States, I don't think that South
Africans, the South Africans undoubtedly 
had a lot to say to the U.S. government 
about subversive activities in their own
country. The U.S. government probably
provided then some information about Soviet 
or Communist bloc activities in the region.
209
I don’t know. But I don't have the impression 
that the United States provided the South 
African government with intelligence about 
anything yet, might know about, what was 
going on inside South Africa. I don't believe 
that our intelligence services were very
well informed about any of them. I think 
they tended to take whatever the South
Africans gave them and to evaluate it. But 
they never had much of the collective
operation inside South Africa itself. I
am speaking the time prior to the Carter
administration.............. But I feel
reasonably confident about what I just 
told you.(19)
The relationship between the CIA and its South
African counterpart entered into a more active phase after 
the Portuguese coup in 1974, where the CIA failed to notice 
"cracks in the facade". Subsequently, Angola and Mozambique 
emerged as pro-Moscow governments on the spectrum of the
international system in 1975. This development brought
the Southern subcontinent of Africa into the arena of 
Cold War competition where both the superpowers and their 
regional allies were engaged overtly or covertly to wipe 
out each other's influence and political growth in the 
region. The CIA-BOSS common enterprise in this struggle
was to help overthrow the Marxist government of Agostinho
Neto (1975-79) of Angola, to protect their economic and 
political interests in the region.
During the mid 1970s, the U.S. intelligence 
community was a newcomer in the region with little or 
no experience or understanding of revolutionary movements 
there. In addition, it lacked an insight into the
Afrikaner society in South Africa or any sort of working 
relationship with the African National Congress (ANC).
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Thus, the U.S. intelligence entity had to work on
different fronts in collaboration with BOSS and the
Rhodesian (Zimbabwe) Central Intelligence Organization 
(CIO).
One of the most revealing studies of intelligence 
cooperation between U.S. and South African intelligence 
agencies during this time was the book, 'In Search of
Enemies: A CIA Story', by John Stockwell, the former head
of the CIA's Angola Task Force during the mid-1970s, 
who later resigned in protest against the agency's
policies. He noted that "the CIA has traditionally 
sympathized with South Africa and enjoyed its close liaison 
with BOSS."(20) Stockwell argues that in its hunt for 
military advisers for anti-MPLA groups in Angola, the 
CIA found South Africa the most attractive source, which 
not only provided advisers to UNITA and FNLA, but 
eventually its armed forces entered in the war against 
the ruling MPLA.(21)
Within the ruling National Party there was discontent 
with Prime Minister Vorster's Angola policy in 
collaboration with the CIA. The then Defence Minister 
P.W.Botha "had always warned H.J. [General van den Bergh] 
that the CIA would eventually doublecross South Africa"(22) 
in this regard. The dissent group was "claiming that 
Vorster and van den Bergh were j'ust CIA-dominated kittens 
who were suckling at the teats of that political hyena 
Henry Kissinger."(23 )
However, events exactly happened the way Botha had
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foreseen when the CIA support to UNITA and FNLA was stopped 
by Congress by means of an amendment to the U.S. Arms
Export Control Act, known as the Clark Amendment in 
1976.(24) The Amendment was signed into Law by President
Gerald Ford on February 9, 1976. It remains noteworthy,
however, that the decision to support the UNITA and FNLA 
militarly was made by the State Department under Henry
Kissinger. When Botha became Prime Minister in 1978 
he "publicly accused Washington of encouraging and than
abandoning Pretoria's abortive 1975-76 invasion of
Ang ola."(25)
In January 1978 President Carter signed an Executive
Order which tightened the control over CIA's clandestine
operations, especially through the prohibition of
assassinations.(26) In the second week of May 1978 the
CIA Chief Admiral Stansfield Turner, along with
Brzezinski's adviser, David Aron approached Senator Dick
Clark to ask if he would agree to a plan to give American
arms to UNITA through a third party.(27) According to
Senator Clark, "it is increasingly clear that President
Carter had made the decision to reinvolve the United States
in the Angolan civil war,"(28)
In relation to CIA-BOSS Moose responded that
Now at the beginning of the Carter
administration we formally ended all forms 
of intelligence cooperation with the South 
African government. Even all kinds of infor­
mation exchanges.... We ended all kinds
of governmental exchanges. And that was 
reasonably effective. I believe it was 99
percent effective. In retrospect, I believe
that some of our U.S. intelligence agencies
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without the knowledge of President and 
against his explicit direction neverthless 
maintained some level of clandestine exchange 
with South Africans, providing some types 
of information about Soviet bloc activities 
around the area. It was outside the law. 
It was the kind of thing that unfortunately 
CIA has done from time to time. The CIA 
and our military intelligence believed that 
it was very important for them to maintain 
some of the ties because South Africans 
were the only really effective
non-African intelligence operations in the 
area. But that was wholly illegal, and the 
people who were doing it were acting totally 
against policy. In fact, I repeatedly sought 
to check this and was assured by the CIA, 
by Mr. Clair George,(29) who is currently 
being tried for lying to Congress. I 
repeatedly asked about this really, and 
was assured by the CIA that nothing of 
the sort was going on. Now
I know they lied to me. But that was wholly 
irregular.(30)
Against Moose’s account of a "99 percent effective" 
ban on contact, the CIA was pretty much active in South 
Africa and was working over the heads of the State 
Department bureaucracy. In January 1979, Anthony Sampson 
of the Sunday Observer interviewed the former BOSS chief 
General Bergh on the telephone and asked him whether 
"the CIA might have become less friendly [with South Africa 
because of the Carter administration’s policy]. General 
Bergh's response was: "That’s a lot of bull. On the
contrary only today I had lunch with a friend of mine 
who is back here on holiday, who is very senior in the 
CIA."(31)
Another example of clandestine CIA activities 
involving its South African counterpart was the 
embarrassment caused by the Muldergate scandal, in which 
both the agencies were shown to be engaged in illegal
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activities to improve the white minority government’s 
international image.(32) As a result, Prime Minister 
Vorster and his Information Minister Cornelius Mulder 
had to resign in September 1978, and power went into the 
hands of the far right elements in the National Party, 
under the leadership of F .W .Botha.(33) Sean MacBride, 
the recipient of the Nobel (1974) and Lenin (1977) Peace 
Awards, and the American Medal for Justice (1978) is of
the opinion that in all these criminal actions to obtain 
the services of ’’opinion formers and decision-makers” 
in the United States and elsewhere throughout the world,
"if CIA was not directly involved in covert operations, 
it was aware of them."(34)
In addition to the CIA, the collaboration between
the U.S. Navy and its South African counterpart also 
continued throughout the Carter administration, mainly 
focused on the communications intelligence of Soviet 
sub-marine and shipping activities.(35)
Apart from information sharing, the other function 
of the CIA’s clandestine operations in South Africa had
been to watch and gather information regarding the 
Republic’s nuclear development and capabilities since 
the early 1970s. This, however, became much more active 
with the advent of the Carter administration. In February 
1977 the U.S. intelligence community reported "that South 
Africa could make a nuclear weapon by 1981, or within 
a few months if it initiated a crash programme."(36)
It was during his administration that the agency
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was ordered to photograph South Africa's nuclear 
installations. These clandestine operations were, however, 
discovered and responsible officers of the U.S. Embassy 
in Pretoria were given a week to leave the country. The 
South African Prime Minister announced on April 12, 1979
that "they [U.S.] had photographed some of the Republic’s 
’most sensitive military installation’ by means of secret 
cameras installed in a diplomatic aircraft,"(37) and he 
demanded an apology from the U.S. government. The 
intrusion was not officially "denied by the Carter 
administration", but "a Pentagon official said that the 
plane was primarily used to keep an eye on South Africa’s 
nuclear installations, particularly a test site in the 
Kalahari desert."(38)
In his unpublished memoirs, the then South African 
Ambassador to the United States, Donald B.Sole has 
revealed that "the matter of expulsion [of U.S. officers] 
was resolved by Botha government even without consulting 
its Embassy in Washington, D . C .’’ According to him, he 
"pleaded with Botha for caution."(39) The question of 
whether the spy-plane incident was a genuine allegation 
or the Botha government wanted to derail and divert U.S. 
attention from the Namibian talks which in fact, were 
gaining momentum and progress caused much concern in 
Washington.(40)
In response to South Africa’s "spy plane" allegation, 
the Carter administration refused to apologise and replied 
by ordering the immediate expulsion of two South African
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diplomats based in Washington, D.C. Three days later, 
on April 15, 1979, Dr. A.J.A.Roux, then Chairman of the
South African Atomic Energy Board, said in an statement 
that much clearer pictures could have been taken of the 
Valindaba uranium enrichment plant with its ’unique 
process' from a low flying aircraft than from satellite. 
(41) According to the Sunday Times (Johannesburg, April 
29, 1979) report, the CIA had "for many years exchanged
aerial photographs taken over Black African countries 
in exchange for secret information from the South African 
authorities, regarding the Soviet moves in the region." 
This report, however, was categorically denied by the 
U.S. Embassy in Pretoria.
216
Like most of the CIA covert actions, this operation 
had probably been carried out under the directions of 
the White House and the National Security Council (NSC). 
The Presidential Executive Order 12036 of January 1978, 
"allowed the president to order the CIA to do everything 
it had done in the past except political assassinations."
On the other end of the CIA's intelligence scale, 
it is difficult to assess the lengths of its involvement 
in espionage operations concerning the ANC, PAC, and other 
black leaders' activities, both inside and outside South 
Africa during and before the Carter administration because 
of the lack of information. Neverthless the involvement 
of the U.S. intelligence community in this regard cannot 
be ruled out given its past record. For example, in
the assessment of Winter, the CIA was engaged to "groom 
Chief Gatsha [Buthelezi] for power with financial and
political backing. Should a revolution come to South Africa 
the CIA would prefer him to be the national black leader 
rather than the Moscow-based Nelson Mandela."(42) Martin 
Dolinchek, also a former intelligence officer of the BOSS, 
disclosed in 1991 "that the U.S. CIA had been involved 
in promoting Chief Buthelezi’s image overseas,"(43) as
an 'acceptable' black South African leader.
Writing about the CIA’s penetration within black
nationalist movements, Winter has noted:
At the much later date [probably after the
Soweto uprising] Pretoria showed me 
conclusive proof that the CIA had also given 
covert support to such Black organizations 
as the Soweto Students' Representative 
Council (SSRC), the Black Community Program
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(BCP) , the Union of Black Journalists (UBJ), 
the Black Allied Workers' Union (BAWA), 
the National Youth Organization (NYO), the 
South African Students’ Organization (SASO), 
and the Black People's Convention (BCP). 
(44)
In his assessment, in the beginning these 
organizations were unaware of the CIA’s involvement, 
because funds were comming through respectable liberal 
foundations and groups in the United States and 
Switzerland. Their support, however, was covering various 
forms, such as educational grants, cultural exchanges, 
’study tours’, and legal aid for black political 
prisoners.(45)
Quoting the then BOSS chief General Bergh concerning 
the CIA’s infiltration in black organizations, Winter 
has noted:
'So you see, the CIA backs all the black 
horses in the race so that, whichever mount 
wins, America will have a share in the prize
money our strategic mineral deposits
and, almost as important, our vast and cheap 
Black labour force.’(46)
However, since the 1970s the South African 
intelligence entity was narrowing its focus on the African 
National Congress. In July 1986 Seymour Hersh carried 
an article in the ’’New York Times" about intelligence 
cooperation between the U.S., the U.K. and South Africa 
in this respect. According to Hersh, a conference was 
held at Cheltenham in 1980 between the representatives 
of the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) of 
the United Kingdom, the National Security Agency (NSA) 
of the United States, and the South African Directorate
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of Military Intelligence. Among other things, the South
African delegation requested: [1] the intelligence
information about Oliver Tambo and ten members of the 
ANC high command staff; [2] information on any flights 
Tambo took abroad on Soviet and Cuban airlines; and [3] 
special attention to be paid by the NSA, and the GCHQ 
to the ANC communications.(47)
This kind of intelligence triangle was confirmed 
by Moose:
I always suspected that the British 
intelligence was passing stuff on to the 
American intelligence. So we just got it 
through the British back door somehow, 
because the British certainly collabora­
ting with the South Africans and with the 
Rhodesians and all about. I suppose our 
intelligence people got some of the 
[information], but it wasn’t the policy 
of the U.S. government to do that.(48)
The ANC related cooperation between the CIA and
its South African counterpart during the Carter
administration thus continued despite the fact that it
was considered as a "nationalist movement" by the Carter
administration. When this author asked Moose about his
administration’s perceptions regarding the ANC, his
response was:
I think we understood there were Communist
party members within the ANC. I never thought 
of the ANC anything other than the African 
movement. And they were native......... But
I never thought they would be Mar xist or
under the control of, or even under the 
influence of the Soviet Union. I mean there
were still....... the Soviet Communist party,
Soviet Union, Russia, all have gone, these 
fellows are still there because they were 
quite inependent from the influence of
Russians . We had contacts with
them. I used to see ANC people. I saw them.
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We didn’t see them frequently. We didn’t 
see them in South Africa. But we saw them
outside from time to time........... I
consider them as a nationalist movement. 
I consider them as a legitimate nationalist 
movement. Most of the members of our 
administration who believed and said 
Communist movement.(49)
In sum, the U.S. intelligence community continued 
to pursue its own policy independently and in collaboration 
with its South African counterpart, throughout the Carter 
administration, against the declared U.S. government 
policy, which only allowed information gathering
activities In host countries.
5.3 Intelligence Cooperation During the Reagan 
Administration
The closer relationship between the U.S. intelligence 
community and its South African counterpart (Department 
of National Security (DONS), later the National 
Intelligence Service (NIS), once again mushroomed when 
Ronald Reagan became the President of the United States 
with the clear and firm idea of supporting the white 
minority regime of South Africa.
The intelligence cooperation between both countries 
during his administration was mainly concentrated on the 
activities of the African National Congress (ANC), because 
Washington did not want to see a ’Moscow-oriented' 
organization come into power in Pretoria. Their activities 
included for example, obtaining of information from the 
interception of communications between ANC headquarters 
in Lusaka, Zambia, its guerrilla training camps in Angola,
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and its offices in Africa and Western Europe.(50)
This kind of cooperation between both the countries,
however, was denied by Chester A.Crocker.
We were not exchanging intelligence or 
as working together as partners on 
things related to black African parties. 
As such that was beyond the limits and 
constraints of our policy.(51)
Some of the important Africa specialists in the 
State and the Defence Departments I interviewed in
Washington, categorically denied the cooperation between 
the intelligence entities of both the countries in this 
regard. For example, Ambassador James K.Bishop Jr.told 
the author :
We shared them [South Africans] intelligence 
about the movement of our adversary 
[Soviet Union] in that part of the 
world. We didn't provide them
intelligence that related to internal 
South African matters. And we did not 
engage with the South Africans in 
covert operations in that part of the
world or anywhere.(52)
An official in the State Department said:
.........then you are talking about
internal South African [intelligence
sharing]. And in my experience there was
none. None. Absolutely none. We did not 
cooperate. There was no collaboration.
(53)
A middle-echelon U.S. Defence Department officer:
No. As far as I know they didn't [cooperate]. 
We didn't know the ANC movement either. 
I mean there wasn't lot of information to 
pass that. I know.(54)
The above interviewees, including Crocker, were
putting emphasis on this particular issue despite the 
fact that throughout the Reagan administration the ANC
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was considered as a terrorist organization. Their denial 
was motivated, partly because of restraints, and partly 
because it would cause an embarrassment to Washington 
vis-a-vis the African National Congress.
In addition to the ANC-related intelligence under 
the new administration in Washington, the meetings between 
senior U.S. officials and South African military personnel 
resumed once again on U.S. soil. So much so, that just 
seven weeks after the inauguration of Reagan as President, 
the U.S. permanent representative in the United Nations, 
J.Kirkpatrick had on March 15, 1981, a secret meeting
in Washington with the South African head of military 
intelligence. Commenting on the meeting, the New York
Times' concluded that the visit was to "discuss matters 
of common interest with officials in the new
administration." It further noted that the South African 
Defence Minister Malan cited it as an example of improved 
relations with the United States.(55)
In December 1981 the United Nations established
a commission to investigate the South African based 
mercenary invasion to overthrow President Albert Rene’ 
of Seychelles. The commission concluded in its report 
published in December 1982 that "the arms and ammunition 
for the attempted coup were supplied by the members of 
the South African Defence Force (SADF) and that the South 
African intelligence service, NSI was generally aware
of the ’mercenaries’ preparation."(56) According to the 
New York Times, the mercenary leader, Mike Hoare testified
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that he informed a representative of the CIA in Pretoria 
about the plan and he told his men that the CIA had 
approved the plan. (57) Why did the CIA-NIS want to help 
topple the government of Albert Rene? Several aspects 
of this could be explained. First, in September 1980 the 
Seychelles government banned South African Airways planes 
from landing there as a protest against South Africa's 
policies of apartheid. Second, South Africa and the CIA 
were also wary of the presence of the Tanzanian soldiers 
on the island who helped Rene to overthrow the previous 
government in 1977, and therefore attempted to bring back 
the ousted president, James Manchan. Finally, according 
to the Seychelles government "the coup stemmed from 
superpower interest in the Indian Ocean oil tanker routes, 
which are near the islands."(58)
By the end of the Reagan administration's first 
term in office, the CIA and NIS were once again caught 
in an abuse. This time in their covert involvement in 
Iran-Contra scandal. The South African denial of 
involvement in this case was followed by George Shultz's 
statement in which he disowned CIA documents suggesting 
that he had approved William Casey's plan in 1984 to use 
South Africa covertly to provide aid to the Contra 
rebels.(59)
In another example of continuing cooperation in 
the field of strategic intelligence, both the governments 
had been exchanging information regarding the movement 
of Soviet ships in the Indian and the South Atlantic
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Oceans. It was later disclosed by the former National
Security officials of South Africa that a vast quantity
of electronic equipment, including antennas and
sophisticated interception receivers, were secretly shipped 
from Britain and West Germany to enable it to build more
listening sites at Silvermine,(60) the South African
military surveillance system.
The intelligence cooperation regarding the Soviet
activities in the region was confirmed by Crocker:
Well I think we did some degree of 
consultation and discussion on issues [during 
the Reagan administration] related to
Soviet activities and Soviet presence, 
Soviet-Cuban presence. We would talk
about Angola, particularly Angola, because
that was the leading case. We would share 
and passions of Soviet decision-making
and Soviet goals, and methods and that kind 
of things. We would talk about the facts 
in an effort, frankly to inform them
because they [South Africans] tended to 
be very ill-informed. Historically
ill-informed at the times. This is an 
isolated pariah state and sometimes one 
way to deal with them is to give them
objective fact. It might make them more 
realistic.(61)
After the passage of the Comprehensive Anti
Apartheid Act in 1986, the ANC-Reagan administration 
relations apprently took a different turn. By now the
administration was divided between Secretary Shultz and 
Crocker on the one hand, and the White House and the
intelligence community on the other. In Crocker's 
assessment:
When [George] Shultz made an appointment 
to meet Oliver Tambo in January 1987, I
said it was the right thing to do. It would
set a good example for the South Africans
themselves. It would give us a chance to
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speak directly to the top of the ANG about 
our problems, some of their positions and 
they could speak direct to us. And it was 
a smart thing to do. But Shultz got trouble
with the extreme right here.............. X
met Tambo in London. I think it was October 
1986. This was the first time that I had 
met any level. So we were doing this. Now 
it subsequently became known as you know 
that South Africans themselves were meeting 
the ANC Secretary during this time.(62)
However, the Shultz-Crocker "trouble with the extreme 
right" concerning the ANC, especially with the White House 
and the intelligence community, continued more or less
until the very end of the administration. In November 
1988 "the ANC was identified by the then Vice President
George Bush's Task Force on Combating Terrorism as an 
official terrorist group."(63) "That was a joke", said
the Bush administration’s Under Secretary for Political
Affairs in an interview with the author. He continued:
"That was like saying that because Manachem Begin allegedly 
participated in terrorist acts, he is a terrorist. Then
you can make Thomas Paine [1737-1809] and Thomas Jefferson 
[1743-1826] terrorists also on somebody's list."(64)
How far did the intelligence agencies pursue their
own policies towards South Africa during the Reagan
administration?
Crocker indicated that certain elements in the
intelligence community were pursuing their own policy:
Having said that I will have to add one
point. That is interesting and that has 
[not] yet probably been revealed. And that
is the Director of the CIA. Bill Casey was 
a man who was quite capable of conducting
his own policy on occassions. And taking
the initiatives that were not in fact 
approved. In some cases we learned about
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that. So that made my job interesting. Let 
me put that way.
He further said:
Casey was very very activist and one might
even say adventurist, forward leaning 
proponent of a certain approach to dealing 
with all parts of the world. All parts 
of the world with same perspective. Many 
of his colleagues were in fact uncomfortable. 
That’s the reality.(65)
Casey and his intelligence community’s ’’adventurism”
became known to the public when the New York Times carried
an article by mid 1986 which revealed that the ’’U.S. 
and the British intelligence agencies had been providing 
South Africa information about the exiled ANC's political 
moves as well as their planned attacks in return of
the Soviet-Cuban activities in the region.”(66) The 
Secretary of State, Shultz denied that report and said 
that Casey had assured him that the United States had 
not passed South Africa any intelligence concerning the 
anti-apartheid guerrilla groups.(67)
However, it is safe to say that the number of 
intelligence "outlaws” regarding South Africa policy in 
the Reagan administration was greater than that of the 
Carter administration, and that they were working with 
Casey’s knowledge and approval.
On the policy-making front in general, unlike his 
predecessors, Nixon, Ford, and Carter, who did not include 
their intelligence chiefs within their inner circles,(68) 
President Reagan brought Casey into foreign policy channels 
and the decision-making process. Consequently, the U.S. 
intelligence entity started influencing foreign policy
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decisions by covertly arming the U.S. ’friends and allies’ 
in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
A middle-echelon Defence Department career officer
on Africa agreed with the author regarding a certain degree
of intelligence sharing between the U.S. intelligence
entities and their South African counterpart during the
Reagan administration:
For example, during the late 1980s two
Russian ships were blown up near Maputo 
harbour. We wouldn’t pass that kind informa­
tion to South Africans. We might say that 
we knew there were twenty Soviet ships in 
the South Atlantic and the South Indian
Oceans and we wouldn’t say that one of 
them was in Maputo, one of them was in 
Lobeto, and one of them was in Madagascar.
So it was that kind of general trading of
that level of intelligence.(69)
Thus, it was against the wishes of the Reagan
administration that Congress passed the CAAA in fall
1986, which among other sanctions, prohibited intelligence
cooperation with South Africa, except for activities
’’reasonably designed to facilitate the necessary collection
of intelligence” . The Act further says:
It is the policy of the United States that
no agency or entity of the United States
involved in intelligence activities may
provide any intelligence information to
the government of South Africa which pertains 
to South African internal opposition 
group, movement, organization, or individual. 
Any change in such policy, or the
provision of intelligence information 
contrary to such policy, shall be considered 
a significant anticipated intelligence 
activity for purpose of Section 501 of the 
National Security Act of 1947.(70)
On the prohibition of intelligence cooperation 
between both the countries, the above-mentioned Defence
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Department officer gave his Department's reaction:
Our argument was that those guys are such
important internal players [South African 
military] in South African politics then 
why blind us [U.S. Defence intelligence 
personnel in South Africa]. Why take away
people who actually talk to them. Our 
argument always was that diplomats like 
to talk to diplomats. Soldiers like to talk 
to soldiers. And South African soldiers 
were likely telling the American soldiers 
something that might be even of intelligence 
interest not just for the Department of
Defence, but for [U.S.] government.(71)
It is important to note that the Act does not
completely sever the CIA's ties with South African 
intelligence services. The ban was imposed on intelligence 
sharing regarding the anti-apartheid movements. At least 
two reasons could be suggested in this regard. First, 
keeping the national security of the United States in 
view, the makers of the Act did not impose a ban on their 
regional intelligence cooperation. Second, the intelligence 
cooperation between both the countries was not in the 
limelight of the U.S. public. The anti-apartheid movements 
in the United States were mostly focusing on
disinvestment and divestment from South Africa, and leaders
y
of the anti-apartheid movement inside and outside Congress 
were of the opinion that the cut-off of economic links 
would break the back of the white minority regime.
David King, staffer to Congressman Howard Wolpe, 
a strong opponent of the apartheid system, told the author: 
"From our perspective the fundamental question was and 
is human rights [in South Africa], Everything else is 
secondary."(72)
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Historically, before the development of the mid 
-1970s, and the congressional interest to share foreign 
policy-making matters with the Executive branch, "Congress 
virtually knew nothing about U.S. intelligence operations, 
nor did they wish to know."(73) Therefore, from the 
creation of the CIA under the National Security Act of 
1947 until the congressional anti-intelligence feelings 
of the mid-1970s, the Executive branch had virtually 
dominated the intelligence policy of the United States. 
As a result of the congressional assertiveness to check 
the activities of the unruly elements of the intelligence 
community, Congress amended "the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1974, usually known as the Hughes Ryan Amendment. This 
amendment require the Director Central Intelligence 
(DCI) to brief at least eight congressional committees 
in advance prior to any CIA action, apart from intelligence 
collection."(74)
The congressional Sub-Committee on Africa in its 
staff report in 1982 recommended an investigation by 
the House and Senate Intelligence committees into the 
CIA role which helped South Africa In 1975 to achieve 
the technology for the G-5 gun-howitzer system to counter 
the Soviet rocket launchers possessed by the Cubans in 
Angola. The report noted that at the least this suggested 
"serious negligence on the part of the Agency [CIA]. At 
the most there is a possibility that elements of the CIA 
purposefully evaded United States policy."(75) Thus, the 
House and the Senate Intelligence committees did not want
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to open the CIA’s Pandora's Box once again, as they 
had done during the mid-1970s. However, this time things 
were different. There was neither the Vietnam defeat, 
nor the Watergate scandal, nor Seymour Hersh's revealing 
articles in the New York Times regarding the covert and 
overt CIA operations inside and outside the United States, 
which compelled President Ford to appoint the Rockefeller 
Commission to investigate the alleged covert operations 
of the Agency, in addition to the Church and the Pike 
Committee reports of the mid-1970s.
Formally speaking the CIA and other U.S. intelligence 
agencies are not part of the policy-making process in 
Washington. Their job is to provide information to be 
utilized in policy formulation by those who make the
policy. But in practice, because of their "knowledge” 
they usually have influence over the policy-making
apparatus.(76) This, however, depends on the nature of
the relationship between the President and the Director 
of Central Intelligence (DCI). If the DCI enjoys a close 
relationship with President, as in the case of Reagan 
and Casey, the intelligence agencies will certainly have 
a certain degree of influence on foreign policy-making. 
But this does not mean that in case of 'strained'
relations between the President and the DCI, (as between 
Nixon and Richard Helms), the intelligence agencies do 
not try to influence policy. Like other Executive 
departments and agencies in Washington, the intelligence 
community had always remained in a constant bureaucratic
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tug-of-war to influence foreign policy decisions, and 
have usually supported covert actions or preferred the 
military to the diplomatic solution of problems. According 
to the former CIA deputy director Bobby Inman’s 
observation: "Every administration ultimately turns to
the use of covert operations when they become frustrated 
because the lack of success with diplomatic initiatives 
and are unwilling to use military force."(77}
Conclusion
The above discussion suggests that it was the U.S. 
intelligence community, especially the CIA which trained 
and strengthened the South African intelligence agency, 
and later became considerably reliant for information 
on it, which was focused mostly on Communist subversion. 
As a result, the CIA's perspective on Southern Africa 
developed according to the information they had been 
receiving from BOSS, later the NIS, which in turn assisted 
the policy-makers in Washington to formulate and execute 
the anti-Communist policy towards the region, especially 
during the Nixon and the Reagan administrations. The South 
African intelligence entity had been instrumental to 
its country’s policy to annihilate the national movements 
inside and outside the country. These movements were 
classified as pro-Moscow to gain Western support and 
”appl[ied] the CIA label"(78) to create rift within black 
organizations. According to Stephen Talbot, both the 
agencies have acted in secret operations outside the normal
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review processes of the U.S. Congress and the South African 
parliament.(79 )
One common thread which runs through all the 
successive administrations from Truman to Reagan, either 
with their explicit or implicit knowledge, was that the 
African National Congress had mostly remained the focal 
point of the CIA's covert operations.
In sum, the CIA-NIS involvement in the Congo, 
Nigeria, Angola, Muldergate, Seychelles, Iran-Contra, 
and against the ANC and the PAC is only the tip of the 
iceberg of their covert operations. The entire picture 
of their 'dirty tricks' perhaps will never come to surface 
because of the so-called national security reasons of 
both countries.
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CHAPTER VI
U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA: ORIGINS
AND IMPLEMENTATION
Introduction
The Cold War issues discussed in the previous three 
chapters, which shaped the U.S. perceptions in its 
relations with South Africa, for a time overshadowed the 
issue of human rights violations in the Republic. This 
does not mean that the issue emerged abruptly and only 
became the center of the debate during the mid 1970s. 
It was there in U.S. government policy, though symbolic, 
since the early 1960s.
The major break-through in this regard commenced 
with the efforts of the Carter administration in 1977 
to get away from the traditional Cold War practices of 
the Nixon and the Ford administrations, which "showed 
that there is still life in the 1776 tradition of promoting 
rights which governments exist to ensure."(1) This 
tradition, moreover, did not fade away completely with 
the emergence of the Reagan administration in 1981. 
Responsible officials of the administration had been 
denouncing the South African apartheid, keeping the Reagan 
philosophy in mind that "human rights means working at 
problems, not walking away from them," publicly known 
as "quiet persuasion".
The object of this chapter is to look first at the
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origins, meaning, and various definitions of the term 
human rights; then the influence of human rights 
considerations in the making of U.S. foreign policy; and
finally to examine the emergence of human rights issues
in the making of U.S. policy towards South Africa.
6.1 Origin of Human Rights
The question of human rights has come to occupy
a prominent place in international relations, a field
that was once dominated by controversies over thrones
and territories.(2) It became the focus of world attention
on?- o-?
after the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 and^the dominant 
issues of international concern since the Second World 
War. Since then human rights have been promoted through 
the United Nations Declaration, Covenants, and regional 
arrangements, such as the European Convention on Human 
Rights of 1953, the Helsinki Accord of 1975, and the 
Inter-American Conventions on Human Rights.
The emergence of modern human rights, which has 
its roots in the form of natural rights, goes back at 
least to the philosophy of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), a 
Dutch jurist, whose f0n the Law of War and Peace', (1625) 
became the foundation of international law. Following 
his writings there emerged two schools of thought about 
natural rights. A conservative school, headed by Thomas 
Hobbes (1588-1679), the English political theorist and 
philosopher, and a radical one led by John Locke 
(1632-1704), also an English philosopher. The Hobbesian
239
view of rights tends to diminish their authority by arguing 
that they are in effect surrendered in return for the 
security of civil society,(3) which is to be maintained 
through a supreme power and authority. As opposed to 
Hobbes, John Locke was of the opinion that "every person 
by virtue of the law of nature is entitled to life, 
liberty, and property",(4) which have not been abandoned 
by man. He argues that governments exist to maintain such 
rights and lose legitimacy when they fail to do so. (5)
The seventeenth century debate about natural rights 
was received by the eighteenth century as a philosophical 
heritage. The Lockian view of individual rights and the 
constitutional form of government on the basis of natural 
rights was developed and extended in the 18th century 
through the American Declaration of Independence of 1776, 
and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of 
the Citizen of 1789. The U.S. Bill of Rights of 1791, 
and the French Declaration of 1789, promulgated in their 
respective constitutions may be considered as examples 
of contractual documents.
The idea of natural rights embodied in the French 
Declaration was challenged by a range of anti-human rights 
thinkers, such as the English philosopher, Jeremy Bentham 
(1748-1832), the Irish philosopher and statesman, Edmund 
Burke (1729-1797), founder of the modern conservatism, 
and to some extent, by Karl Marx (1818-1883), the major 
theorist of modern socialism. The central point of their 
respective critical studies of natural rights is
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individualism versus community, but their relative 
conceptions of community are very different.(6)
The philosopher who challenged the idea of natural 
rights and the social contract theory was Jeremy Bentham, 
the founding father of utilitarianism. The events of the 
1789 French Revolution provoked Bentham to write an 
outstanding piece of work, the ’Anarchical Fallacies'. 
In this caustic study, commenting on Article 1 of the 
French Declaration which reads: "Men are born and remain
free, and equal in respect of rights", Bentham argued 
that all men are born in subjection, and the most absolute
subjection_______the subjection of a helpless child to
the parents on whom he depends every moment for his 
existence.(7) After the political failure of the French 
Revolution, Bentham was convinced that talk of natural 
rights was merely non-sense,(8) "from real law came real 
rights; and from imaginary law, such as the law of nature, 
came imaginary laws."(9) He stood for the idea that human 
beings had no other rights except those written in the 
books of law. Being a utilitarian, he saw the total 
happiness of the community as the sole aim of law. 
Rosenbaum has argued that Bentham did not reject rights 
altogether, but only their transcendental conceptions.(10) 
Another famous philosopher who questioned the concept 
of natural law and natural rights was Edmund Burke, founder 
of modern conservatism. Two major occurances of the 
eighteenth century: the war of American Independence,
and the French Revolution of 1789 captivated the mind
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of Edmund Burke. It was Burke who "cheered the rebels 
in Amer ica" (11) , but in the case of France "found the 
very idea of equality a monstrous f iction." (12) In his 
observation both events were not similar. The American 
rebels were not seen by him as revolutionaries in the 
extreme sense, whereas the French Jacobins were revolting 
against an "ancien regime", attacking property and commerce 
rather than defending them.(13) Professor Vincent has 
argued that here Burke was as frightened of anarchy as 
Bentham.(14) Thus, the post-French Revolution events,
which set the stage for the rise of Napoleon, seemed the 
fulfillment of Burke’s revelation.(15) But the Revolution 
became the everlasting legacy of mankind, as seen by his 
contemporary Thomas Paine (1737-1809) an English-born 
outlaw and one of the leaders of the American Revolution.
Burke's argument for inequality of rights traces 
its roots to Plato and his 'Republic' in which men were 
not equal. But here "Burke is quick to deny the Divine 
Rights of Kings."(16) Before him inequality was unavoidable 
in society. Being a critic of individualism, Burke
considered the family, not the individual as the basic 
unit of social order. His idea of inequality of rights 
thus has no place in the modern concept of human rights 
and in the contemporary international and regional 
instruments of human rights.
The last philosopher to be discussed here briefly 
who criticised the theory of natural rights was Karl Marx 
(1818-1883). As against the welfare of an individual,
242
Marx talked about collectivism, which could be accomplished 
in a classless society by abolishing private property 
and the individual competition for livelihood.(17) Private 
property, according to Marx, not only creates division 
among classes in society but the conditions of alienation 
as well. Classless social relations would "guarantee
all members the equal rights to satisfy basic needs and
to contribute to the collective effort of production."(18) 
At the intellectual level then the general tendency 
in debate about the theory of natural rights, despite
powerful criticisms, has developed towards a view of 
the universality of the rights of man everywhere whether 
they are protected and guaranteed by law or not.
Until recently, the relationship between the state
and people living within its territorial jurisdiction 
and the human rights issues were considered to be an
internal matter beyond the interference of sovereign 
states. The state had complete sovereignty over its people. 
The nineteenth century Western involvement in the Middle
East to protect the rights of Christian minorities there, 
and the legislations by,(19) and the agreements among 
the prominent Western countries to abolish slavery and
slave trade were few exceptions of interference by other 
sovereign governments in this regard. In the twentieth
century, the League of Nations provided protection in 
its Covenant for religious and linguistic minorities, 
care of refugees, and fair employment, conceived of as 
human rights.(20) But in practice, the political situation
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during the inter-War period (1919-39) did not seem to 
be one in which human rights had much chance to success.
It was not until the Second World War that human
rights entered the mainstream of Western political
practice.(21) The Lockian view was exemplified in the
Atlantic Charter of August 1941, followed by the creation
of the United Nations in 1945, and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. The Atlantic Charter
was perhaps the first twentieth-century international
instrument which emphasized the importance of "defending
life, liberty, justice, in their own land as well in other
lands,"(22) This was followed by the UN Declaration of
1942 , and the UN Charter of 1945, to preserve and promote
human rights among other things. The promulgation of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights indicated that
rights are not limited to any particular state or community
but are rather universal. With the growing number of member
states in the United Nations since the late 1950s, Marx's
collectivism and his central emphasis on group rather
than individual started affecting the Western liberal
conceptions of rights. As a result of this debate, the
rights outlined in the Declaration were further described
in detail in two separate UN covenants of 1966, which
reflect the Marxian philosophical approach in this regard.
Article 1.1 of the Civil-Political and Article 1.1 of
the Socio-Economic covenants reads:
All people have the right of self- determina­
tion. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social, and cultural
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d ev e l o p m e n t . (23)
The question that arises from this is whether: 
states have duties beyond their borders to interfere in 
the human rights violations of other sovereign states?
There are always two sides to this debate. In one
view the promotion of human rights interferes with the
proper business of the traditional states system. Vincent
argues that it could provide an excuse for "humanitarian
intervention". "The problem with this doctrine lies not
on its identification of the evil to be removed, but in
the trust it must place in those who are to act for
international society."(24) He further claims that:
the domestic conduct in regard to human
rights ......... is under the scrutiny of
international law. This does not issue 
a general license for intervention. 
International society is not yet as solidarist 
as that. But it does expose the internal 
regimes of all the members of international 
society to the legitimate appraisal of their 
peers. (25)
Against this view however a "moral internationalism" 
or quest to "reform the xtforld", has been wide spread in 
the U.S. academic and political world. This school 
advocates that the traditional concept of the state having 
complete sovereignty over its nationals, especially in 
the area of human rights, is not acceptable in the world. 
"No member of the United Nations", said former U.S. 
President Jimmy Carter in an speech in General Assembly 
"can claim that mistreatment of its citizens is solely 
its own business."(26) This view finds expression in the 
fact that all member states of the United Nations have
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treaty obligations to encourage the protection of human 
rights. Article 55 and 56 of the UN Charter require member 
states not only promote human rights in their respective 
countries but take "joint affirmative action on human 
rights,"(27) violations anywhere in the world. In addition, 
the optional protocol of the International Covenant on 
Civil-Political Rights of 1976 authorizes individuals
to submit written communications regarding the human 
rights violations in their respective countries to the 
Human Rights Committee for consideration. Further, "certain 
human rights beliefs such as freedom from racial
discrimination and right of self-determination have become 
peremptory norms of international law"(28) today.
In sum, states in contemporary international law 
do have obligations beyond their borders to expose the 
human rights violators, and the question of human rights
violations has become an accepted issue area of 
international politics today.
6.2 Definition of Human Rights
The above discussion suggests that human rights 
stemmed from Western liberalism, and focus on the
individual's civil and political rights in relations to
the state. To some extent the Western individualist 
tradition has been challenged by some Third World and 
other countries. The rights universalized through the 
Declaration include the right to life, the freedom of 
movement, the freedom of association, the right to a fair
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trial, the right to take part in the government. The
adoption of the Declaration, however, marked the beginning 
of differences between the Western and non-Western 
definition of rights. As a result, Belorussia SSR,
Ukrainian SSR, USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia 
abstained from voting in the General Assembly.
In response to the East-West argument, the UN Human
Rights Commission prepared two separate covenants on civil- 
political and socio-economic rights. The primary purpose 
of these covenants was to discuss in more precise terms 
the rights outlined in the Declaration. Both covenants 
were passed by the General Assembly in 1966. What 
differentiate them from the Declaration is particularly 
article 1.1 of both the covenants, discussed earlier. 
Many in the United States believe that "economic, social,
and cultural rights.......... fit into the program[me]
of Franklin D.Roosevelt rather than Karl Marx or 
Lenin."(29) In Hedley Bull's assertion the Western 
countries "see these rights as a broadening and filling 
out of civil and political rights.........."(30)
In addition to these two major disagreements, which
some consider to be part of a "semantic trap"(31), there 
also exists the third category, what Bull calls the "human 
rights empirical sense", to be known from "experience
and observation.......of 'human rights conditions' in
various countries,"(32) This is the domain of the 
non-governmental organizations, such as Amnesty 
International, which is concerned with the "integrity
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of the person." Its efforts, however, are directed towards 
torture, arbitrary arrest or imprisonment, and murder 
of political opponents.
Is this the end of the debate? Certainly not. Still 
there are those who put emphasis on "the right to a clean 
environment, and the right to die," for example, known 
by some theoreticians as a third generation of human 
rights. (33) And there are many in the academic world who 
are the champions of the single rights, which they assert 
is the only valid form of right, such as "right to 
liberty", "right to freedom from torture", and "right 
to participate."(34)
In such a maze, can human rights be universalized? 
There is no easy answer to the question. The former U.S.
Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance enunciated three categories
of human rights, which could provide the basis for an 
answer:
Those relating to the integrity of the person 
(freedom from torture and other cruel, 
inhumane, or degrading treatment; from 
arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; from denial 
of a fair public trial; and from invasion 
of home); economic rights (the right of
food, shelter, health care, and
education.......in other words, the right
to fulfillment of basic human needs); and 
civil and political liberties (freedom of
thought, religion, assembly, speech, country 
and to take part in government).(35)
to
Secretary Vance's WftS "bridge the gap between
Western and Third World concepts of human rights,"(36) 
and appear to represent the gist of the UN covenants.
In sum, it is difficult to decide whether the concept
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is universal, but in practice more than economic rights, 
world attention is focused on the rights concerning "the 
integrity of the person" and "civil-political liberties."
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6,3 Place of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy
The concept of human rights as a concern for U.S.
foreign policy is not a new development. Its roots goes 
back to the early days of the Republic. As has been 
mentioned earlier, the United States has stood for 
classical liberalism as a political belief based on 
democracy, equality, and freedom expressed in its founding 
documents. Therefore in the course of 200 years history 
these beliefs have become closely identified with the 
"American way of life". Professor Schlesinger Jr. argues 
that "Americans have agreed since 1776, that the United
States must be the beacon of human rights to an 
unregenerate world".(37) This kind of moral alignment 
has its foundation in the American Protestant past where 
religious groups were viewed as purely voluntary 
organizations, which served to strengthen the introduction 
of religious morality in politics.(38)
The American tradition to protect human rights abroad 
goes back at least to the mid-nineteenth century, when 
Senator Lewis Case introduced an unsuccessful Bill to 
cut off diplomatic relations with Austria, because of 
its troops’ suppression of the Hungarian revolution of 
1848.(39) This praxis, however, appeared in the post World 
War II era in the shape of Roosevelt's Four Freedoms of 
1941, and Truman’s fostering of the 1948 UN Human Rights 
Declaration.(40) However, Roosevelt's and Truman's ideas 
of human rights were placed on the "back-burner" of U.S.
foreign policy, in the wake of 1947 Greek civil war,
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with the subsequent announcement of the Truman Doctrine, 
which assured that the United States would "support free 
people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed 
minorities or by outside [Communist] pressures." In the 
1950s, the United States, for all practical purposes, 
withdrew from its multilateral efforts to advance human 
rights and never really returned to it.(41)
Cingranelli has divided the moral positions of the 
post-World War II presidents of the United States in their 
foreign policy behaviour towards the Third World into 
Nationalists and Progressives. In his opinion nationalists 
believe that the "main societal interests that government 
should advance through foreign policy are its military 
security and macroeconomic prosperity or, in other words, 
its national self-interest." They have accordingly often 
supported "military intervention and covert actions." 
Cingranelli places Franklin Roosevelt, Dwight Eisenhower, 
Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan, 
and George Bush in this category.
On the other hand the progressive presidents
" ...... give relatively greater weight to universal ideals
in the making of foreign policy. He identifies Harry
Truman, John Kennedy, and Jimmy Carter in this group.(42) 
In practice, however, it is sometimes difficult to draw
a line when the same administration, whether headed
by a "nationalist" or "progressive" president, is engaged
in policies of more than one type.(43)
The nationalist trend, however, reached a climax
251
during the Nixon presidency. For Henry Kissinger, his
Assistant for National Security Affairs, and later the
Secretary of State, the "constituencies" of human rights
and foreign policy were different. In his confirmation
hearing before the Senate in 1973, Kissinger rejected
the inclusion of human rights objectives in American
foreign policy:
I believe it is dangerous for us to make 
the domestic policy of countries around the
world a direct objective of American foreign
policy........... The protection of basic
human rights is a very sensitive aspect of
the domestic jurisdiction of governments.(44)
Donald F.McHenry, the Carter administration's
Ambassador to the United Nations (1979-81), told the author
that human rights "had moved so far back under realpolitik
of Nixon and Kissinger....... These guys came over as people
who would sell grandmother. No, I don't believe that's
true. But that's sort of perception."(45)
It was during Nixon's presidency that events such
as the growing U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the secret
bombing of Cambodia, the Watergate scandal, the CIA and
FBI violations of human rights, coupled with the
Nixon-Kissinger attitude towards Congress, caused deep
congressional concern and dissatisfaction about the conduct
of U.S. foreign policy. As a result, "Congress lit the
human rights candle",(46) during the first half of the
1970s. The congressional interest in the human rights
factor was well defined by David King, staffer to
Congressman Howard Wolpe, "I think because Congress does
not have as large a foreign affairs role, [that's why]
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we [Congress] are talking about human rights. That’s a 
sub-section of foreign affairs."(47 )
During the late 1960s and the early 1970s, it was 
some of the ordinary Congressmen, who took the initiative 
to bring the human rights factor into the conduct of U.S. 
foreign policy even though the congressional leadership 
of the time was fairly suspicious, and considered it 
somewhat impracticaL( 48) As a result of these sporadic 
initiatives, the congressional Sub-Committee on 
International Organizations and Movements under the 
chairmanship of Don Fraser held a series of hearings on 
the human rights factor in the making of U.S. foreign 
policy. This Sub-Committee was among the most active groups 
to link the human rights factor with U.S. foreign policy. 
These hearings were followed by a Sub-Committee report 
on the subject in March 1974, which made 29 specific 
recommendations to "treat human rights factor regularly 
in U.S. foreign policy decision-making".(49) Unlike the 
administrative multilateral efforts during the 1940s, 
this time the Congress selected a unilateral and bilateral 
approach to protect human rights abroad.(50)
The Executive branch has generally opposed U.S. 
interference in human rights violations of other sovereign 
states on the grounds that that kind of interference would 
accelerate the chances of outside intervention in U.S. 
domestic affairs. They always advocate that U.S. society 
is not flawless as well in respect to human rights issues.
Thus the above-mentioned factors of the first half
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of the 1970s were the reasons that propelled human rights
into the foreign policy debate in the presidential campaign 
in 1976.(51) Roberto Cohen, before joining the Carter
team, wrote in 1978 that "President Carter has broken
the conspiracy of silence that so long dominated U.S.
policy toward[s] international human rights questions".(52) 
In this respect Carter shifted away from his predecessor's 
approach to the different "constituencies" of human rights 
and foreign policy. He adopted moral idealism, placed
human rights on top of the U.S. foreign policy agenda, 
and created the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Affairs in 1977, with its own assistant secretary to deal 
with human rights, refugees and migration, and prisoners 
of war affairs. In addition, the Carter administration
directed all U.S. ambassadors to report to Washington
on human rights conditions in their respective host
countries on a regular basis. "Carter asserted that a 
foreign policy based on fundamental American values will
serve the U.S. national interests".(53 ) Thus, human rights 
became not the only goal of his foreign policy but one 
of the more important ones. In his speech in the United
Nations Carter admitted that "preserving national 
security, achieving arms control, and building better 
economic order were more important to the United States 
than advancing human rights around the world."(54)
The vital point to be noted here is that the Bureau
of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs was established
within the State Department rather than as an independent
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agency. The Bureau was created despite the fact that the
State Department has generally taken a strong position
that human rights is a domestic matter which has nothing
to do with establishing U.S. bilateral relations. In
addition, the effectiveness of the newly created Bureau
and its access to the State Department and the White House
in making U.S. foreign policy, appeared to be limited.
For example, throughout the Carter administration, the
Inter-Agency Committee on Human Rights and Foreign
Assistance was chaired by Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State rather than the Assistant Secretary of State for
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. Another example
of the peripheral role of the Bureau in the making of
human rights foreign policy was when "in mid 1978 President
Carter sent a 'personal’ letter to President Anastasio
Somoza of Nicaragua congratulating him for certain human
rights improvements. Here, too, the Bureau was not
consulted."(55) When the author raised this issue with
an official, his response was:
Fifteen years ago when the Bureau was estab­
lished many of the bureaucratic immune 
systems of the State Department flashed 
red alert, and there were attempts to ward 
off this intrusion. The process was 
complicated by the manner in which the
intrusion took place a very strident
individual..........
Over the course of the last fifteen
years human rights has been internalized 
as one of our most important foreign policy 
objectives, so that our senior diplomats
recognized that monitoring human rights 
situations, calibrating our relationships 
to reflect human rights conditions, are 
the central tasks for diplomats accredited 
to foreign governments, so that there is
much less resistance.(56)
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Stephen Cohen has rightly pointed out in this regard 
that "the Bureau of Human Rights was defeated in the 
bureaucratic battle within the State Department during 
Carter's presidency because of its alleged lack of 
experience on such arcane matters as that of national 
security."(57) Another factor which weakened the Bureau's 
capability in foreign policy-making was the "single-minded 
views" of its Assistant Secretary Patricia Derian, which 
"conflicted with the pursuit of other national 
interests."(58)
Thus, it was during the Carter administration that 
one of the major pieces of human rights legislation, the 
Multilateral Banks Act was passed in 197 7 to promote human 
rights in U.S. foreign policy. However, the differences 
of images between the "globalists" and the "regionalists" 
regarding the international system within the Carter 
administration since its inception in office, coupled 
with U.S. security and commercial interests all over the 
world made Carter reluctant to take up a firm position 
on delicate and sensitive issues, such as human rights. 
Confronted with this broad range of resistance and 
criticism within his own administration, he had to tone 
down his criticism of human rights abuses in his second 
year in office. In addition, the U.S. political system 
with several policy-making nucleuses (discussed in chapters 
I and II) , was another hindrance for the administration 
in its efforts to form a coherent human rights policy. 
On the other hand, because of these inconsistencies
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Congress "perceived the Carter administration as highly 
disorganized and unclear in its human rights policy".(59)
Talking about the inconsistencies of the Carter
administration’s human rights foreign policy, the
administration’s Ambassador to the United Nations (1979 —
81) told the author:
It [human rights] has always been an 
enormous part though we can be amazingly 
hypocritical on occasions, that is we are 
able sometimes to rationalize the
continued existence of a policy which we 
don’t like. This was particularly true
during the Cold War. Countries found we 
didn’t like, but we turned a blind eye to 
because of some larger interests. I think 
in the long term our large interests are 
best served by a consistency in policy. 
(60)
Yet for all its weakness and inconsistency, and
a selective human rights policy, such as the U.S.-China 
human rights policy, toning down on the Soviet Union (since 
the late 1977), the Philippines, Zaire, and Pakistan's 
human rights violations, the Carter administration’s human 
rights policy certainly affected the political atmosphere 
in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
The Reagan administration came into office 
"committed to oppose aggressively real and apparent Soviet 
ambitions throughout the world".(61) Therefore, the 
importance given by his predecessor to human rights factor 
in the conduct of foreign policy declined in general. 
Secretary of State, Alexander Haig in a speech made to 
Trilateral Commission on 31 March 1981 said:
Let us be clear on one human rights issue: 
the U.S. opposes the violation of human rights
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by ally and adversary, friend or foe....... The
point to be made is that we must be 
discriminating in our action with an eye 
to the impact of our protest on the
violator.......The first imperative is to
strengthen the U.S., its allies and friends, 
the main safeguard against the spread of 
totalitarian aggression.(62)
Secretary Haig's "totalitarian” aggressors were 
Communist regimes all over the world which had to be 
countered. And among his friends and allies were many 
of the authoritarian regimes spread through Asia, Africa, 
and Latin America, which he wanted to and, in fact did 
support and strengthen militarily, economically, and 
politically to check the growth and influence of 
international Communism, despite their poor human rights 
record. The Reagan administration argued that the 
strengthening of friends and allies, in turn, had 
contributed to the security of the United States.
During his administration the human rights issue 
was regarded as a domestic affair of authoritarian allies 
and friends. On the other hand, the administration 
highlighted the Soviet Union and the Communist states' 
human rights issues to embarrass the Soviet Union. This 
policy shift in human rights by the Reagan administration 
met with strong resentment in Congress when its first 
nominee for the post of Assistant Secretary for Human 
Rights, Dr. Earnest Lefever had to withdraw due to 
congressional opposition, mostly because of Dr. Lefever's 
anti-Communist ideas. In the case of South Africa, he 
publicly stated that the United States was not concerned 
with the Republic's racial policies but to make it a
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fulfledged partner of the United States in the struggle 
against Communist expansion.(63)
Throughout its first tenure, the Reagan 
administration terminated or reduced no economic and
security assistance for human rights reasons. On the
contrary, security assistance rose 300 percent(64) during 
that period, founding its way to authoritarian but friendly 
regimes. The security assistance was provided by the
administration on the basis of Section 502 B of the 
Security Assistance Act. This Section on the one hand,
prohibits military assistance to those countries which
are involved in gross violation of human rights, and 
on the other, allows the President to provide aid in 
"extraordinary circumstances".(65)
However, during its second term the administration 
took strong actions in 1987 in countries like Panama, 
and South Korea against their human rights violations. 
On the other hand, for example, the Philippines (under 
Marcos), and Zaire continued to receive economic and
military assistance from Washington.
Since its inception, the administration distanced 
itself from its predecessor's human rights policies which 
were perceived by the Reagan team as one of the great
failures of the Carter administration. Unlike Carter's 
perceptions, Reagan saw Communism as the worst human 
rights violation in the world. The former U.S. Ambassador
to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick declared that 
"authoritarian repression is better than totalitarian",(66)
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without realizing that repression is repression, which
cannot be classified as good, better or, best. It is a 
condemnable act whether committed by authoritarian or
totalitarian regimes against their people. Kirkpatrick's 
idea was that authoritarian regimes could be replaced 
by democracy, whereas totalitarian regimes could not. 
Ms Jeri Laber, Executive Director, U.S. Helsinki Watch
Committee, in her testimony before the House Sub-Committee 
on Human Rights rightly pointed out that : "Distinguishing
between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, may have 
a place in the history class room, but it hasn't much
place in the making of foreign policy."(67)
In defending the Reagan administration's human rights 
policy the then Assistant Secretary of State for Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Elliot Abrams, in his 
testimony before the House Sub-Committee on Human Rights 
on March 3, 1983 described it as a two-track policy: the
negative track; and the positive approach. The negative 
track was described as responding to abuses by using all 
available diplomatic tools from quiet diplomacy to aid 
cut off, to signal disapproval of human rights violations. 
In Abram's view the positive approach was building and 
strengthening democracy abroad on the theory that popular 
control of government reduce the likelihood of human rights 
violations.(68) Under the "positive approach" the National 
Endowment for Democracy (NED) was created. Thus, the 
effectiveness and purposes of the NED will be discussed 
with reference to South Africa in the final section of
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this chapter.
In the contemporary world different countries raise 
their concern regarding human rights violations by using 
different methods. The most frequently used approach is 
the public condemnation through speeches from various 
forums, and statements. In the case of the United States 
at least three different methods have been used by the 
successive administrations since the mid-1970s. These 
include for example, the Carter administration's approach 
of public condemnation; the Reagan administration's 
modus operandi of "quiet diplomacy"; and the enactment 
of economic sanctions.
The vital point to be noted here is that of 7 
non-treaty human rights instruments, and 44 human rights 
treaties and agreements, which are currently in force 
in the world, the United States has ratified only 13 
treaties so far (see Appendix H) . It has not yet ratified 
some important human rights instruments, such as the UN
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 
1976; and the International Covenant on Social, Economic, 
and Cultural Rights of 1976. In addition, the United States 
has not signed the International Convention on the
Suppression and Punishment of Crime of Apartheid of 1976. 
In this regard certain constitutional obligations always 
come in the way of Senate ratification of these treaties. 
For example, Article 20.2 of the Civil and Political
Covenant of 1976 says:
Any advocacy of national, racial or religious
hatred that constitutes incitement to
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discrimination, hostility or violence shall 
be prohibited by law.(69)
The Senate opposes the ratification of the Civil- 
Political Covenant on grounds that it is against freedom 
of speech, association, and press in the United States. 
So far as the Socio-Economic Covenant is concerned, 
economic and social rights are not considered as rights 
and are not equated with traditional U.S civil and 
political rights, based on individualism and equality. 
They are being considered as societal goals. So far as 
the International Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid is concerned, it 
binds the signatories to "declare illegal any organization 
which advocate racial discrimination". The Senate argues 
that the treaty is against the concept of freedom of speech 
and press in the United States.
With this brief analysis of the human rights factor 
in U.S. foreign policy-making initiated by Congress in 
the early 1970s, we focus our discussion on U.S. human 
rights policy towards South Africa, under both the Carter 
and the Reagan administrations.
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6.4 U.S.-South Africa Human Rights Policy
In the previous section we have shown that human 
rights "candle lit by Congress", during the first half 
of the 1970s was subsequently, embraced by presidential 
candidate Jimmy Carter, and his administration when it 
entered the White House in 1977. Vie also suggested
that the Carter administration's human rights foreign 
policy was based on a country-by-country basis, keeping 
U.S. national interests in view. Like its "Nationalist" 
predecessors, the Reagan administration's foreign policy 
was a realpolitik, in which human rights issues had 
secondary place.
As has been discussed at the outset, human rights 
violation is a condemnable act and "freedom from racial 
discrimination has become an essential norm of contemporary 
international law". The task in this section is to 
analyse the factors behind the congressional and public 
push to include human rights in U.S.-South Africa policy, 
which had been more widely discussed by both Congress 
and the public than any other human rights violations 
in the world.
Although it is difficult to be precise about the 
fundamental change in U.S. human rights policy towards 
South Africa, the congressional hearings on human rights 
during late 1973 and the early 1974 could be regarded 
as the beginning of human rights policy towards the 
Republic. Part two of the congressional Sub-Committee 
on International Organizations and Movements' report on
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human rights in March 1974 discussed and examined racial
discrimination in certain Southern African countries,
including South Africa. The eighteenth recommendation
of the report reads:
The governments of South Africa, Southern 
Rhodesia, and Portugal should fully implement 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
in particular:
(a) to eliminate the practices of racial 
discrimination and apartheid;
(b) to ensure the right of everyone to take 
part in the government of his country, 
including the right to vote;
(c) to ensure the right to work, free choice 
of employment, equal pay for equal work, 
and to join trade unions; and
(d) to ensure the rights to education at 
all levels without regard to race, colo[u]r, 
sex, language, national or political and 
other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.(70)
As against the Sub-Committee report, South Africa’s 
human rights issue was considered by the Nixon-Kissinger 
administration as an exclusively internal matter of the 
Republic. The first apparent change in policy tactics 
towards black Africa came to light during the Ford 
administration when Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
visited Southern Africa in April 1976 and called for 
majority rule in the region.
None of the U.S. presidents have been as personally 
engaged with South African matters as Jimmy Carter. With 
human rights at the top of his foreign policy agenda, 
South Africa became a matter of foreign policy principle. 
The new administration in its early days openly supported 
the elimination of injustice and majority rule in the 
Republic to break away from U.S. perceptions which had
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developed under the Nixon administration, and which 
preferred to work through white rule. The new 
administration in the White House adopted a tougher stance 
against the white minority regime and became actively 
engaged in encouraging peaceful transformation towards 
majority rule. The Carter administration’s stance was 
two pronged: at the diplomatic level; and in the United
Nations.
During its early part, the Carter administration 
protested on human rights violations in South Africa at 
the highest levels. For example, the issue was raised 
during a meeting between the U.S. Vice President Walter 
Mondale and the South African Prime Minister Vorster in 
Vienna in May 1977. The major purpose of this meeting 
was to let Vorster know that apartheid was not only
discriminatory, but if South Africa were to persist in 
its ideology their paths would diverge and their policies 
would come in conflict.(71)
This significant priority of American policy met 
with a strong response from the South African government. 
In August 1977, Prime Minister John Vorster attacked 
Carter’s policy as an interference in his country's
internal affairs. He further accused the United States
of blaming South Africa so as to gain the political support 
of black African states in the United Nations on the one 
hand, and to please black Americans on the other.
What is still not known is why did Walter Mondale
go to that extreme in the very first top-level meeting
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with the South African leadership? Did he do it on his
own? Or was it done with presidential consent? According
to Brzezinski's memoirs, Mondale was ’authorized' to focus
on the South African issue.(72) Therefore, it can be
assumed that he took the tough stand with South African
leaders in Vienna, certainly with Carter's understanding.
Richard Moose told the author:
......... because he [Vorster] was up for
election, maybe we timed it very badly. 
Maybe we shouldn't have rushed into that,
in restrospect we shouldn't have rushed into 
that. We should have let him get himself
elected. Then when he had a firmer base, 
then perhaps we should have come back, waited
to make our move then.........But we wanted
to get busy on a busy agenda in Africa.
There were a lot of things that we 
wanted to do. We knew that we had to deal 
with South Africa. So in American fashion
we setout first things first.(73)
On the basis of "first things first” the top level 
meeting with South Africans not only backfired and put
the administration in a defensive position, but opened
up new flood gates of criticism against it. The critics
argued that the administration was not attempting to engage 
in a diplomatic process with South Africa that would lead
to the resolution of a problem in the region.
Moose, however, categorically denied that his
administration’s policy was confrontational:
Because of the way Vorster used that 
meeting for his own internal political
purposes, the impression came about that 
from the very first the Carter 
administration adopted a confrontational 
posture. That’s not true. That is not 
an accurate reading of what happened. The 
very decision to meet Vorster was a very 
important one and it said we want to 
have a dialogue with you. We want to work
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with you. Here is what we believe, here 
are our objectives. We didn't pull any 
punches about that.(74)
The ultimate result of the early hardline approach 
was deterioration of relations between both the countries. 
This attitude, however, lost momentum when the 
administration entered its second year in office. By 
then it had started focusing more attention on the 
Rhodesian settlement and the Namibian independence issues 
rather than majority rule in South Africa. Washington 
recognized South Africa's importance in helping 
negotiations with the Smith regime in Rhodesia and in 
achieving the Namibian settlement. As a result, the 
administration had to lower its tone, in order not to 
prejudice the Rhodesian talks and the Namibian settlement.
Beyond diplomatic discourse, and apart from U.S. 
Ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young’s vocal 
attacks against South Africa, the United States supported 
the UN mandatory arms embargo on South Africa in November 
1977. The Carter administration knew that the arms embargo 
against South Africa would be symbolic, since many 
countries including the United States had already imposed 
voluntary embargoes. However, the major purpose of the 
administration in joining the UN arms embargo was to avoid 
the mounting Afro-Asian pressure in the United Nations 
for economic sanctions against South Africa. Like its 
predecessors, the Carter administration was also against 
the U.S. disinvestment and divestment from the Republic. 
In the following year the administration tightened the
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procedures on the sale of civilian aircraft to South 
Africa. Furthermore, it was his administration which 
publicly denied the existance of the so-called independent 
homelands of Transkei, Bophthatswana, Venda, and Cislcei 
(TBVC).
At the Legislative level, Congress also took certain
steps to disentangle the United States from South Africa.
In the economic sphere, legislation was passed in 1978
to limit Export-Import Bank loans to those firms which
followed fair employment practices in South Africa. In
fact, this step was first recommended by Congressman Edward
J.Markey to Congress and the President in hearings before
the Sub-Committee on Africa on October 26, 1977. In
addition, Markey recommended two more steps against South
Africa: the withdrawal of U.S. military and Chief
Commercial Attaches’ and a halt to "grey area" military
sales to South Africa.(75) In 1978, the Carter
administration introduced regulations to ban all exports 
iK®-
to.South African military and police forces.
A
It was during this time, when Congress was caught 
in the crossfire,, that some of the newspapers in the United 
States reported in 1979 that the South African government 
offered bribes and free trips to members of Congress 
as part of a worldwide campai gn to improve its overseas 
image.(76) Staff investigators found that at least 17 
House aides and 13 members had trips to South Africa 
between 1973 and 1978 paid for either by the South African 
government or a front for the government.(77) No names,
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however, were supplied by the investigators.(78)
At the public level, when the Carter administration 
entered the White House in 1977, the U.S. anti-apartheid 
movement was still in its formative phase. Thus, the 
congressional activism in the field of human rights, 
coupled with the inauguration of President Carter brought 
a new life and enthusiasm to the U.S. anti-apartheid 
movement. From 1981 onwards the anti-apartheid movement 
entered into a phase of broad-based coalition to influence 
U.S-South Africa policy (discussed in chapter VII).
Although the Carter administration in its approach 
of open condemnation did succeed on cooling down domestic 
pressures, both inside and outside Congress, its regional 
policy aimed at getting all Southern African problems 
solved simultaneously was certainly an ambitious strategy. 
It later proved to be impossible and beyond the control 
of the Carter administration, which was then compelled 
to address the issues independently, as it did in the 
case of Rhodesia.
The Reagan administration which entered into office 
in 1981, rejected the Carter administrations’s public 
diplomacy in the field of human rights in favour of "quiet 
diplomacy". The Republic of South Africa was seen by the 
new administration through these lenses. This policy 
approach, however, caused widespread concern both inside 
and outside Congress as to whether the United States was 
going to continue its leadership role in human rights 
campaign. By this time the situation was different from
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that of the Nixon-Kissing er era. The promotion of the 
human rights factor in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy- 
had become the law of the land in the shape of the series 
of Acts passed by Congress between 1973 and 1980. In 
addition, the administration’s fresh modus operandi helped 
to gain momentum both within Congress and the U.S. 
anti-apartheid movement.
During the first Reagan term (January 1981 to January 
1985) in addition to stormy relations between the United 
States and the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, 
Afghanistan, and Central America were centres of tension 
and conflict which took precedence over the issue of 
apartheid and human rights in South Africa. The Republic 
was seen by the Reagan administration within the context 
of the East-West conflict. Personally, Reagan showed 
very little concern in African affairs, and in fact he 
"allowed the Carter administration’s Africa policy to 
be dismantled", said Moose.(79) The new administration 
in the White House relaxed the trade restrictions which 
had been imposed by the Carter administration, and opened 
up loopholes in the Commerce Department regulations over 
the sales of non-military goods to the South African 
military and police.(80) During fiscal year 1982-83, the 
U.S. State Department licensed the export to South Africa 
of goods on the munition list worth more than U.S. $ 28
million, as compared to the entire value of U.S. $ 18.6
million in military exports to South Africa between the 
period 1950-1980.(81)
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In response to the continued growing domestic 
pressure against the administration’s human rights policy 
President Reagan proposed the National Endowment for 
Democracy in 1983 funded by bipartisan support of Congress 
to help develop the human rights and democratic
institutions not only in South Africa but in other 
countries as well which were seeking to develop their
democratic practices.(82) Through the Endowment the human 
rights grants programme, known as the Kassebaum-Percy 
Human Rights Fund was created for equal civil and political 
liberties for all South Africans. At the very end of
1983 $ 1.5 million were approved by Congress for private
and community organizations in South Africa working for 
the cause of human rights.(83) The Reagan administration 
like its predecessors resisted the imposition of economic 
sanctions against South Africa, therefore demonstrating, 
it was claimed, U.S. opposition to the system of apartheid 
through assistance to black South Africans. The 
administration’s belief was that imposition of economic
sanctions "would harm blacks more than help them". By 
the end of 1984 both the House and Senate Conference
Committee agreed on an unprecedented ban on bank loans 
to the South Africa government and parastatals.(84)
At the time when Americans were preparing for 
presidential elections, the third wave of violence began
in South Africa in August 1984 (after the Sharpeville 
shooting of 1960, and the Soweto uprising of 1976) in
response to the introduction of a new constitution in
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the country. Unrest in black townships grew during the 
following weeks into a nationwide uprising surpassing 
that of 1976. Those events quickly and directly affected 
the United States which has its own troubled history. 
The racial and ethnic constituencies started expressing 
their interest and concern about the black insurgency 
in South Africa. The ethnic composition of the United 
States was different from the rest of the major trading 
partners of South Africa. In fact the situation in the 
Republic was linked with that of the civil rights movement 
in the United States.
By this time the U.S. policy-makers were facing 
a situation different from that the mid-1970s. The 
"Congress stood at moral crossroads in modern history".(85) 
The Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) and other major 
figures in both the parties were linking South Africa 
with Marcos' Philippines. These Congressmen were pressing 
for a major shift in U.S. policy towards South Africa 
so as not to repeat the same mistake. Thus "the human 
rights issue in South Africa became the absorbing question 
of the day, pushing questions of security and commercial 
interests in one side".(86) This was partly because of 
the administration's attitude towards Congress and anti­
apartheid organizations, and partly because of the 
Republic's cross-border attacks (87) and brutal suppression 
of its black majority uprising. All these factors thus, 
combined to produce a political reverberation in the United 
States. In the wake of these events President Reagan
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had to break his silence on the issue. (88) In his annual 
speech on International Human Rights Day, delivered on 
December 10, 1984, President Reagan felt the "moral
responsibility" to show his "concern and grief over the 
human and spritual cost of apartheid in South Africa."
Senator Kennedy’s visit to South Africa in early 
1985, and sit-ins in colleges, universities, and 
corporation offices throughout the United States, plus 
the demand for congressional action made "South Africa 
as one of the most prominent and decisive foreign policy 
debates of the Reagan period."(89) The struggle against 
White South Africa by Congress and public was considered 
as a "moral war"(90) to help black South Africans in their 
struggle to secure human dignity. Ambassador McHenry 
told the author "that the anti-apartheid forces in the
United States drew their strength [during the mid 1980s] 
not from here [U.S.], they drew it from South Africa.
I take the position that South Africans passed the 
[Comprehensive] Anti-Apartheid Act."(91)
Apart from South Africa's institutionalized 
discrimination rejected by the world community, at least 
three more factors made the South Africa issue special 
and different in the United States from the rest of the 
human rights violations in the world.
First, unlike the U.S. congressional response to 
other issues of gross violation of human rights in the
world, the individual members of Congress continued to
keep the South African issue alive at least from 1971.
273
This process, however, was further accelerated when the 
Congressional Black Caucus was established during the 
same year. The Black Caucus, in addition to other 
Congressmen sympathetic towards the black cause in South 
Africa had been preparing for a legislative package on 
South Africa through draft legislation between the period 
1971 and the passage of the CAAA of 1986. The congressional 
activism reached a climax in 1985 "when 41 separate Bills, 
amendments and resolutions dealing with South Africa were 
introduced into Congress between January and September 
1985".(92) In addition to the importance of black voters 
kept by Congress in view, memories of the civil rights 
struggle in the United States made many Congressmen 
sympathetic to the sufferings of black South Africans. 
In this regard the South Africa case was unique and special 
before Congress.
Second, among all human rights violators in Africa, 
South Africa was the biggest trading partner of the United 
States. In 1983 American banks had a total of $ 343 million 
in outstanding loans to the South African government and 
$ 4.6 billion to the private sector. Over 350 U.S.
companies controlled approximately 70 percent of the South 
African computer industry, 50 percent of its petroleum 
industry, and 25 percent of the automobile industry.(93) 
The financial link with South Africa was considered by 
Congress and public as one of the major factors to help 
strengthen the system of apartheid. Therefore, the pressure 
was focused on disinvestment and divestment so as to cut
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off commercial connection with South Africa.
Finally, the issue of white domination in South 
Africa and Namibia came under focus more than ever before 
in the United States when the independence of 
Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola brought an end to 
European colonial rule in Africa during the mid 1970s. 
As the crisis in South Africa broke into U.S. public 
visibility during late 1984, the anti-apartheid supporters 
rolled up their sleeves for "moral war" against South 
Africa’s repugnant system. In this regard anti-apartheid 
groups, especially the Free South Africa Movement, a 
broad-based coalition, formed in 1984, played a prominent 
role in launching a movement to make apartheid a major 
public issue in the United States (discussed in chapter 
VII) .
Conclusion
The human rights policy is certainly a difficult 
area of foreign policy for a variety of reasons, such 
as the lack of a generally agreed definition of rights, 
its clash and competition with national strategic, and 
commercial interests and the difficulties of implementing 
human rights policy, etc. With all its complexities and 
problematic nature, rights such as "the racial 
discrimination and the right of self-determination" are 
internationally protected. Since the early 1970s, each 
successive U.S. administration had its own attitudes to 
human rights issues, such as Carter’s early policy of
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open condemnation of violators, and Reagan’s attitude 
of ’’quiet diplomacy”. The execution of a coherent human 
rights policy in a country like the United States with 
a wide and complex nature of political and economic 
interests worldwide is difficult. In the post-World War 
II period South Africa appears to be an exceptional case 
because of the reasons discussed earlier in which Congress 
established and applied a consistent human rights policy 
to demonstrate U.S. opposition to the system of apartheid.
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CHAPTER VII
THE ROLE OF SANCTIONS IN U.S.-SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONS 
Introduction
Sanctions have always been an instrument in U.S. 
foreign policy in the post-World War II period. Since 
the early 1970s, it has usually been used as a means to 
encourage/compel a recipient country to improve its human 
rights record. Many actions of this type have been taken
by successive administrations. The case of South Africa
is, however, different from these examples in which all 
the successive administrations had been resisting the 
public demand for sanctions against the Republic on the
grounds that sanctions would be "counterproductive".
Since the African National Congress1 (ANC) call 
for sanctions against South Africa in 1950, the centre
of the world sanctions debate had always been in the United 
States. It was partly because of the presence of the United 
Nations headquarters in New York, and partly because of 
the initiatives taken by anti-apartheid movements there 
since the early 1960s, which became effective because 
of the fragmented political system of the country.
This debate, however, finally found its way to 
Congress and became an important domestic political issue 
affecting U.S. foreign policy during the mid-1980s. In 
response to congressional and public pressure the United
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States has been the first country among South Africa's 
major trading partners to impose sanctions against it 
in 1986.
The task in this chapter is to address the following 
questions: [1] How were the sanctions movements developed
in the United States? [2] Why was there a congressional 
consensus on sanctions against South Africa? [3] How 
were sanctions policed?
7.1 Definition of Sanction
According to the Oxford dictionary the literal
meaning of sanction is an "action taken by a country
to penalize and coerce a country or organization that
is considered to have violated a law or code of practice
or basic human rights." "Webster's dictionary defines
the term as "coercive measures applied eg to a nation
taking a course of action disapproved by others." Or
"motive for obedience to any moral or religious law."
In a broader perspective sanctions means
an action initiated by one or more
international actors (the "senders") against
one or more others (the "receivers") with
either or both of two purposes: to punish 
the receivers by depriving them of some 
value and/or to make the receivers comply
with certain norms the senders deem
important."(1)
In 1938 the British Royal Institute of International 
Affairs (RIIA) defined sanctions as an "action taken by 
the members of international community, against an 
infringement, actual or threatened, of the law."(2) These
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actions include the rupture of diplomatic relations, 
cultural and sports boycotts, commercial sanctions both 
on imports and exports, and naval blockades. Of all these 
measures, the most widely used are economic sanctions.
Lloyd Brown John says that economic sanctions may 
be grouped into three types: embargoes, boycotts, and
blockades.(3) Daoudi and Dajani have defined that embargo 
means a ban on export of goods to any sanctioned country 
by one or more countries. Boycotts on the other hand have 
been defined by them as actions imposed by one or more 
countries to stop the importation of some or all goods
from the sanctioned country.(4) Finally, blockade means 
the closure of territorial waters of the target country 
to deprive it from import and export facilities, for 
example, the current blockade of Iraqi waters by allied 
countries.
In addition, we have to look into the place of
sanctions in international law composed "of rules and 
norms that governs relations between states."(5) The 
p re-World War I principles of the balance of poi^er in 
international relations which asserted "that any increase 
in the military capacity of one side must be met by an 
equal increase in military expenditure on the other side, 
else the ’balance of power’ will be distur bed", (6) was
replaced by a system of international organizations to
provide collective security to prevent war. This system 
is based on the mutual cooperation of member states of 
the international organization to resolve their differences 
within its framework. The creation of the League of
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Nations in the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 was the first 
step and experience in this regard. Under its Covenant 
the maintenance of international peace and security was 
the ’obligation’ of the ’’peace loving states". Article 
16 of the Covenant authorized the member states to impose 
economic, financial, and political sanctions against 
any state which would violate its obligations. During 
the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, the economic 
and financial sanctions were imposed on Mussolini's Italy 
by the League but did not become much effective because 
of the growing military might of Hitler and the 
unwillingness of France and Great Britain to press for 
strict and comprehensive sanctions.
However, after the Second World War the League of
Nations was replaced by the United Nations in 1946 a
more comprehensive body. Chapter seven of the UN Charter
specifies the legal basis for sanctions to be imposed
on violators to avoid the "use of force". Article 39
authorizes the Security Council to "determine the existence
of any threat to the [world] peace, breach of the peace,
or act of aggression," for the maintenance of international
peace and security and to "avoid the use of force". In
addition Article 41 of the Charter reads:
The Security Council may decide what measures 
not involving the use of armed force are 
to be employed to give effects to its 
decision, and it may call upon the members 
of the United Nations to apply such measures. 
These may include complete or partial 
interruptions of economic relations and 
of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, 
radio, other means of communication, and 
the severance of diplomatic relations.
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This, however, suggests that sanctions are vital 
in international law in support of a social order 
regulating human behaviour.(7)
7.2 The Sanctions Movement Against South Africa: An
Overview
The imposition of India's ban on trade with South 
Africa in July 1946 was probably the first example of 
sanctions history in the post-World War II era, employed 
against an independent country active in the formation 
of the United Nations. This was followed by the closure 
of the Indian High Commission in South Africa in 1954.(8) 
However, two years after apartheid was officially 
introduced in South Africa in 1948, the African National 
Congress (ANC) in its conference held in Accra in 1950 
appealed for an economic boycott, and called it a 
non-violent weapon against the racist regime of South 
Africa.(9 )
In the United States, in response to the ANC's appeal 
for sanctions against South Africa it was the American 
Committee on Africa (ACOA), founded in 1953 under the 
leadership of George Houser, a white liberal,(10) which 
made early calls for sanctions during the 1950s. In 
addition to ACOA, the African Liberation Support Committee 
(ALSC) was another organization which came into being 
in the late 1960s. The ALSC not only opposed Portuguese 
colonial rule in Africa but demanded economic sanctions
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against South Africa as well.
Most of the anti-apartheid groups and organizations 
in the United States came into existence in the early 
1960s, in the aftermath of the Sharpeville shooting.
Notable in this regard are:
[1] American Coordination Committee for Equality 
in Sports and Society (ACCESS), New York 
City .
[2] International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern 
Africa-U.S. Committee (IDAF), Cambridge, 
Massachusetts.
[3] South Africa War Resisters, New York City.
[4] TransAfrica, Washington, D.C. (predominantly 
black organization).
[5] Washington Office on Africa, Washington, D.C.
[6] American Friends Service Committee-Southern
Africa Programme (AFSC), Philadelphia, Pennsy- 
vania.
[7] Association of Concerned Africa Scholars, 
East Lansing, Michigan.
[8] Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law Southern Africa Project, Washington,
D.C.
[9] National Black United Front, New York City
(predominantly black organization).(11)
These organizations are comprised of various social, 
political, and religious groups aiming to influence U.S.
policy formulation towards South Africa in particular, 
and Africa South of the Sahara, in general. It is important 
to note that many of these organizations came out of the 
civil rights struggle of the United States.
In addition to these groups and organizations, the 
National Council of Churches (NCC), Interfaith Centre
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of Corporate Responsibility, with its headquarters in 
New York city, was also active. Its activity included 
pressure on banks to end lending to South Africa and
pressure on U.S. corporations in South Africa to:
[1] disclose relevant information;
[2] commit themselves to a policy of no
expansion;
[3] end sales to the South African government 
of strategic equipment, such as computers;
[4] end sales to South African policy and
military of products such as oil and trucks 
which are still being sold despite a U.S.
government embargo; and
[5] terminate operations in South Africa and 
withdraw from the country.
This approach, however, was considered by the NCC 
not as "a policy of pressures” rather "an indication of 
American values" in non-cooperation with the white minority 
regime.(12) The activities of these organizations ranged 
from marches, demonstrations, and campaigns to attack 
apartheid,(13) to put pressure on their respective 
legislators and companies, and banks doing business in 
South Africa, which signified the rejection of 
institutional cooperation with apartheid.(14)
The anti-apartheid movements' efforts started gaining 
fruit since the mid-1970s, when the institutional 
investors, such as local governments, universities and 
colleges, churches, labour unions, and foundations started 
pursuing their own policies towards South Africa, through 
disinvestment and divestment activities. One of the early
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examples in this regard was the "East Lansing local 
authority of Michigan which adopted a measure for selective 
purchasing in August 1977 which would favour firms not 
linked with South Africa."(15)
It was during this time that the State Attorney 
General of Wisconsin ruled in 1977 that investment of 
state educational funds in corporations with South African 
ties violated the civil rights Act.(16) It is noteworthy 
that during the mid-1980s' uprising in South Africa some 
of the investors started a second divestment action from 
firms with a South African involvement. From 1977 through 
1987, more than 80 U.S. universities and colleges divested 
business in South Africa and funds of almost $ 4 billion 
were withdrawn.(17) Unlike some of their European 
counterparts who did not succeed in the disinvestment 
and divestment struggle because of legal constraints, 
the U.S. local governments and institutional investors 
were able to be more effective in their struggle to put 
pressure on South Africa because of the structure of 
government in which power and authority are diffused 
between the federal government, state governments, and 
municipalities all over the country.
In addition to non-governmental organizations' 
activism, the bells of the anti-apartheid movement started 
ringing on the Capitol Hill in the early 1970s in the 
shape of sporadic actions and legislation introduced 
by some individual Congressmen sympathetic to black 
majority rule in Southern Africa. In the case of Rhodesia,
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in response to the Byrd Amendment which allowed the United
States to import Rhodesian chrome in violation of UN
resolutions, the anti-apartheid organizations launched
a campaign to influence Congress, which finally resulted
in the repeal of the Amendment in 1973.(18)
Under the influence of lobbying and information
provided by ACOA and ALSC, a black-American Congressman,
Ronald V.Dellums introduced an unsuccessful resolution
in the House of Representatives in 1971 for disinvestment
from South Africa, which marked the beginning of the
sanctions debate in Congress. This was a year when the
Congressional Black Caucus (CBC), comprised of nine black
American legislators was formed, but it certainly lacked
unity and common consensus on the sanctions issue.
Congressman Charles Diggs, leader of the CBC, following
his visit to South Africa in 1971, instead of putting
pressure on the U.S. government, stressed the possibility
of influencing events in the Republic through U.S.
companies regulating their wage policies in their South
African subsidiaries.(19) In addition, Congressman Andrew
Young from Georgia (1973-77) had also tried to influence
events in South Africa through U.S. companies doing
business there. It was at Young's suggestion that Rev.
Leon Sullivan formulated the Sullivan principles in 1977,
the backbone of the Carter administration's South African
policy.(20) The Sullivan principles, were 'rejected' by
black South Africans on grounds that equal employment
was not the issue. The main issue was to put pressure
on Pretoria for political change in which every South 
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practices for all employees". Ambassador Young’s statements 
throughout his affiliation with the Carter Cabinet 
(1977-79) suggest that the CBC, until the early 1980s, 
lacked a common strategy on sanctions issue.
In addition, the black-American legislators were
radical in their approach to South African race issues
only. Their attitude in this regard was well illustrated
in the statement of Congressman William H.Gray III in
the House of Representatives in 1986:
It is not my intention to destroy South 
Africa and in any event, these sanctions 
are not capable of destroying South Africa. 
It is not my intention to cut off communica­
tions for leverage. It is my intention to 
cut off the economic fuel for the political 
engine of apartheid.(21)
However, the famous hearings in Congress during 
the 1970s regarding U.S. business relations with South 
Africa were held in 1976, on the initiative and interest
of Senator Dick Clark, then Chairman of the Sub-Committee 
on Africa of Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Because 
of his anti-apartheid attitude, the South African governmet 
through its "influence buying" tactics, generally known 
as the Muldergate scandal, started a secret campaign 
against his Senate election in 1978. As a result, he
was opposed by a number of special interest-groups, and 
lost the election. The South African campaign against 
Clark continued and he lost his reelection bid in 1980.
These tactics, were also applied to some other Congressmen, 
opponents of South Africa’s racial policies. For example, 
Senator John Tunny of California, who in 1975 "pressed
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through an amendment in Congress that stopped U.S. 
involvement on the South African side in Angola" also 
lost the election, allegedly because of South African 
"influence buying" tactics. The same ploys, however, were 
used against Representative Howard Wolpe, a strong opponent 
of apartheid, in 1982 but he won the election. During
the late 1980s, anti-apartheid groups lost important 
allies, such as Senators Dick Clark and George McGovern 
and Representative Charles Diggs,(22) (there is no evidence 
of South African involvement in McGovern's and Diggs's 
election defeats). Inside Congress the anti-apartheid 
and sanctions issue started gaining momentum with the 
inception of the Reagan administration in 1981, mostly
as a result of the administration's pro-South Africa
posture.
As opposed to the anti-apartheid and congressional 
activism and demands for sanctions, successive 
administrations from Kennedy to Reagan were against 
disinvestment and divestment demands, and advocated a 
"communication" approach towards South Africa. The Kennedy 
and the Johnson administrations neither "encouraged or 
discouraged" U.S. investment and trade links with South
Africa. According to George Ball an Under Secretary of 
State under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, "sanctions
would hurt those whom it is meant to help the
Blacks and would sour internal and international
relationships, preventing constructive negotiations."(23) 
The Kennedy administration, despite claims to distance
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itself from the white minority regime and its racial 
policies, granted official loans of $ 15 million to South 
Africa in 1962.(24)
The issue of apartheid was considered by the Nixon
administration as an internal matter of South Africa;
therefore it did not pay attention to sanctions calls
made by some Congressmen, non-governmental anti-apartheid
organizations and groups, and Afro-Asian countries. David
Newsom, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
(1969-74), described the administration's policies in
his speech in late 1971:
.......... punitive economic measures are
unpopular in this country. We have had 
experience in the problems of enforcement 
and control. These experiences do not ecour- 
age us to believe that such measures are 
workable against countries which are 
important economic entities. By their wealth 
such entities are able to cushion themselves 
against economic pressures and encourage 
non-compliance by others to weaken and thwart 
these pressures.(25)
Throughout the Nixon administration South Africa 
was treated as a trustworthy ally in the struggle against
the international Communism.
The Carter administration, despite its open
condemnation of human rights violation in South Africa, 
was reluctant to impose economic sanctions. It preferred 
to give "preference to promote an accelerated rate of 
economic growth. The administration found that economic 
prosperity would create a situation in which racial
conflicts had no relevance."(26) The administration further 
argued that sanctions would be counter-productive. It
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"would result in South Africa's virtual isolation, possibly 
drive its government to even greater defiance, seriously 
reduce whatever influence we [U.S.] might have to bring 
about peaceful change."(27)
However, during its tenure the administration limited 
the Export-Import Bank's credit to South African purchasers 
in 1978, discussed in chapter VI, and imposed a ban on 
sales of computers to the South African government, 
including sales of other items to its police and 
military.(28)
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7.3 Reagan Administration and the Sanctions Movement
The inception of the new administration in the White 
House in 1981 with public support for engagement in the 
South African economy, coupled with the presidential style 
of Ronald Reagan, provided fuel for the anti-apartheid 
movement. On the basis of this policy approach, the
administration not only opposed sanctions demands but 
also increased trade links with the Republic. For example, 
by the end of 1983 the United States had opened a new 
trade promotion office in Johannesburg with the aim of 
boosting trade with South Africa.(29) Further, the Commerce 
Department issued 1,864 licenses in 1984, valued at $
672.9_______ millions_more than the Carter administration
issued in three years.(30)
Most of the critics of Crocker'5 Sou-Wra 
that: "Constructive engagement does not mean waging
economic warfare against the Republic; nor does it mean 
erecting foolish pinpricks that only erode the American 
position in South African and world markets."(31) But 
they usually ignored the complex nature of regional
problems.
The overall position of the Reagan administration,
like previous administrations, both "nationalist" and 
"progressive", on this issue was not to isolate the 
Republic, "rather to continue the dialogue with the South 
African leaders, necessary for the United States to achieve 
her objectives in Southern Africa."(32)
The Reagan administration's approach was also against
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international boycott of South Africa. Table 1.7 illustrate 
the U.S. vcsVes against the United Nations’ General 
Assembly resolutions calling for sanctions against the 
Republic during its first three years in office.
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Year
1981
1982
1983
Table 1.7
U.S NEGATIVE VOTES IN THE UNITED NATIONS CALLING FOR 
SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA
General Assembly Votes of UN Members U.S Vote
Resolution Yes No Abstain
Sanctions against S.A
(No.36/172D) 109 18 13 NO
Against Military and 
Nuclear collaboration
(No.36/172E) 119 19 04 NO
For the cessation of 
new foreign investment 
in South Africa
(No.36/1720) 138 01 07 NO
Asks IMF not to grant 
credit to South Africa
(No.37/2) 121 03 23 NO
Call for international 
action against apartheid
(No.37/69B) 135 03 08 NO
Sanctions against 
South Africa
(No.37/69) 114 10 19 NO
Against military and 
nuclear collaboration 
with South Africa
(No.37/69D) 120 08 16 NO
For the cessation of 
new investment in 
South Africa
(No.37/69H) 137 01 09 NO
Oil Embargo against 
South Africa
(No.37/69J) 125 06 13 NO
Sanctions against 
South Africa
(No.38/39D) 122 10 18 NO
Against military and 
nuclear collaboration
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with South Africa 
(No.38/39G) 122 09 17 NO
1983 For the cessation of
new foreign investment 
in South Africa
(No.38/391) 140 01 09 NO
Oil embargo against 
South Africa
(No.38/39J) 130 06 14 NO
Note In 1985 after the Uitenhage killings, the United States did 
vote to support a United Nations Security Council resolution 
condemning to killing and detention of the South African 
government's opponents,but that resolution did not propose 
sanctions.
Source; The New York Times, and Dan Jamison cited in, Ann Seidman,
'The Roots of Crisis in Southern Africa', Africa World Press, 
Trenton, 1984, pp.94-95
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By the end of the first Reagan term, the total U.S.
financial involvement in the shape of bank loans, direct
corporate investment and shares owned by Americans in
South Africa was as high as $7.6 billion worth of stocks
in South African companies and had bought about $600
million worth of Krugerrand (South African gold coins).
Over 350 American companies had a total of $ 2.3 billion
invested in South Africa and employed 120,000 South
Africans. The American companies controlled 70 percent
of the South African computer industry, 50 percent of
its petroleum industry, and 25 percent of automobile
industry. (33)
The U.S. investment supported by the successive
administrations was vital for the South African
economy.(34) For example, in early 1981, the South African
Minister of Finance Owen Horwood said:
The story of the economic development in 
this country is intimately bound up with
foreign capital, technology, and expertise. 
Significantly investments usually bring 
all three. It allows us to do what we want 
to rather more quickly. It allows us to 
do something better than we would other 
wise do.(35)
In Danaher1s view the demand for disinvestment and 
sanctions was not only considered "interruption in
relations between both countries but an interruption in 
relations between specific classes, institutional actors, 
and individuals."(36) In contrast, the first Reagan
administration had already imposed economic sanctions 
against countries, such as Libya, Nicaragua, and Poland
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because of the lack of commercial interest of these actors.
However, these "classes, actors, and individuals" 
who were influential in U.S.-South Africa policy 
formulation started losing ground between 1983 and 1986, 
and were replaced by other actors, such as the 
anti-apartheid organizations.
More than any organization discussed earlier, 
TransAfrica was the most effective in lobbying Congressmen 
and in mobilizing public opinion from its creation in 
1977. Before the inception of the Reagan administration 
in 1981, TransAfrica undertook two major projects to 
contact black legislators across the United States. In 
May 1978, TransAfrica Director Randall Robinson, with 
an insider's knowledge of the American political process, 
began to lobby the Representatives whose congressional 
districts consisted of a considerable number of black 
voters.(37) In 1980, TransAfrica again contacted over 
seventy black legislators throughout the country to inform 
them about the organization's anti-apartheid activities 
nationwide, and provided them with the text of a model 
disinvestment bill.(38)
TransAfrica gained prominence, especially as a result 
of peaceful demonstrations at the South African Embassy 
in Washington beginning November 21, 1984. Two days later,
Randall Robinson, the U.S. Civil Rights Commissioner, 
Mary Frances, and Congressman Walter Fauntray, who then 
represented the District Columbia in Congress, announced 
the formation of the Free South Africa Movement (FSAM)
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on November 23.(39) The FSAM, led by TransAfrica, was
a multi-racial and broad-based movement, represented 
in every state, and major religious and ethnic groups. 
By this time the anti-apartheid activists "won over such
prominent leaders as Jesse Jackson, Congressman Charles 
Rangal, Stephen Solarz and Howard Wolpe, and Senator Edward 
Kennedy."(40)
The real tug-of-war between the Executive and the 
Legislature to impose sanctions against South Africa 
started in 1983 when a major sanctions bill was passed 
by the House of Representatives. But it failed to find
passage in the conference between the House and the Senate 
on the Export Administration Act.(41) The presidential
election compaign of 1984 also played a role. During the 
election campaign "the Democratic platform contained a 
highly detailed Africa policy statement longer than the 
Middle Eastern section."(42) This was coupled with 
anti-apartheid statements made by presidential candidate 
Rev. Jesse Jackson during his election campaign.
The sanctions bill was re-introduced in 1985. One
month before the passage of the bill by the House in June
1985, the House Sub-Committee on International Policy
and Trade on Africa held hearings regarding U.S.-South
Africa relations. In his well -articulated statement
Congressman William H.Gray III, who later introduced the
sanctions bill, described:
Arguments about loss of economic 
opportunities [in U.S.] miss the point 
completely, and is similar to arguing that
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slavery should not be abolished because
this would cause unemployment. Unemployment 
is not the issue in South Africa. The virtual 
political, economic, and social enslavement 
of the 80 percent majority is the issue.(43)
Before the same Sub-Committee, Chester Crocker was
pulling the sanctions issue in a different direction:
We have no intention of waging economic 
warfare on South Africa and its people. 
On the contrary we firmly believe that
economic growth has been and will continue 
to be a main engine of constructive change
in all fields in that country.(44)
Contrary to his above statement of April 1985,
Crocker told this author in an interview:
 .......and I argued inside our adminis­
tration [1985-1986] that we should in fact 
be doing more. As you know we did something. 
We had a sanctions initiative on our own 
in 1985 [Presidential Executive Order, Septe­
mber 1985] which bought sometime. 
But by mid [19]86 it got worse again.(45)
However, during the same period, in response to
killings at Uitenhage in March 1985, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee under the Chairmanship of Senator
Richard Lugar, reported out a bill S.995, which required 
the imposition of sanctions against the government of 
South Africa if, within two years, significant progress 
had not been made towards ending the policy of
apartheid.(46)
In addition to growing violence in South Africa,
at the hight of tension between the Reagan administration 
and Congress regarding South Africa policy, President 
Reagan in his public statement in August called the 
government of President P.W.Botha a "reformist 
administration" that had made "substantial changes in
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eliminating some form of racial discrimination." Later 
Reagan apologized that he "carelessly gave the impression 
that racial segregation had been eliminated in public 
places in South Africa."(47)
In this political environment the House of 
Representatives was prepared to act. The sanctions bill 
introduced by William H.Gray III in March 1985, was passed 
in June 5, 1985 by the House. The bill prohibited loans
to the South African government and all new investment 
in the Republic. In addition, it banned the importation 
of South African gold coins into the United States and 
restricted the sale of computers to the South African 
government.(48) Instead of showing some leniency, the 
Botha government declared a partial state of emergency 
in July 1985, which widened the powers of police to 
crackdown on the activities of black organizations.(49)
A few hours before the Senate was scheduled to vote 
on the sanctions bill on September 9, 1985, President
Reagan signed the Executive Order (EO) imposing a set 
of sanctions against South Africa. The EO banned the import 
of South African gold coins, and prohibited the export 
of computers, nuclear technology and weapons to the South 
African government and its agencies.(50) The EO, in fact 
was not the "administration’s sanctions initiative", as 
Crocker suggested but rather it was the result of the 
congressional and public pressure. At the time of signing 
of the E O , eleven states and thirty-five cities across 
the United States had already taken some kind of economic
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actions against South Africa. (51)
However, the EO demonstrated the success of Congress
and the public at least in two ways. First, it marked
the shift in the administration's anti-apartheid attitude
towards South Africa. Second, one of the provisions of
the EO directed the Secretary of State to establish an
Advisory Committee on South Africa. The Committee submitted
its report in January 1987 which concluded the failure
of the constructive engagement and recommended a fresh
U.S. policy towards the Republic.(52)
On the other hand, the administration’s change in
approach was at least twofold. First, to cool down the
simmering congressional and public pressure against its
policy towards South Africa. Second, to assert its
influence on South Africa policy-making. Throughout the
mid-1980s, said Crocker,
it was a kind of a tug-of-war between not
only Republicans and Democrats, but more 
importantly between two branches of 
government, Congress and the Executive.
And the battle was really....... you know
it looks like......... it was a battle over
the content of our policy. But in fact, 
a lot of it was over the issue of who should 
control it.(53)
With the passage of the EO, the sanctions issue
did not fade away and was back on the congressional agenda
in 1986. Some Republican Senators were also putting
pressure on President Reagan for the appointment of a
special envoy to consult the governments of Great Britain
and Federal Republic of Germany, the key black leaders
in South Africa, and to present privately to the government
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of South Africa the views of the United States on the 
situation.(54) This, however, did not materialize because 
of policy chaos within the Reagan administration on this 
issue.
In addition, with regard to coordination between 
the Reagan administration and the European allies on the 
sanctions issue, an official in the State Department said: 
"The sanctions were a congressional mandate. So it was 
not a question of consulting European allies. "(55) But 
the Reagan speech of July 22, 1985 shows that the
administration was in constant touch with its European 
allies on this issue, especially with the United Kingdom, 
West Germany, and France. President Reagan said: "I urge
the Congress and the countries of Western Europe to resist 
this emotional clamo[u]r for punitive sanctions."(56 )
However, the disappointed Congress passed the 
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) in September 1986. 
Instead of signing the Act, President Reagan vetoed it 
on September 26. Three days later, the House of 
Representatives overrode the veto, followed by the Senate 
on October 2, 1986. This kind of rebuff of a Chief
Executive is very rare in U.S. political history. Similar 
sort of bipartisan force were used during the early 1970s 
when Congress overrode the presidential veto and passed 
the War Powers Act in 1973.
The sanction measures taken by the United States 
in the CAAA to undermine apartheid were following:
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Title II Measure to assist victims
of apartheid
Title____ III_Measure by the United States
to undermine apartheid (see Appendix
I)
Title IV___ Multilateral measures to
undermine apartheid
Title V Future policy towards South Africa
Title_____ VI_Enforcement and administrative
provisions.(57)
These measures were taken by the United States 
to urge South Africa to scrap the apartheid laws and allow 
the exercise of political freedom, the release of political 
prisoners, etc. In addition to the internal changes within 
the Republic, the Act encouraged the Republic to stop
the cross-border attacks on the neighbouring countries.(58)
Apart from sanctions imposed against South Africa,
some positive measures were also taken in the CAAA as
well. These included, scholarships to the victims of 
apartheid; financial assistance for disadvantaged South 
Africans; legal assistance to political prisoners and 
detainees; and a human rights fund for families of the 
victims of apartheid.(59) These measures were taken to
help blacks prepare for leadership in post-apartheid South 
Africa.
The passage of the Act, however, was the first
congressional overturning of a presidential veto in the 
foreign policy field since the passage of the 1973 War 
Powers Act. The CAAA sent a warning that the future of
U.S.-South Africa relations would depend on South African 
efforts to eliminate apartheid. For all its weakness and
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loopholes, the passage of the Act was the best example 
of conflict between the Executive and the Legislative. 
In this process Congress exercised its authority, not 
only linking the human rights issue in the U.S.-South 
Africa policy but "tied the hands of a [popular] 
president."(60) as well.
The weakness of the Act was that it permitted the 
president to allow the importation of South African 
products considered to be essential for the United States. 
On the basis of this clause, the Reagan administration 
exempted ten non-fuel minerals from the sanctions list. 
These minerals were considered strategic by the 
administration for the national security of the country. 
The Reagan administration, which felt the CAAA practically 
unfeasible, failed in some areas to implement it against 
South Africa. Crocker told the author in an interview: 
"But frankly when it was all over we went back and started 
to pursue our own policy again. Sanctions or no 
sanctions."(61)
In his October 1987 report, President Reagan told 
Congress that there was not any noteworthy progress towards 
the abolition of apartheid in South Africa despite the 
U.S. sanctions. The disappointed Congress tried once again 
in 1988 to amend the CAAA to impose some tough sanctions 
against South Africa. An influencial black American 
congressman, Ronald V.Dellums sponsored a bill in 1988, 
that called for six more sanctions against the Republic, 
and this was passed by the House on August 1 , 1988. The
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sanctions included the ban on:
[1] U.S. investment in South Africa;
[2] all imports from South Africa; except for
strategic minerals essential for the economy 
or defence, publications, and imports from
businesses 90 percent owned by black South 
Africans;
[3] all exports to South Africa; except for 
agricultural commodities, and U.S. public
and private aid for South Africa;
[4] new Federal coal, gas and oil leases for
the U.S. subsidiaries or U.S. affiliates
under control of a foreign company.....
invest in or export oil to South Africa* 
oil industry;
[5] U.S.-owned, controlled or registered ships
transporting oil to South Africa; and
[6] U.S. intelligence and military cooperation 
with South Africa.(62)
In addition, for keeping the violations in the
implementation of the CAAA, the amended act required the
Inter-Agency Coordination Committee on South Africa to
coordinate and monitor the implementation of the act.
The act set out the composition of the Committee of the
Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defence, Commerce, and
Agriculture; the Attorney General; the U.S. Trade
Representative and the heads of such other agencies as
the President deemed appropriate. The Secretary of State
was to be the chairperson of the Committee.(63)
But the bill did not succeed in achieving a
bipartisan consensus in the Senate on the issue as it
did in 1986. Several factors had contributed to the
congressional failure. For example, by this time more
than half of the leading American companies, such as the
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IBM, Ford, Agfa, General Motors, Coca Cola etc, had already 
withdrawn from South Africa. (64) Out of a total of 285 
U.S. firms operating there in December 1984, only 136 
remained by mid-1988.(65) Second, the political crises
within South Africa were not of that intensity as those 
of the mid-1980s. The level of township unrest had 
declined significantly. In addition, a number of reforms
had already been announced between 1986-87, including 
the removal of influx control and pass laws and the 
restoration of South African citizenship to millions of 
blacks. This was followed by the release of a senior 
African National Congress (ANC) leader, Govan Mbelci from 
prison, and some positive moves started to take place 
for the Cuban and South African withdrawal from Angola 
in 1988. Finally, on top of these factors, the most 
important consideration which created hindrance in 
achieving bipartisan consensus was that in a few months 
time a new administration had to enter the White House. 
The Reagan administration, became successful in its 
persuasion and manoeuvring so that most of the Senators
did not take to extreme measures in the final months
of the administration to create policy problems for the 
incoming administration.
As has been mentioned earlier, changes in U.S. policy 
towards South Africa during this period offer an excellent 
example of the impact of public opinion on policy 
formulation, which in turn was "energized" by events 
in South Africa, the lack of presidential leadership,
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the bureaucratic friction, and the 1984 presidential
election campaign.
The deepening internal crisis in South Africa in 
the wake of the new constitution and the introduction 
of a tricameral parliament which excluded blacks from
the country's main political stream resulted in nationwide
protests. These crises were given widespread coverage 
by U.S. media.
"Millions and millions of Americans had been
traumatised watching South Africa's white police beating
up black South Africans", recalled Ambassador James
K.Bishop Jr.(66) The issue went beyond conventional
political differences and Congressmen from both sides
of the aisle came under pressure to work for sanctions.
The public pressure in the shape of demonstrations in
colleges, universities, states, etc was so immense that
Congressmen from Kensas, Texas, Montena, etc. who had
no connection whatsoever with South Africa, had to help
policy formulation. " ........ The politicians felt a need
to do something", told Crocker to the author, "and to
be seen doing something. That's the dynamics. They didn't
know what [anything] else to do".(67)
Further, the lack of presidential leadership and
bureaucratic friction within the Reagan administration
also palyed an additional role in the passage of the
sactions Act. Crocker told the author:
Unfortunately, Reagan was simply not credible 
on this issue, even to some in his own party. 
So when the vote came as you know he had
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lost many Republicans. He lost the huge 
faction of his own party in the Senate. 
There never would have been the sanctions 
because he would have been able to sustain 
veto.(68)
Among many Republican Senators, President Reagan 
also lost Senator Nancy L .Kassebaum on this issue, who 
was then a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations. When the author raised this issue with Senator 
Kassebaum, her respose was:
 ......myself included would have liked
to see President Reagan to speak out with 
stronger voice against the apartheid and 
to urge the South African government to 
step forward and to undertake the initiative
on its own........ As the President just
clearly believed that we shouldn’t be telling 
him what to do.(69)
Crocker further added:
that if Reagan had managed to organize 
his public performances better on South
Africa, he could have provided the cover 
for many politicians who would sa^ well 
the President is doing the right thing
and we support the Executive on this. 
We think he is basically right. They pushed 
him some but they let him lead.(70)
I asked him further: are you saying that he damaged
the South Africa policy? His response was: "Yes, the
President."(71)
A middle-echelon bureaucrat in the Bureau of African
Affairs told the author:"..........President Reagan had
so misrepresented in his public statements the. sentiments
of American people that they had to do something dramatic
to prove that was not just........"(72)
Crocker, in his book ’High Noon in Southern
Africa’(73), and in an interview with the author, and
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Hedrick Smith in his book, ’The Power Game: How Washington
Works’ have identified at least three persons_____ William
Casey, Director Intelligence Agency; Donald Regan, the 
White House Chief of Staff; and Pat Buchnan, the Director
of Communications ’’who encouraged President Reagan
to face down Congress over economic sanctions against 
South Af rica .’’( 74 )
Above all there was a lack of communications between 
the White House and the Capitol Hill on this issue, even 
with many of the Republicans who sought the White House’s 
opinion at various stages of the process. Members were 
not certain at a given moment who in the White House was 
responsible for the issue, or whether responsibility 
at the time lay with the State Department.(75)
The laws and acts passed by Congress are left in 
the hands of bureaucracy which makes the Legislature unable 
to monitor their implementation process, partly because 
of the involvement of various agencies, and partly because 
of the large number of congressional commitments.
Like other acts, the CAAA required the administration 
to make various government agencies and departments 
responsible for implementing the provisions of the Act. 
The main agencies and departments involved in implementing 
sanctions were: the Department of State; the Department
of Treasury; the Department of Commerce; the Bureau of 
Customs; the Department of Energy; the U.S. federal 
agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI). In addition, to a certain degree the Department
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of Justice was also involved with overseeing the 
implementation of sanctions. Among the above-mentioned 
agencies, the Department of Treasury, the Bureau of 
Customs, and the Department of Commerce were the main 
enforcers.
However, the responsibilities assigned to these 
agencies varied from agency to agency. For example, there 
was an office within the State Department, whose 
responsibility was to oversee that no prohibited item 
be allowed to go to South Africa. The Commerce Department
was responsible for administering the list of goods which
were subject to exchange control. The Bureau of Customs, 
which is the part of the Treasury Department, was 
authorized to look into the documentation of goods subject 
to export to South Africa. The Department of Energy had 
a responsibility for an enforcement of control on exports 
of nuclear materials. In addition to these agencies some
of the U.S. embassies were also involved in conducting
investigations into possible irregularities.(76 )
It is difficult to pinpoint the effects of economic 
sanctions on the country’s economic health. Haider Ali 
Khan has argued that theoretical and empirical research 
have not yet become successful in assessing the effects 
of economic sanctions on a target country.(77) In the 
case of South Africa it is also difficult to identify 
the effects of U.S. sanctions on the Republic, and its 
impact on the behaviour of the government. But what 
sanctions in fact did was to deliver a psychological
315
blow against the white minority regime. Further, it 
encouraged the black population inside South Africa and 
the anti-apartheid organizations in the United States 
to fight to end the repugnant system of apartheid.
In addition, "it had some real effects in terms 
of companies that left South Africa. It had real effects 
in terms of providing the Europeans and Japanese to 
reevaluate [their financial links] and take some limited 
steps which further increased the anxiety of the business 
people in South Africa",(78) explained Robert Brauer, 
the special counsel to Congressman Ronald V.Dellums. 
The South African business leaders, such as the Standard 
Bank, the Investment Corporation, the Trust Bank Ltd., 
and the Rand Mines Ltd., had expressed their anxiety and 
accepted that sanctions had contributed towards the 
economic problems of the country. A study done by the 
Scandinavian Institute of African Affairs Uppsala, Sweden, 
indicated in 1988 a total loss of at least U.S. $ 3
billion annually to South Africa in foreign exchange.(79)
In the political arena sanctions "played a real
part in the reevaluation by Nationalist Party of what
was the possible outcome."(80) It is also safe to argue
that the mid-1980s congressional move also played an
important role which prevented the South African government 
from taking a tough action against its black population. 
Therefore, the Republic announced a series of reforms 
including the scrapping of influx control, the hated pass 
laws, and the restoration of South African citizenship
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to millions of blacks.
Conclusion
The discussion in this chapter suggests that in 
the post-World War II period sanctions have been used
as an instrument of foreign policy, and most of these
actions in the world have been initiated by the United 
States. In the case of South Africa the sanctions issue
had always appeared in the United States in response
to events inside the Republic, such as during the Soweto 
roits of the mid-1970s, and the mid-1980s insurgency.
However, with all its strength and weakness, the 
CAAA had proved to be effective, non-violent measures
to express and convey U.S. public feelings against the 
apartheid system. The passage of the Act had also 
encouraged other trading partners of South Africa to 
take such actions. The imposition of Japanese economic
sanctions against South Africa in 1987 is the best example 
in this regard. In addition, the passage of the Act had
provided ’moral satisfaction’ to the public and the 
Legislature, which never wanted to be a "part of the evil 
conspiracy that kept the status quo in South Africa."(81)
317
Notes and References
1. Johan Galtung, ’On the Effects of International 
Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of 
Rhodesia’, World Politics, Vol., XIX, No., 3, April 
1967, p. 379.
2. C.Lloyd Brown John, ’Multilateral Sanctions in 
International Law: A Comprehensive Analysis’, Praeger 
Publishers, New York, 1975, p. 5.
3. ibid., p. 16.
4. Daoudi and Dajani, quoted in D.J,Venter, ’South Africa 
Sanctions and the Multinationals’, Carden Publications 
Ltd., Sussex, 1989, p. 57.
5. John Dugard, 'Sanctions Against South Africa: An 
International Law Perspective', in Mark Orkin (ed), 
’Sanctions Against Apartheid', Catholic Institute 
of International Relations (CIIR), London, 1989,
p.113.
6. David Robertson, 'The Dictionary of Politics', Penguin
Books, London, 1985, p. 19.
7. David L.Sills (ed),'International Encyclopedia of
Social Sciences’, Vol., 14, The Macmillan Co., and 
the Free Press, U.S., 1968, p. 5.
8. Elna Schoeman, 'South African Sanctions Directory,
1946-1988', South African Institute of International 
Affairs, Johannesburg, 1988, p. 1.
9. Tom Lodge, 'Sanctions and Black Organizations’, in
Mark Orkin (ed), 'Sanctions Against Apartheid’, 
op., cit *, P * 34.
10. Peter Duignan and L.H.Gann, 'The United States and 
Africa: A History', Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1984, p. 350.
11. Janice Love, 'The U.S. Anti-Apartheid Movement:
Local Activism in Global Politics', Praeger 
Publishers, New York, 1985, p. 19.
12. Statement of Rev. William Howard, President National 
Council of Churches, U.S. Congress, House of 
Representatives, ’U.S. Corporate Activities in South 
Africa’, Hearings Before the Sub-Committee of 
International Economic Policy and Trade, 97th 
Congress, September 24, October 15-22, 1981, May
18 and June 10, Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C., 1983, pp. 133-135.
318
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20. 
21 . 
22 .
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
Peter Duignan and L.H.Gann, op., cit., p. 349.
Janice Love, op., cit., p. 13.
For comprehensive account of actions taken by 
international investors see, Elna Schoeman, op., 
cit.
ibid., p. 14.
Lipton quoted in D.J.Venter, op., cit., p.148.
Janice Love, op., cit. p. 81.
Africa Confidential, Vol., 12, No., 25, December 
17, 1971, p. 3.
Richard J.Payne, ’Black Americans and the Demise 
of Constructive Engagement’, Africa Today, Vol.,
33, Nos., 2 and 3, 1986, p. 80.
Anti- Apartheid Act of 1986, U.S. Congress, House 
of Representatives, 99th Congress, 2nd Session, June 
10, 1986, Washington, D.C., 1986, p. 31.
For a detailed account of Muldergate scandal see, 
Anthony Sampson, ’Pretoria's Scandal’, Newsweek,
April 2, 1979, pp. 20-24. Also see, Janice Love 
op. cit., pp. 83-84.
James Barber and Michael Spicer, ’Sanctions Against 
South Africa: Options for the West’, International 
Affairs, Vol., 55, No., 3, July 1979, p. 392.
David Palliser et al., ’South Africa Inc.: The 
Oppenheimer Empire*, Lowry Publishers, South Africa, 
1987, pp. 80-81.
Africa Confidential, Vol., 12, No., 25, December 
17, 1971, p. 3.
Arnt Spandau, ’Economic Boycott Against South Africa: 
Normative and Factual Issues', Juta and Co., Cape 
Town, 1979, pp. 7-8.
Letter, Landon Kite, Staff Assistant, The Department 
of State, (on behalf of President Jimmy Carter) to 
Joseph E.Lowery, (President, Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference, Atlanta, Georgia), November 
25, 1977, WHCF, Subject File TA 1/Co 141, 
1/20/77-1/20/81, Box TA5, Jimmy Carter Library, 
Atlanta, U.S.A.
Janice Love, op., cit., p. 4.
Africa Research Bulletin, Vol., 20, No., 9, September
319
15-October 14, 1983, p. 84.
30. Christopher Coker, 'The United States Policy Towards 
South Africa, 1968-1985: Constructive Engagement 
and its Critics', Duke University Press, Durham,
1986, p. 12.
31. Chester Crocker, 'South Africa: Strategy for Change1, 
Foreign Affairs, Winter, 1980/81, Vol., 59, No.,
2, p . 346.
32. Interview with Ambassador James K.Bishop Jr., acting 
Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs, Washington, D.C., July
30, 1992.
33. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 'Congress 
and Foreign Policy: 1985-1986', Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C., 1988, p. 10.
34. In 1982 the six major trading partners of South
Africa the United States, the United Kingdom, West
Germany, France, Italy, and Japan supplied 84 percent 
of South Africa's imports and purchased 84 percent
of its exports.
Allan I .Mendelowitz, Senior Associate Director, 
National Security and International Affairs Division, 
testimony, 'U.S. Sanctions Against South Africa',
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 
24, 1988.
35. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 'U.S. 
Corporate Activities in South Africa', op., cit., 
p . 34.
36. Kevin Danaher, 'The U.S. Struggle Over Sanctions 
against South Africa', in Mark Orkin (ed), op, cit., 
p. 132.
37. Henry F.Jackson, 'From the Congo to Soweto: U.S. 
Foreign Policy Towards Africa Since I960', William 
Morrow and Co., Inc., New York, 1982, p. 124.
38. Janice Love, op., cit., p. 45.
39. For protest chronology see, Washington Post, November
27, 1986, p. 4 of 4.
40. Richard W.Hull, 'American Enterprise in South Africa: 
Historical Dimensions of Engagement and Disengagement' 
New York University Press, New York , 1990, p. 325.
41. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 
'Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985’, Hearings Before the 
Sub-Committee on International Economic Policy and
320
Trade on Africa, 99th Congress, 1st Session, April 
17-May 2, 1985, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C., 1986, p. 5.
42. Kenneth Longmyer, 'New Ethnic Voices', Foreign Policy,
No., 60, Fall 1985, p. 9.
43. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 
'Anti-Apartheid Act of 19858, op., cit., pp. 5-6.
44. ibid, p . 48.
45. Interview with Chester A.Crocker, former Assistant 
Secretary of State for African Affairs, Washington, 
D.C., September 15, 1992.
46. U.S. Congress, Senate, 'Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985, 
99th Congress, 1st Session, June 28, 1985, p. 4.
47. New York Times, August 27, 1985.
48. Kenneth Longmyer, op,, cit., p. 10.
49. Chester A.Crocker, 'High Noon in Southern Africa:
Making Peace in a Rough Neighbourhood', op., cit., 
p . 264.
50. Richard W.Hull, op., cit., p. 333.
51. ibid., p . 330.
52. For further details, see, 'A United States Policy 
Toward South Africa: The Report of the Secretary
of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa', United 
States Department of State, January 1987.
53. Interview with Chester A.Crocker.
54. Senators Nancy L.Kassebaum and Richard Lugar, letter 
to President Ronald Reagan, June 23, 1986.
55. Interview with Jeffrey Davidow, Senior Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 
Washington, D.C., August 28, 1992.
56. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 'Congress 
and Foreign Policy, 1985-1986', Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Government Printing Office Washington,
D.C., 1988, pp. 25-26.
57. On July 10, 1991, U.S. President George Bush lifted 
the following sanctions: Import of Krugerrand and 
other gold coins; import of military articles; imports 
of products of South African parastatals; computer 
exports for South African military, police, and
321
apartheid enforcing agencies; air transportation 
with South Africa; loans to South African government; 
import of uranium ore, uranium oxide, coal, and 
textile, iron and steel; ban on new investments in 
South Africa; ban on promoting U.S. tourism in South 
Africa; export of munition list items; import of 
South African agriculture products; export to South 
Africa of crude oil and refined petroleum products; 
ban on cooperation with South African government 
armed forces; and sugar imports.
According to the Newsouth Africa Bulletin (July 
1993) the remaining federal U.S. economic sanctions 
on South Africa are to be repealed and U.S. investment 
supported under U.S. legislation to be offered by 
Senators Nancy L.Kassebaum and Paul Simon.
Source: Africa Research Bulletin, Vol., 28, No.,
7, July l-31st', 1991, p. 10200. Africa Confidential 
Vol., 32, No., 16, August 9, 1991, p. 1. And, Newsouth 
africa, Vol., 1, Issue 7, July 1993, Published by 
South African Embassy, London, p. 2.
58. For further details see, U.S. Congress, House of 
Representatives, 'Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986', 99th 
Congress, 2nd Session, June 10, 1986, Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1986, pp. 21-23.
59. Before the passage of the Comprehensive 
Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986, U.S. Congress created 
the following funds for persons whose rights were 
violated by apartheid: [1] Scholarships programme
exists since 1982; [2] Human Rights Fund exists
since 1979; [3] Trade Union Training Programme exists
since 1983; [4] Participation of disadvantaged South
African in private enterprise exists since 1983.
For further details see, 'South Africa: Status Report 
on the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act', Report 
to Congressional Requesters', U.S. General Accounting 
Office, Washington, D.C., October 1987, pp. 22-29.
60. Julius W.Praat, 'A History of United States Foreign 
Policy', Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1980, p.2.
61. Interview with Chester A.Crocker.
62. Ronald V.Dellums, 'The Case for Comprehensive 
Sanctions Against South Africa', p. 19.
63. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Anti 
Apartheid Act Amendments of 1988', 100th Congress,
2nd Session, May 20, 1988, Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C., 1988, p. 24.
64. Allan I .Mendelowitz, testimony, op., cit. p. 9.
65. For further details see, Pauline H.Baker, 'The United
322
States and South Africa: The Reagan Years1, op., 
cit., pp.59-60.
66. Interview with James K.Bishop Jr.
67. Interview with Chester A.Crocker.
68. Interview with Chester A.Crocker.
69. Interview with U.S. Senator Nancy L.Kassebaum,
Washington D.C., August 3, 1992.
70. Interview with Chester A.Crocker.
71. ibid.
72. Interview with Peter R.Chaveas, Director Office of 
Southern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, 
Department of State, Washington D.C., August 6, 1992.
73. Chester A.Crocker, 'High Noon in Southern Africa: 
Making Peace in Rough Neighbourhood', op., cit., 
pp. 279-303.
74. Hedrick Smith, 'The Power Game: How Washington Works', 
Collins, London 1988, p. 327.
75. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, 'Congress and Foreign Policy, 
1985-1986', Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C., 1988. p. 32.
76. The list of various agencies is based on interviews 
conducted by the author in Washington, D.C., between 
July and October 1992.
77. Haider Ali Khan, 'The Political Economy of Sanctions 
Against Apartheid', Lynne Rienner, Publishers,
Boulder, 1989, p. 34.
78. Interview with Robert B.Brauer, Special Counsel to 
Congressman Ronald V.Dellums, Washington, D.C., August 
25, 1992.
79. Kenneth Hermele and Berti Oden, 'Sanctions Dilemas: 
Some Implications of Economic Sanctions Against South 
Africa', Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 
Uppsala, Sweden, 1988, p. 25.
80. Interview with Robert B.Brauer.
81. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 
'Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986', Testimony of William
H.Gray III, 99th Congress, 2nd Session, June 10,
1986, Government Printing Office, Washington,
D .C ., 1986, p . 2.
323
CHAPTER VIII
Conclusion
This thesis has been concerned with examining in 
detail the development of the United States’ policy towards 
South Africa in the period roughly 1970 to 1986, paying 
special attention to the broader context of the
policy-making process towards the Republic. To this end 
a number of separate policy fields and questions have
been examined in detail both in terms of their general 
characteristics and in the way they influenced relations 
between the two countries. It is time to conclude the 
discussion, and to identify the areas of future research 
which flow from this study.
In the post-War period U.S. foreign policy was
driven by the Cold War imperatives of competition for 
influence and the containment of international Communism, 
itfhich gave successive presidents an almost ’imperial' 
role in the field of foreign policy. The enormous 
discretionary powers became possible for a variety of 
reasons, including Constitutional ambiguties, the 
development of nuclear weapons, and congressional 
inactivism. As a result, the ’high’ politics of the great 
strategic issues of the Cold War remained the exclusive 
domain of the President and his immediate entourage, (often 
with close links to big corporations, and banks), not 
necessarily, as this study shows, the foreign policy
324
'professionals’. The routine ’low’ politics of relations 
with other states was left to a large number of dpartmentsA
and agencies which constantly generated great problems 
of coordination because of bureaucratic struggles to 
influence decisions.
The various bureaucratic agencies involved in,foreign
A
policy-making process can in part be seen as permanently 
institutionalized representatives not only of ’interests’ 
but also approaches to policy. So that for example the 
Commerce Department can generally be seen as the ’voice 
of business' but also as instinctively opposed to sanctions 
in almost any circumstances. "The Commerce Department 
always opposes trade embargoes" said Richard Moose "no 
matter who the object of trade embargo is. Whether it 
is Sadam Hussain or [Fidel] Castro or [Colonel] Kadaffi 
or the South Africans. They are always against trade 
embargoes. ” (1) While the Central Intelligence Agency would 
always seek to have cooperative relations with the 
intelligence agencies of ’friendly’ nations, irrespective 
their form of government, even sometimes against the 
U.S. government policy. At the other end of the spectrum 
Congress remained largly dominated by powerful committee 
chairmen and presidents usually cultivated good relations 
with power ful congressional figures so as not to run into 
difficulties, at least on foreign policy issues. Similarly, 
agency heads also tended to develop relations with key 
congressional figures for the purposes of routine 
bureaucratic infighting over resources.
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The general effect of this balance of institutional 
forces meant that Cold War considerations prevailed in 
relations with South Africa at least until the late-1970s. 
Presidents took little interest in African issues 
generally, with the exception of the inaugural policy 
action taken by the Kennedy administration towards black 
Africa, which in part was the result of the domestic civil 
rights movement and partly because of the changing map 
of Africa. But under Lyndon Johnson the growing U.S. 
military involvement in Vietnam caused the administration 
to move away from open confrontation with the Republic. 
Despite its preoccupations in the Far East, the 
administration restricted U.S. Import-Export financing 
to South Africa in 1964. The new Republican administration 
under Richard Nixon in 1969, adopted a policy of "quiet 
persuasion" towards Southern African issues. The white 
states of Rhodesia and South Africa, alongwith the 
Portuguese colonial power in the region were considered 
by Henry Kissinger to be a stable political force there. 
The Portuguese coup of 1974 and the subsequent independence 
of Angola and Mozambique in 1975 marked the end of the 
Nixon-Kissinger approach of covert actions in Southern 
Africa.
Operating within the framework of Cold War 
objectives, the government agencies responsible for foreign 
policy-making, strove to attain what they perceived through 
their respective organizational lenses to be the most 
advantageous arrangements for the United States, whether
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it was the purchase of uranium or the securing of 
intelligence data. This was made easier by the fact that 
most of Africa remained part of European colonial empires 
until the 1960s and the U.S., despite its anti-imperial 
tradition, had accepted the reality of European colonialism 
as a bulwark of its anti-Soviet position. In this scenario, 
business interests sought profits where they could be 
found and were generally encouraged to do so by the 
government.
However, both the U.S. domestic and the international 
parameters shifted dramatically in the 1970s. The 1960s 
saw the huge erruption of race in American politics which 
for the purposes of this discussion had two important 
effects. Firstly, race became a key dimension of political 
virtue accross the U.S. political spectrum. Secondly, 
and more practically, one of the effects of the civil 
rights struggle was to give black voters some real voice 
and to make it easier to elect black legislators. As has 
been suggested it does not have to be assumed that such 
legislators would necessarily take 'progressive* positions 
on all political questions but on all racial questions, 
including racial questions overseas, they could not but 
be radical. It is here that one can find the roots of 
alignment in the American mind with the civil rights 
struggle in the U.S. itself and the position of Africans 
in South Africa.
Internationally the end of European colonialism 
changed the circumstances in which the United States and
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(South Africa) operated. The newly independent African
states focused their attention and criticism on the 
apartheid policies of South Africa. But the peculiar
structure in Southern Africa delayed the full effects
though African voices were loud enough at the United 
Nations throughout the 1960s, which time and again created 
pressures for policy-makers in Washington. It was not 
until the mid-1970s collapse of the Portuguese empire 
which proved the failure of Kissinger’s dictum of "whites 
are there to stay", followed by the final surrender of
white Rhodesia in 1979 did South Africa stand alone both 
as a now vulnerable state because of the breakdown of
white safety belt in the north, and as an international 
pariah.
It was exactly the same time that the underground
shifts in U.S. domestic politics brought about by the
civil rights movement bore fruit in terms of Presidential 
politics, when Jimmy Carter, the first Southern candidate 
to be elected to that office where narrow majority win 
was made possible by black votes. For the first time 
in American political history Carter brought a significant 
number of black-Americans into government at the highest
level. The President himself also had a genuine revulsion 
towards apartheid. As has been pointed out though it would 
be wrong to see the new importance of human rights as 
being solely a Carter initiative. Congress had already 
begun to link human rights issues to a number of policies 
in the shape of foreign economic and defence aid since
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the early-1970s, in apparent revulsion against the 
Nixon-Kissinger approach to U.S. foreign relations, and 
their attitude towards Congress. However, the centrality 
of the president in the American political system means 
that his initiatives tend to energise the whole system 
in a way that Congress cannot.
This was certainly the effect on South Africa policy 
most dramatically in the U.S. inspired UN arms embargo 
in November 1977, the first such (mandatory) embargo to 
be imposed on any state by the United Nations. The early 
activism of the Carter administration, however, produced 
difficulties because the logic of pressure on South Africa 
seemed to conflict with the logic of Cold War, a point 
that the South Africans, as has been noted, constantly 
sought to exploit. Within his administration South Africa’s 
importance as a supplier of key minerals and as a staunch 
ally in the Cold War was regularly cited by those who 
thought Carter's approach confrontational. But it should 
be noted that in case of South Africa the policy was more 
a source of disagreement than of conflict at the level 
of elite politics. During the presidential election of 
1980 between Carter and his opponent these, however, were 
the terms of debate. It had been generally argued by 
opponents of Carter's Southern Africa policy that his 
administration pursued a policy of disengagement towards 
the region. However, his administration was much engaged 
to get the regional issues solved alongwith other major 
issues on top of the administration's foreign policy
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agenda. In addition, as against the general perception
that during the second half of the administration its
pressure became diffused on South Africa, because of
problems in Afghanistan and Iran, Moose told this author:
MI think that's not really correct...! was still trying
to put a lot of pressure on South Africans up to the very
end." Did it work, I asked. "It didn't do any good. They 
AfviOarT)
y^ere optimistic people as world knows,” said Moose.(2)
But for reasons we have suggested by the 1980s it 
was impossible for American politicians of any stripe
to argue that apartheid and the country's political system 
were purely South Africa’s internal matters. Thus for 
a sophisticated Reaganite like Chester Crocker the key 
issue was the form of alignment of the Cold War logic
with the anti-apartheid logic, not only to secure the 
abandonment of apartheid but also regional stability and 
the exclusion of radical regimes, (most importantly from 
Pretoria, even a blackruled Pretoria). In the quest for 
the solutions of the Namibian problem and the removal 
of the Cubans from Angola, pressure on South Africa had 
to be traded. It is noteworthy, however, that neither 
the Carter nor Reagan administration made the domestic 
political change in South Africa as corner-stone of their 
respective policies. But to her credit, the United States 
continued to keep the condemnation of apartheid actively 
alive and in successive policies towards Southern Africa
vis-a-vis other major trading partners of South Africa.
The mid-1980s circumstances, both in the United
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States and South Africa, however, contributed to upset 
the finely calculated manoeuverings of Chester Crocker 
when, as he put it a "very unfortunate episode [which] 
distracted the attention and infact reduced our
influence"(3) in South Africa. P.W. Botha's reforms, 
particularly his constitutional reforms, in which the 
black majority was excluded resulted in a huge wave of
disturbances on a much greater scale then Sharpeville 
and Soweto, which required considerable repression and
for a while became constant television fare in the United 
States until the South African government decided to expell 
television teams from the country. "But by then the damage 
has been done", recalled Ambassador James Bishop Jr.(4)
All the international and domestic factors, which 
we have tried to discuss, suddenly came together. A vocal 
group of black American politicians, both inside and 
outside Congress, in addition to many white liberals were 
able to present U.S. relations with South Africa as 
tantamount to support for apartheid and a betrayal of 
basic American values of freedom and human equality. 
Immense pressures, stoked by well run campaigns at the 
local state and federal levels, built up "to do something". 
Congress as a unified force started to argue that U.S. 
national interests would best be served by imposing 
economic sanctions against Pretoria. The commercial links 
with South Africa were considered as "fuel for the 
apartheid engine." One of the major driving forces behind 
the congressional enthusiasm, as has been noted, was the 
multi-ethnic composition of the United
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States, which was not shared by any of the South Africa's 
major trading partners. Within the presidency, however, 
there was massive indecision as different factions at 
the top-level struggled for influence and threatened to 
overwhelm Schultz's and Crocker's grip on policy. But 
the basic problem remained that, as Crocker suggested 
in interview, Reagan was "simply not credible on these 
issues. ’’
There was thus both crisis, presidential indecision 
and public pressure, conditions in which we have suggested 
Congress tends to intervene to fill the policy vacuum. 
The Constitution allows Congress to override a presidential 
veto and thus gives the legislature a salience in foreign 
policy-making rare in Western states. But the strength 
of the Executive lies in implementation and knowledge. 
Also Congressmen essentially play to a public gallery, 
a gallery which might be suggested in the United States 
to be notoriously fickle. The influence of the American 
public on foreign policy has often been disregarded. It 
has been argued that public opinion has no place in foreign 
policy-making. But the findings in this study has proved 
that the mid-1980s public pressure changed the course 
of the Reagan administration’s South Africa policy.
The findings in this study further show that there 
seems to be no basic difference in successive U.S. policies 
towards the Republic. What was different was the change 
in strategies, emphasis, philosophy and personnel, rather 
than any basic shift in U.S. national goals in the region. 
All the administrations, with exception of the early Carter
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administration, treated South Africa as an ally in the 
struggle against international Communism. The priorities 
were to ensure that South Africa did not shift into the 
Soviet orbit, that the Soviet Union gain control or access 
to its strategic minerals or be able to disrupt shipping 
lanes in the Indian and the South Atlantic Oceans. Any 
of these would have been a direct challenge to Western 
economic survival. Almost all the administrations of the 
time were concerned about growing violence in the region
which would damage U.S. national interests economic
and military/strategic in the region. They were concerned 
also that continuing crisis in South Africa would produce 
strained relations between the United States and African 
countries in which it had economic and political stakes. 
Further all the administrations openly opposed the 
imposition of economic sanctions against the Republic.
On the policy-making front, major decisions during 
the Nixon administration were usually initiated from the 
White House under the direction of the President's 
Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger. 
In the case of Southern Africa after some broad policy 
framework at the National Security Council (NSC) level, 
was left to lower-echelon officials in the NSC and the 
State Department's Bureau of African Affairs, because 
of the lack of top-level interest in African affairs. 
Throughout the Nixon-Kissinger era the involvement of 
the Defence Department and the Central Intelligence Agency 
was pretty significant in the making of South Africa policy
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because of its geo-strategic location. In addition, the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
also had some role in South Africa policy-making because 
of its interests in the Republic, such as space tracking 
stations.
During the Ford administration, with Henry Kissinger 
as Secretary of State, the 'foreign ministry' was shifted 
away from the White House basement to the Foggy Bottom. 
It was during this time that a high-level interest in 
the State and the Defence Departments and the CIA was 
developed in Angola in 1975. The decision taken by 
Kissinger and his close officials to provide covert 
military support to the Union for the Total Independence
of Angola (UNITA) was resisted in the State Department. 
As a result, Kissinger’s own appointee Nathaniel Davies 
resigned in August 1975 from the post of Assistant
Secretary of African Affairs. "Like John Foster Dulles, 
the former U.S. Secretary of State (1952-59) Kissinger 
neglected the State Department bureaucracy and turned 
to a small group of close associates"(5) concerning foreign 
policy decisions, including Africa.
The Carter administration's policy-making style 
was different from that of its Republican predecessors. 
At least during the administration's first two years in
office normally influential foreign policy-making players, 
such as the Defence Department, the CIA, and the NSC
were kept to a peripheral role in South Africa policy 
formulation. The administration further tightened
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clandestine operations and information sharing of the 
CIA with its South African counterpart. In the State 
Department "Cyrus Vance had limited interest in the 
problems of Southern Africa...he was content to leave 
Southern African problems in the hands of his Deputy 
Secretary of State or Don McHenry"(6), deputy to Ambassador 
Andrew Young, and Assistant Secretary Richard Moose. The
involvement of the President’s National Security Advisor 
Zbigniew Brzezinski and the NSC staff in conduct of South 
Africa policy, at least until the resignation of Ambassador 
Young in 1979 seemed to be marginal as well.
In addition the role of the Carter administration's 
Commerce Department in making of South Africa policy 
seemed to be marginal. For example, in 1978 the 
administration imposed the restrictions on loan capital 
through Export-Import Bank for U.S. companies doing 
business in South Africa. These restrictions were imposed 
without consulting the Commerce Department. This, however, 
was confirmed by Moose in an interview: "Commerce has
never been a very strong department in our government.
And I am sure that's right." The role of the Agriculture
Department, which is concerned about the interests of 
U.S. farmers, had also been peripheral. In the opinion
of Ambassador Sole, the "Commerce and Agriculture 
Departments were considered as South Africa's friends."(7) 
Both Departments were in favour of trade and commercial 
links with the Republic.
It was first time in the history of U.S.-South Africa
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relations that the Labour Department was given response 
by the State Department in policy-making process when 
the administration began to articulate a policy of fair 
employment in the Republic based on Sullivan voluntary
code of conduct for U.S. business in South Africa.(8) 
The Labour Department was a bridge between U.S. companies 
doing business in South Africa and the Department of State 
which in turn "certified to Congress that loan recipient
followed policies of racial integration in their labour 
and management practices."(9) After the passage of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act in 1978 the Energy Department 
also stepped in South Africa policy-making with respect
to nuclear matters.
Although these departments were charged with various
tasks having a foreign policy dimension, it was not
impossible for such departments to affect the detailed
implementation. In Moose’s account
...the Commerce Department would get its
revenge when some of the arms embargo regula­
tions were formalized and published in the
Federal Register, the Commerce Department 
people behind the backs of the lawyers and
against the explicit decision of the
President of the United States inserted
some language that left loopholes to export 
certain kind of computers to South Africa.
But this is Mickey mouse,(10)
In sum, at least until the resignation of the 
Secretary of State Vance, almost all South Africa policy 
decisions were made in the Bureau of African Affairs under 
Assistant Secretary Moose and his close associates.
During the first Reagan term main player involved
in South Africa policy formulation was the State
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Department. Other Executive Departments and agencies 
including the NSC, the Defence and the CIA had a marginal 
impact on the process. In the State Department most of 
the policy work was done within the Bureau of African 
Affairs under Chester Crocker. Unlike the Carter 
administration, which was well-endowed with knowledgeable 
senior officials about Africa Crocker was the only notable 
African specialist appointed at the Assistant Secretary 
level during the Reagan administration. Within the State 
Department "South Africa issue didn't really affect other 
parts of the State. This was not an issue like the Middle 
East peace talks or the callapse of the Soviet Union. 
In this case other parts of the State didn't energize", 
said an official.( 11) During the second Reagan term South 
Africa was going to be more a public issue day-by-day 
in the United States, and eventually decreased only to 
the White House and Congress because of reasons discussed 
in the study.
Future Research
Researching on a period where there is little 
documentary evidence, this study has been based on 
interviews with those who were involved in the 
policy-making process. Further, the study will be helpful 
for researchers interested in the U.S.-South Africa 
policy-making apparatus. The research flowing from the 
results of this project has identified at least two areas 
on which future research could be carried out.
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As the findings in this study point towards the 
conclusion that South Africa policy formulation has been 
usually left in the hands of lower and middle-level 
bureaucrats in the State Department’s Bureau of African 
Affairs during the period under discussion^ -further 
research on this subject from the policy-making angle 
could be carried out by interviewing responsible officials 
of the Bureau of the time from assistant secretaries to 
desk officers. Special attention should be focused on 
desk officers from where the policy papers are initiated. 
The comprehensive data of the Bureau officials has been 
provided in Appendix C of this study.
A second area which still has to be explored in 
detail is the successive South African governments' 
"influence buying" tactics which continued until the very 
end of the de Klerk government. The main focus of this 
campaign, however, had been to influence the U.S. 
bureaucracy and Congress, and to keep an eye on 
anti-apartheid movements. This kind of penetration was 
made possible by the fragmented nature of the U.S. 
political system where lobbies play an important role 
in promoting the political and economic objectives of 
foreign governments in Washington D.C.
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APPENDIX A
Assistant Secretaries of State for African Affairs
NAME RESIDENT APPOINTMENT ENTRY ON DUTY TERM OF APPT.
1. Joseph C.Satterthwaite Mich. Aug. 23, 1958 Sept. 2, 1961 Jan. 31, 1961
2. G.Mennen Williams Mich. Jan. 30, 1961 Feb. 1, 1961 March 23,1966
3. Joseph Palmer II Md. April 1, 1966 April 11, 1966 July 7, 1969
4. David D.Newsom Cal. July 8, 1969 July 17, 1969 Jan. 13, 1974
5. Donald B.Easum Va. Feb.27, 1974 March 18, 1974 Mar. 26, 1975
6. Nathaniel Davis N.J March 17,1975 April 2, 1975 Dec. 18, 1975
7. William E.Schaufele Jr 0 Dec. 11, 1975 Dec. 19, 1975 July 17, 1977
8. Richard M.Moose Ark. June 16, 1977 July 6, 1977 Jan. 16, 1981
9. Chester A.Crocker D.C June 9, 1981 June 9, 1981 Jan. , 1989
10.Herman J.Cohen N-y
11.George E.Moose N-y
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Principal Officers of the Department of
State and U.S. Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1986, p. 7.
CSIS Africa Notes, No., 128, Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, Washington, D.C., September 30, 1991.
CSIS Africa Notes, No., 153, Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, Washington, D.C., October 1993.
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APPENDIX B
Africa Specialists and Policy-makers 
1976-94
THE FORD ADMINISTRATION
1. Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State.
2. Donald Easum, Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs, 1974-75.
3. William Schaufele, Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs, 1975-77.
4. Lord Winston, Director Policy Planning Staff.
THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION
1. Andrew Young, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, 
1977-79.
2. David Newsom, Under Secretary of Political 
Affairs. (Newsom served as Assistant Secretary of 
State for African Affairs under the Nixon 
administration).
3. Richard M.Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs, 1977-81.
4. Anthony Lake, Director Policy Planning Staff.
5. Donald McHenry, Principal Deputy to Ambassador Andrew 
Young.
6. Ambassador William Bowdler, Director of the State 
Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Bowdler 
served as U.S. Ambassador to South Africa.
7. William Maynes, Assistant Secretary of State for 
International Organizations.
8. Frank Wisner, Deputy Executive Secretary, Department 
of State.
9. Donald Petterson, Southern Africa Office of the State 
Department. (Petterson helped draft Kissinger’s 
Lusaka speech of April 1976, in which he talked 
about the majority rule in Southern Africa).
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10. Tom Thorn, South Africa expert.
11. Paul Henz, Horn of Africa.
12. William Quandt, Handled North African issues.
13. David Aaron, Chief aides of Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
President Carter’s National Security Adviser.
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
Department of State (1986)
1. Dean Curran, Special Assistant for Africa to Under 
Secretary of State for Political Affairs.
2. Nelson Ledslcy, and Richard Kauzlarich, African 
Specialists, Policy Planning Council.
3. Yvett Wong, Africa Specialist, Bureau of Political/ 
Military Affairs (PM).
4. Anthoney Dalsimer, Director, and Martin Lowen Roph, 
Deputy, Office of Analysis for Africa, Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research (INR).
Division Chiefs: Lars Hydle: Central and West Africa
Mary S.Seasword: Southern Africa 
Lars Hydle: Eastern Africa.
5. Elizabeth Spiro, Legislative Management Officer for 
Africa, Bureau of Congressional Relations (H).
6. Steve Maloney, African Specialist, Bureau of Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (HA)
7. John Willet, African Specialist, Bureau of 
International Organization Affairs.
8. Nancy H.Ely, Edward Cummings, and Linda Clarizo, 
Assistant Legal Advisers for Africa, Legal Adviser 
(L).
9. Mark L.Edelman, Assistant Administrator for Africa. 
Deputies: Lois Richards, Larry Sair, and Alexander 
Love, Agency for International Development (AID).
10. Leonard Lefknow, African Director, John Garner Deputy, 
and James Haley, Policy Director, U.S. Information 
Agency (USIA),
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Bureau of African Affairs (A/F)
11. Robert Cabelly, Ned McMahon, and Larry Palmer, Special
Assistants to Ghester A.Crocker, Assistant Secretary 
of State for African Affairs.
12. Chas W.Freeman Jr., Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary.
13. James K.Bishop Jr., Deputy Asistant Secretary.
14. William B.Robertson, Deputy Assistant Secretary.
15. Roy Stacy, Deputy Assistant Secretary.
16. J.Douglas Holladay, Director, and Allan Van Egmond, 
Deputy Director, South Africa Working Group (AF/SAWG).
17. James B.Morgan, Executive Director, and Jack
M.Bryant, Deputy, Office of the Executive Director 
(AF/EX)
Post Management Officers: Michael J.Hinton, Raymond 
Boneski, Harry Young Jr., Frank Coutler, and Donald 
Rek.
18. Nancy E.Morgan, Director, Beatrice Russell, Deputy, 
and Mary Swann, Public Affairs Office, Public Affairs 
Staff (AF/P).
19. David Passage, Director; Richard Tierney, Deputy;
Jean Gardner, Bernadette Allen, Raymond Pardon, 
International Relations Officers; Lt. Col. Charles 
Snyder, Political/Military Adviser, and Gregory 
Bradford, Special Security Assistance, Regional Affairs 
(AF/RA)
20. E.Gibson Lampher, Director Southern African Affairs 
(AF/S).
Deputy Director: Larry Napper.
Country Officers: Gerard Gallucci (Angola), Barbra 
Hughes (Botswana), Kenneth Kolb (Lesotho), Robyn 
Hinson Jones (Malawi), Greg Fergin (Mozambique),
Nambia, vacant, Ashley Wills (South Africa), Robyn 
Hinson-Jones (Swaziland), Robyn Hinson-Jones (Zambia), 
Kenneth Kolb (Zimbabwe).
21. Edward L.Killham, Director Central African Affairs 
(AF/C).
Deputy Director: Vittorio Brod.
Country Officers: Judith B.Cefkin (Burundi), T.Dennis 
Reece (Cameroon), Judith B.Cefkin (Cen, African Rep.), 
Robert Ayling (Chad), Russell L.Frisbie (Congo),
T.Dennis Reece (Gaboon), Russell L.Frisbie (Equatorial
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Guinea), Judith B. Cefkin (Rwanda), Jack Audert 
(Zaire).
22. David J.Fischer, Director East African Affairs (AF/E). 
Deputy Director: Robert E.Bribbin II.
Country Officers: Eunice S.Reddick (Comoros), Jean 
Szymanski (Djibouti), Jean Szymanski (Ethiopia), Steve 
Eisenbraun (Kenya), Eunice S.Reddick (Madagascar), 
Eunice S.Reddick (Mauritius), Dale Dean (Seychelles), 
Dale Dean (Somalia), Eric H.Madison (Sudan), Eunice
S.Reddick (Tanzania), Steve Eisenbraun (Uganda).
23. Howard K. Walker, Director West African Affairs 
(AF/W).
Deputy Director: David Halsted.
Country Officers: Hugh F.Williams (Benin), Deborah 
M.Odell (Burkina Faso), John O.Cook (Cape Verde), 
Anthony Benesch (Gambia), John A,Hedges (Guinea),
John O.Cook (Guinea-Bissau), John A.Hadges (Cote 
d fIvoire), Constance J.Freeman (Liberia), Deborah 
M.Odell (Mali), Anthony Benesch (Niger), Robert 
A.Proctor (Nigeria), Ronald A.Trigg (Sierra Leone), 
Anthony Benesch (Senegal), Hugh F.Williams (Togo), 
Anthony Benesch (Western Sahara).
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION
Department of State
1. Karl Hofman, Special Assistant for Africa to Under­
secretary for Political Affairs.
2. Robert Gosende, Director Office of African Affairs,
U.S. Information Agency.
3. Scot M.Spangler, Assistant Administrator for Africa, 
Agency for International Development (AID).
4. Ross Wilson, Special Assistant for Africa, Deputy 
Secretary of State.
5. Marc Nicholson, African Specialist, Bureau of Political 
and Military Affairs (PM).
6. Robert Cabelly, Regional Specialist Africa, Policy 
Planning Staff (S/P).
7. John Byerly, Assistant Legal Adviser for Africa.
8. Llyod George, Legislative Management Officer for 
African Affairs, Legislative Affairs.
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9. Vincent Farley, Director Office of Analysis for 
Africa, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR).
10. Raymond Pardon, Division Chief East, Central and 
West Africa, Office of Analysis for Africa, Bureau 
of Intelligence and Research.
11. Richard Ristaino, Division Chief Southern Africa, 
Office of Analysis for Africa, Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research.
12. Steve Eisenbraum, African Specialist, Bureau of Inter­
national Organization Affairs (10).
13. Gary Fuller, Regional Officer Africa, Bureau of Human
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.
14. Sheila Gwaltney, Regional Officer Africa, Bureau of 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.
Bureau of African Affairs
15. Herman J,Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs.
16. Alison Rosenberg, Deputy Assistant Secretary.
17. Jeffrey Davidow, Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary.
18. Leonard H. Robinson Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary.
19. Robert G.Houdek, Deputy Assistant Secretary.
20. F.Allen ("Tex") Harris, Director Office of Regional 
Affairs.
21. Clyde Bishop, Deputy Director Office of Regional 
Affairs.
22. Charles Snyder, Senior political-Military Affairs 
Adviser, Office of Regional Affairs.
23. Robert Hess, Political-Military Affairs Adviser,
Office of Regional Affairs.
24. Peter R.Chaveas, Director Office of Southern African 
Affairs.
Deputy Directors: Richard Roth and Jim Carraghar.
Country Officers: Lois Cescarini (Angola), David Fetter 
(Botswana), David Fetter (Lesotho), Moosa Valli 
(Malawi), William Jackson (Mozambique), Barbara 
Bowie-Whiteman (Namibia), Gerard Gallucci, Mary Grace 
McGeehan,and James Bond (South Africa), David Fetter 
(Swaziland), Andrew Parker (Zimbabwe).
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25. Alan R.McKee, Director Office of Anglophone and 
Lusophone West African Affairs.
Deputy Director: Ollie Anderson.
Country Officers: Kevin Richardson (Cape Verde), Karl 
Olson (Gambia), Kevin Richardson (Ghana), Kevin 
Richardson (Guinea-Bissau), Charles Gurney (Liberia), 
Leon Weintraub (Nigeria), Karl Olson (Deputy country 
officer Nigeria), Karl Olson (Sierra Leone).
26. Robert M,Pringle, Director Office of Central African 
Affairs.
Deputy Director: Robert C.Porter Jr.
Country Officers: Carol Fuller (Burundi), Janet Beilc 
(Chad), Carol Fuller (Rwanda), Joseph Gregoire (Zaire).
27. Mark Johnson, Director Office of East African Affairs. 
Deputy Director: James Ledesma.
Country Officers: Lora Berg (Comoros), Lora Berg 
(Diego Garcia), Herb Thomas (Djibouti), Gennie Pratt 
(Ethiopia), Lucien Vandenbrouke (Kenya), Lora Berg 
(Mauritius), Gary Gray (Seychelles), Herb Thomas 
(Somalia), Gary Gray (Sudan), Lora Berg (Tanzania), 
Lucien Vandenbroucke (Uganda).
28. William Dameron, Director Economic Policy Staff.
29. Lawrence Garufi, Director Public Affairs.
30. Andrew Winter, Executive Director Office of the Exec­
utive Director.
THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION
Department of State
1. Richard M.Moose, Under Secretary for Management.
2. John Hicks (acting), Assistant Administrator for 
Africa.
3. Bruce E,Thomas, Special Assistant for Africa, Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs.
4. Lionel C.Johnson, Policy Planning Staff.
5. Vincent Farley, Director Office of Analysis for 
Africa, Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
6. Janean Mann, Division Chief East, Central, and West
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Africa, Office of Analysis for Africa, Bureau of
Intelligence and Research.
7. Richard Ristaino, Division Chief Southern Africa,
Office of Analysis for Africa, Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research.
Bureau of African Affairs
8. George E.Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs.
9. Robert Cabelly, Adviser to Assistant Secretary,
10. Prudence Bushnell, Deputy Assistant Secretary.
11. Edward Brynn, Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary.
12. Peter R.Chaveas, Director Office of West African 
Affairs,
Deputies: Jacquelyn Briggs (Francophone), and
Jeff Millington (Lusophone).
Country Officers: Timothy Andrew (Nigeria), Gayleatha
Brown (Guinea, Mauritania, Senegal, Western Sahara), 
William Jackson (Gambia, Sierra Leone), Geeta Pasi 
(Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger), Ann Syrett (Benin, Togo).
13. April Glaspie, Director Office of Southern African 
Affairs .
Deputies: Martin Brennan, and Dan Mozena.
Country Officers: Philip Egger (Malawi, Zambia), Dennis 
Hankins (Angola), Mary Elizabeth Hayas (Botswana, 
Lesotho, Swaziland), Robert P.Jackson (Zimbabwa),
Sue Keogh-Fisher (Officer-in-Charge for South Africa), 
Deborah Malac (South Africa, Economic/Sanctions),
Chris Riche (Mozambique), Alan Yu (South Africa, Human 
Rights/Visas).
14. Arlene Render, Director Office of Central African 
Affairs.
Deputy: Reed Fendrick.
Country Officers: Kevin Auston (Burundi, Rwanda),
Mary E.Grandfield (Central African Republic, Chad), 
Steven A.Honley (Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea), Lori 
Magnusson (Congo, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe), 
Terrence P.McCulley (Zaire).
15. David Shinn, Director Office of East African Affairs. 
Deputy: Raymond J.Pardon.
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Country Officers; Ted Andrews (Djibouti, Somalia), 
George Colvin (Eritrea, Ethiopia), Joe Fishbein 
(Sudan), Oliver Griffith (Comoros, Diego Garcia, 
Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Tanzania), Chris 
Wilson (Kenya, Uganda).
Office of National Security Affairs (NSC)
16. Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs. (Lake resigned in protest because 
of his differences with Henry Kissinger over the U.S. 
invasion of Cambodia. He later became the Director
of the Carter administration's Policy Planning Staff)
17. Samuel R.Berger, Deputy Assistant to the President 
for National Security Affairs.
18. Nancy Soderberg, Special Assistant to the President 
for National Security Affairs and Staff Director of 
the National Security Council.
19. Jennifer Ward, Special Assistant to the President 
and Senior Director for African Affairs.
Department of Defence
20. Les Aspin, Secretary of Defence.
21. William Perry, Deputy Secretary of Defence.
22. Frank Wisner, Under Secretary for Policy.
23. Charls W.Freeman, Assistant Secretary Regional 
Security Affairs.
24. Morton Halperin, Assistant Secretary Democracy and 
Peace-Keeping.
25. Lt. General Thomas G.Rhame, Director Defence Security 
Assistance Agency.
26. Col. Victor Rapheal, Director Middle East, Africa, 
American Division, Defence Security Assistance Agency
27. Ann Smoot, Security Assistance Analysis (Africa), 
Defence Security Assistance Agency.
28. James L.Woods, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defence
29. Vincent D.Kern, Director Africa Region.
30. Bernd McConnell, Deputy Director and Assistant for 
Southern Africa.
31. Lt. Col. Mike Harvin, Assistant for Central Africa.
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32. Therasa Whelan, Assistant for West Africa.
33. LTC. Mike Johnson, Assistant for East Africa.
34. Major Chuck Ilcins, Assistant for Somalia.
35. Major Pete Jordan, Policy Analysis.
36. General John Shalikashvili, Chairman The Joint Chiefs 
of Staff.
37. Richard C.Macke, Director The Joint Staff.
38. Lt . General James R. Clapper, Director Defence 
Intelligence Agency (DIA).
39. J.J.Sloan, Director, Directorate for Policy Support, 
DIA.
40. William G.Thom, Defence Intelligence Officer Africa, 
DIA.
41. William T.Sloakley, Deputy Defence Intelligence Officer 
Africa, DIA.
42. Michael R.Kramer, Director RADM, Current Intelligence, 
Joint Staffs and Command (J-2),
43. Geralde Dye, Director National Military Joint 
Intelligence Centre, J-2,
44. Lt. General Barry R.McCaffrey, Director Strategic 
Plans and Policy (J-5).
45. Frank L.Bowman, Deputy Director Political-Military 
Affairs, J-5.
46. Col. Perry F.Baltimore, Middle East, Africa, Division 
Chief, Political-Military Affairs, J-5.
47. Lt. Col. Alison Poitter, Africa Branch Chief, Political 
Military Affairs.
Department of Commerce
48. Sally K.Miller, Director Office of Africa.
49. Gerald M.Feldman, Deputy Director, Office of Africa.
Sources:
1. Who’s Who, and Where: A Guide to Key Personnel in 
U.S.-African Relations, No., 153, October 1993, 
Center for Strategic and International Studies
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(CSIS), Washington, D.C.
2. Who’s Who and Where: A Guide to Key Personnel in 
U.S.-African Relations, No., 128, September 30, 1991, 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 
Washington, B.C.
3. Who's Who and Where: A Guide to Key Personnel in 
U.S.-African Diplomatic Relations, No., 64, November 
22, 1986, Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS), Washington, D.C.
4. Africa Confidential, Vol., 19, No. 10, May 12, 1978,
PP. 5-7.
5. Africa Confidential, Vol., 21, No., 17, August 13,
1980, pp. 1-2.
6. Christopher Coker, ’The United States and South Africa, 
1968-1985: Constructive Engagement and Its Critics’, 
Duke University Press, Durham, 1986, pp. XIII-XV.
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APPENDIX C
Foreign Affairs Responsibilities of Standing and Select Committees in 
the House of Representatives and Senate
SENATE
COMMITTEE
YEAR OF 
ESTB.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
RESPONSIBILITY
HOUSE
COMMITTEE
YEAR OF 
ESTB.
Agriculture 1825 Foreign agriculture 
policy and assistance
Agriculture 1820
Appropriations 1867 Appropriation of reve 
nues, rescission of 
appropriations.
Appropriations 1865
Armed Services 1816 Defence, National 
security aspects of 
nuclear energy.
Armed Services 1822
Banking, Housing, 
Urban Affairs....... 1913
Foreign commerce, in£l 
economic policy,export 
and foreign trade 
promotion
Banking, Finance 
Urban Affairs,..... 1865
Budget 1975 Budgetary matters Budget 1975
Commerce, Science 
and Transportation.. 1816
Merchant marine, 
marine fisheries, 
oceans, coastal zone 
management, nonmilit­
ary science, and 
aeronautics
Merchant Marines 
and Fisheries..... 1887
Energy and Natural 
Resources.......... 1816 Int’l energy affairs, 
global climate changes 
nonmilitary aspects 
of nuclear energy
Energy and Commerce 1975
3
Environments and 
Public Works........ n.a Environmental policy 
ocean dumping, envir- 
omental aspects of 
outer continental 
shelf lands
Science and 
Astronautics...... 1958
Finance 1816 Revenue measures, 
customs, foreign 
trade agreements, 
tarrifs,import quotas
Ways and Means 1802
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CONTINUED
Foreign Relations 1816 Relations with forei­
gn nations, treaties 
executive agreements 
int’l organizations, 
foreign assistance, 
intervention abroad, 
declaration of war, 
terrorism
Foreign Affairs 1822
Governmental
Ifffl-j TR. . . .......... 1842 Organization and 
reorganization of the 
executive branch, 
organization and 
management of nuclear 
export policy
Government 
Operations......... 1816
Intelligence* 1976 Intelligence 
activities, covert 
operations
Intelligence* 1977
Judiciary 1816 Immigration and 
refugees
Judiciary 1813
Labour and Human 
Resources
1869 Regulation of 
foreign labourers
Education and Laboui: 1867
* Select Committees
Sources: Charles W.Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R.Wittkopf, 'American Foreign Policy:
Pattern and Process’, Fourth Edition, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 
1991, p. 423.
Guide to Congress, 4th Edition, Congressional Quarterly Inc., 
Washington, D.C., 1991, p. 452.
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APPENDIX D
Senate and House Sub-Committees on Africa
SENATE SUB-COMMITTEE ON AFRICA OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE 
1976-1992
HOUSE SUB-COMMITTEE ON AFRICA OF 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 
1976-1992
94th Congress (1975-1976) 94th Congress (1975-1976)
Dick Clark of Iowa 
James B.Pearson of Kensas
Not Available
95th Congress (1977-1978) 95th Congress (1977-1978)
Dick Clark of Iowa 
James B.Pearson of Kensas
Charles C.Diggs Jr. of Michigan 
Charles W.Whalen Jr. of Ohio
96th Congress (1979-1980) 96th Congress (1979-1980)
George S.McGovern of South Dakota 
S.I.Hayakawa of California
Stephen J. Solarz of New York 
William F.Goodling of Pennsylvania
97th Congress (1981-1982) 97th Congress (1981-1982)
Nancy L.Kassebaum of Kensas 
Paul E.Tsongas of Massachusetts
Howard Wolpe of Michigan 
William F.Goodling of Pennsylvania
98th Congress (1983-1984) 98th Congress (1983-1984)
Nancy L.Kassebaum of Kensas 
Charles McMathias Jr. of Maryland 
Charles H.Percy of Illinois 
Paul E.Tsongas of Massachusetts 
Christopher J.Dodd of Connecticut
Howard Wolpe of Michigan 
George W.Crockett Jr. of Michigan 
Howard L,Berman of California 
Harry M.Reid of Nevada 
Edward F.Feighan of Ohio 
Ted Weiss of New York 
Toby Roth of Wisconsin 
Ed Zschan of California
99th Congress (1985-1986) 99th Congress (1985-1986)
Nancy L.Kassebaum of Kensas 
Jesse McC Mathias Jr. of Maryland 
Larry Pressler of South Dakota 
John F.Kerry of Massachusetts 
Paul S.Sarbanes of Maryland 
Claibore Pell of Rhode Island
Howard Wolpe of Michigan 
George W.Crockett of Michigan 
Stephen J.Soralz of New York 
Howard L,Berman of California 
Ted Weiss of New York 
Robert Garcia of New York 
Mark D.Siljander of Michigan 
Michael DeWine of Ohio 
Dan Burton of Indiana 
Robert K.Dornan of California
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100th Congress (1987-1988) 100th Congress (1987-1988)
Paul Simon of Illinois 
Terry Sanford of North Carolina 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York 
Nancy L.Kassebaum of Kensas 
Jesse Helms of North Carolina
101st Congress (1989-1990)
Paul Simon of Illinois 
Alan Craston of California 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York 
Nancy L.Kassebaum of Kensas 
Connie Mack of Florida
102nd Congress (1991-1992)
Paul Simon of Illinois 
Terry Sanford of North Carolina 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York 
Nancy L.Kassebaum of Kensas 
Jesse Helms of North Carolina
Source: Congressional Directories, U.S.
D.C.
Howard Wolpe of Michigan
Geo W.Croclcette Jr. of Michigan
James McClure of North Carolina
James H.Bilbray of Nevada
Fofo I.F.Sunia of American Samoa
Wayne Owens of Utah
Dan Burton of Indiana
Donald E.(Buz) Lukens of Ohio
Ben Blaz of Guam
Robert K.Dornan of California
101st Congress (1989-1990)
Howard Wolpe
George W.Crockett Jr. of Michigan 
Mervyn M.Dymally of California 
Donald M.Payne of New York 
Eliot L.Engel of New York 
Frank McCloskey of Indiana 
Dan Burton of Indiana 
Donald E. (Buz) Lukens of Ohio 
Amo Houghton of New York 
Ben Blaz of Guam
102nd Congress (1991-1992)
Mervyn M.Dymally of California 
Howard Wolpe of Michigan 
Jaime B.Fuster of Puerto Rico 
Stephen J.Solarz of New York 
Edward F.Feighan of Ohio 
Donald M.Payne of New Jersey 
Dan Burton of Indiana 
Ben Garrido Blaz of Guam 
Amo Houghton of New York 
Toby Roth of Wisconsin
Government Printing Office, Washington,
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APPENDIX E
Operating Mines of Strategic Minerals in South Africa as at
January 1983
Mine Location Material
Mapuchs Transvaal Vanadium
Hotazel Cape Town Manganese
Lohathla Cape Town Manganese
Mamatwan Cape Town Manganese
Mancrop Mines Cape Town Manganese
Middleplaats Cape Town Manganese
Wessels Cape Town Manganese
Kilolcong Transvaal Chromium
Grasvally Transvaal Chromium
Grootbroom Transvaal Chromium
Grouthoek Transvaal Chromium
Hendriksplaats Transvaal Chromium
Henry Gould Transvaal Chromium
Jagdiust Transvaal Chromium
Millsell Transvaal Chromium
Mooinooi Transvaal Chromium
Nthuane Bophuthatswana Chromium
Ruighuek Bophuthatswana Chromium
Strydfontein Bophuthatswana Chromium
Winterveld Transvaal Chromium
Szartkop Transvaal Platinum
Amandelbult Transvaal Platinum
Atok Transvaal Platinum
Bafokeng North Bophuthatswana Platinum
Bafokeng South Bophuthatswana Platinum
Rustenburg Bophuthatswana Platinum
Union Bophuthatswana Platinum
Western Platinum Transvaal Platinum
Wildebeestfontein- Bophuthatswana Platinum
Nor th Bophuthatswana Platinum
Brits (Ucar) Bophuthatswana Vanadium
Source: Rae Weston, ’Strategic Materials: A World Surv
Groom Helm, London, 1984, pp. 160 -161 .
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APPENDIX F
Operating Mines of Strategic Minerals in the United States
as at January 1983
Mine Location Material Produced
Sterling New Jersey Manganese
Uravan Colorado Vanadium
Major New Projects in the United States known at' January 1983
Company
Anaconda
Manville Corp./ 
Chevron
California Nickle 
Union Carbide/ 
Hecla
Location
Stillwater, 
Montana 
Stillwater, 
Montana 
Gasquet M t . 
Moab,
Utah
Material
Platinum
Platinum
Chromium
Vanadium
Source: Rae Weston, ’Strategic Materials: A World Survey’,
Croom Helm, London, 1984, pp. 156-164.
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APPENDIX G
Uranium Enrichment' Exports to South Africa 
For SAFARI-I Research Reactor
The following is list of shipments of highly enriched 
uranium supplied to South Africa for the operation of 
the SAFARI-I research reactor. Material supplied by the 
United Kingdom Atomic Energy Agency (UKAEA) was of U.S. 
origin. It was originally shipped to the United Kingdom 
especially for fabrication into SAFARI-I elements, and 
authorized by the United States.
FABRICATOR/SHIPPERDATE U U-234
February 1965 4.315 3.874
May 1965 3.446 3.096
October 1967 2.526 2.273
November 1967 8.299 7.469
December 1967 2.541 2.286
December 1969 7.558 6.806
June 1970 5.767 5.190
December 1970 .976 .878
July 1971 13.334 12.001
September 1971 .663 .596
May 1972 .971 .874
December 1972 4.641 4.177
June 1973 2.139 1.925
August 1973 3.167 2.850
April 1973 .300 . 270
October 1973 3.089 2.780
January 1974 5.217 4.696
April 1974 3.691 3.322
May 1974 3.092 2 . 782
June 1974 3.530 3.177
November 1974 4.299 4.006
December 1974 3.437 3. 203
March 1975 3.444 3.203
April 1975 4.879 4.552
Total 95.320 86.288
Less Returns (34.251) (28.154
Less Burn up (11.473) (13.897
thru 12/31/73
Less Burn up ( 5.473) ( 6.460
12/31/75 at
0.333 kg/ mo
Inventory 44.263 k .g37.777
Babcock and Wilcox 
Babcock and Wilcox 
UKAEA,Harwell,U.K.
U.S. Nuclear
(May 22, 1975)
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Source: U.S. Congress Senate, Hearings Before the
Committee on Government Operations’ 94th Congress 1st
Session, April 24, 30 and May 1, 1975, U.S. Government
Printing Office Washington, D.C, 1975, p.68 and p.100.
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APPENDIX H
I. Human Rights Treaties and Agreements to Which the 
U.S. is a Party .... ..........................
1. The United Nations Charter, signed June 26, 1945,
entered into force October, 24, 1945.
2. Slavery Convention, concluded September 25, 1926, 
entered into force March 9, 1927. Entered into force 
for U.S. March 21, 1929.
3. Protocol Amending the Slavery Convention, entered 
into force December 7, 1953. Entered into force
for U.S. March 7, 1956.
4. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery,
the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices 
Similar to Slavery, done September 7, 1956. Entered 
into force for U.S. December 6, 1967.
5. Inter-American Convention on the Granting of 
Political Rights to Women, opened for signature 
May 2, 1948, entered into force March 17, 1949. 
Entered into force for U.S. May 24, 1976.
6. Convention on the Political Rights of Women, opened 
for signature March 31, 1953, entered into force 
July 7, 1954. Entered into force for U.S. July 7, 
1976.
7. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces 
in the Field (Geneva I) opened for signature August 
12, 1949, entered into force October 21, 1950.
Entered into force for U.S. February 2, 1956.
8. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members 
of Armed Forces at Sea (Geneva II), opened for 
signature August 12, 1949. Entered into force for 
U.S. February 2, 1956.
9. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War (Geneva III), opened for signature 
August 12, 1949, entered into force October 21 1950. 
Entered into force for U.S. February 2, 1956.
10. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva IV), opened 
for signature August 12, 1949, entered into force 
October 21, 1950. Entered into force for U.S. 
February 2, 1956.
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11. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done
January 31, 1967, entered into force October 4,
1967. Entered into force for U.S. November 1, 1968.
12. Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the
Organization of American States, opened for 
signature February 27, 1967. Entered into force
February 27, 1970.
13. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, December 9, 1948, entered into
force January 12, 1951. Entered into force for U.S. 
February 23, 1989.
II. Human Rights Treaties and Agreements Which the U.S. 
Has Signed But Not Ratified ........................
14. Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, 
adopted June 25, 1957. Entered ito force January
17, 1959.
15. Convention on the Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age 
for Marriage and Registration of Marriages, opened 
for signature December 10, 1962. Entered into force
December 9, 1964.
16. International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted December 
21, 1965. Entered into force January 4, 1969.
17. International Convention on Civil and Political 
Rights, adopted December 16, 1966. Entered into 
force March 23, 1976.
18. International Convention on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, adopted December 16, 1966. Entered 
into force January 3, 1976.
19. American Convention on Human Rights, opened for 
signature November 22, 1969. Entered into force 
July 18, 1978.
20. Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened 
for signature December 12, 1977. Entered into force 
December 7, 1978.
21. Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 
opened for signature December 12, 1977. Entered 
into force December 7, 1978.
360
22. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, adopted December 18, 
1979. Entered into force September 3, 1981.
III. Human Rights Treaties and Agreements Which the U.S. 
Has Not Signed........................................
23. Inter-American Convention on the Granting of Civil
Rights to Women, opened for signature May 2, 1948.
Entered into force April 22, 1949.
24. Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Rights to Organize (ILO No. 87), 
adopted July 9, 1948, Entered into force July 4,
1950.
25. Convention Concerning the Application of the
Principles of the Rights to Organize and to Bargain 
Collectively (ILO No. 98), adopted July 1, 1949. 
Entered into force July 18, 1951.
26. Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in
Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution 
and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of 
Others, adopted December 2, 1949. Entered into force 
July 25, 1951.
27. Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men
and Women Workers for Work of equal Value, adopted 
June 29, 1951. Entered into force May 23, 1953.
28. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened 
for signature July 28, 1951. Entered into force 
April 22, 1954.
29. Convention on the International Rights of Correction, 
opened for signature March 31, 1953. Entered into 
force August 24, 1962.
30. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons, done September 28, 1954. Entered into force 
June 6, 1960.
31. Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, 
done February 20, 1957. Entered into force August 
11, 1958.
32. Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of 
Employment and Occupation (ILO No. Ill), adopted 
June 25, 1958. Entered into force June 15, 1960.
33. Convention Against Discrimination in Education, 
adopted December 14, 1960. Entered into force May 
22, 1962.
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34. Convention Concerning Equality of Treatment of 
Nationals and Non-Nationals in Social Security (ILO 
No. 118), adopted June 28, 1962. Entered into force 
April 25, 1964.
35. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 
concluded August 30, 1961. Entered into force 
December 13, 1975.
36. Convention Concerning Employment Policy (ILO No.
122), adopted July 9, 1964. Entered into force July 
15, 1966.
37. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, adopted December 16,
1966. Entered into force March 23, 1976.
38. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory 
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against 
Humanity, adopted November 26, 1968. Entered into 
force November 11, 1970.
39. Convention Concerning Protection and Facilities to 
be Afforded to Worker’s Representatives in the 
Undertaking (ILO No. 135), adopted June 23, 1971. 
Entered into force June 30, 1973.
40. Convention Concerning Basic Aims and Standards of 
Social Policy (ILO No. 117), adopted June 22, 1964. 
Entered into force April 23, 1964.
41. Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour 
(ILO No. 29), adopted June 28, 1930. Entered into 
force May 1, 1932.
42. International Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, adoptd November 
30, 1973. Enterd into force July 18, 1976.
42.1 International Convention against Apartheid in Sports, 
adopted December 10, 1985. Entered into force April 
3, 1988.
42.2 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish 
Torture, opened for signature December 9, 1985. 
Entered into force February 28, 1987.
42.3 Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted 
November 20, 1989.
42.4 Second Optional Protocal to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming 
at the abolition of the Death Penalty, adopted 
December 15, 1989.
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42.5 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on 
Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, opened for signature November 17,
1988.
Source: Richard B. Lillich, ’International Human Rights 
Instruments', Williams Hein Company, New York, 1990.
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APPENDIX I
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986
Title III Measures by the United States to Undermine
Apartheid
Sec. 301. Prohibition on the importation of krugerrands.
Sec. 302. Prohibition on the importation of military
articles.
Sec. 303. Prohibition on the importation of products 
from parastatal organizations.
Sec. 304. Prohibition on computer exports to South Africa
Sec. 305. Prohibition on loans to the Government of South
Africa.
Sec. 306. Prohibition on air transportation with South 
Africa.
Sec. 307. Prohibition on nuclear trade with South Africa.
Sec. 308. Government of South Africa bank accounts.
Sec. 309. Prohibition on importation of uranium and coal
from South Africa.
Sec. 310. Prohibition on new investment in South Africa.
Sec. 311. Termination of certain provisions.
Sec. 312. Policy toward violence and terrorism.
Sec. 313. Termination of tax treaty and protocol.
Sec. 314. Prohibition on United States Government procure­
ment from South Africa.
Sec. 315. Prohibition on the promotion of United States 
tourism in South Africa.
Sec. 316. Prohibition on United States Government
assistance to, investment in, or subsidy for 
trade with, South Africa.
Sec. 317. Prohibition on sale or export of items on
Munition list.
Sec. 318. Munitions list sales, notification.
Sec. 319, Prohibition on importation of South African
agricultural products and food.
Sec. 320. Prohibition on importation of iron and steel.
Sec. 321. Prohibition on exports of crude oil and
petroleum products.
Sec. 322. Prohibition on cooperation with armed forces 
of South Africa.
Sec. 323. Prohibition on sugar imports.
Source: U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Anti-
Apartheid Act of 1986, 99th Congress, 2nd Session, 
June 10, 1986, Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C., 1986, p. 21.
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